A quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the National Endowment for Democracy by Hale, Eric T.
Louisiana State University
LSU Digital Commons
LSU Doctoral Dissertations Graduate School
2003
A quantitative and qualitative evaluation of the
National Endowment for Democracy
Eric T. Hale
Louisiana State University and Agricultural and Mechanical College
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.lsu.edu/gradschool_dissertations
Part of the Political Science Commons
This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Graduate School at LSU Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in
LSU Doctoral Dissertations by an authorized graduate school editor of LSU Digital Commons. For more information, please contactgradetd@lsu.edu.
Recommended Citation








A QUANTITATIVE AND QUALITATIVE EVALUATION OF THE  











Submitted to the Graduate Faculty of the 
Louisiana State University and  
Agricultural and Mechanical College  
in partial fulfillment of the  
requirements for the degree of  














Eric T. Hale 
B.A., Hendrix College, 1994 
M.A., Louisiana State University, 2001 
December 2003 





CHAPTER 1.  PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC 
FREEDOM THROUGH UNITED STATES FOREIGN AID..............1 
Introduction........................................................................................................1 
1950s – Containing the Soviets..........................................................................2 
1960s – Kennedy’s Modernization ....................................................................3 
1970s – Détente and Human Rights...................................................................7 
1980s – The “Re-Freeze” and the Thaw............................................................9 
1990 and Beyond – Freedom Promotion Reigns .............................................12 
Conclusion .......................................................................................................15 
 
CHAPTER 2.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL  
ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY................................................19 
Introduction......................................................................................................19 
NED’s Origin ...................................................................................................19 
What Was Created ...........................................................................................20 
NED’s Relationship with the CIA ...................................................................25 
NED’s History .................................................................................................26 
The Other “Project Democracy”..........................................................26 
France?.................................................................................................28 
1988 Chilean Plebiscite........................................................................29 
1989 Nicaraguan Election....................................................................30 
1994 Authorization Fight.....................................................................36 
Debates Surrounding NED ..............................................................................38 
Interference in the Politics of Other Countries ....................................38 
A Separate Right-Wing Foreign Policy ...............................................40 
Promoting Freedom or U.S. Interests ..................................................41 
Democratic Ethnocentrism...................................................................42 
NED Success........................................................................................43 





CHAPTER 3.  A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE  
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY’S  
GRANT MAKING PROGRAM, 1990-1999 ......................................48 
Introduction......................................................................................................48 
Decade Overview.............................................................................................49 





CHAPTER 4.  THE DETERMINANTS OF  
NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  
GRANT RECIPIENTS AND HOW MUCH THEY  




Independent Variables-of-Interest ...................................................................90 
Control Variables .............................................................................................91 
Difference of Means Test Results....................................................................95 
Regression Results .........................................................................................100 
Discussion of Results.....................................................................................106 
Conclusion .....................................................................................................110 
 
CHAPTER 5.  A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT  
OF NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  




Factors Associated with Democracy and Economic Freedom ......................118 
Control Variables ...........................................................................................120 
Independent Variable-of-Interest ...................................................................122 
Difference of Means Test Results..................................................................123 
Regression Results .........................................................................................128 
Discussion of Results.....................................................................................130 
Conclusion .....................................................................................................135 
 
CHAPTER 6.  THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  
IN NICARAGUA, 1990-1999...........................................................136 
Introduction....................................................................................................136 
Political and Economic History .....................................................................136 
Major Political and Economic Freedom Issues of the 1990s.........................139 
Civilian-Military Relations ................................................................140 
The Rule of Law ................................................................................141 
The Judiciary......................................................................................142 
The Media ..........................................................................................142 
Labor Unions .....................................................................................143 
NED Activity in Nicaragua during the 1990s................................................144 
Overview of NED Activity in Nicaragua by Subject Area............................149 








Other Subject Areas ...........................................................................156 
Discussion......................................................................................................156 
 
CHAPTER 7.  THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  
IN CHINA, 1990-1999 ......................................................................164 
Introduction....................................................................................................164 
Political and Economic History .....................................................................164 
Major Political and Economic Freedom Issues of the 1990s.........................167 
Political Parties ..................................................................................167 
Civil Liberties ....................................................................................168 
The Judiciary......................................................................................168 
Elections.............................................................................................169 
The Legislature ..................................................................................169 
The Media ..........................................................................................169 
Labor Unions .....................................................................................170 
Religion..............................................................................................170 
The Rule of Law ................................................................................170 
NED Activity in China during the 1990s.......................................................171 
Overview of NED Activity in China by Subject Area...................................176 
Specific Groups/Activities Funded within Each Subject Area ......................178 
Media and Publishing ........................................................................179 
Labor ..................................................................................................182 
Elections.............................................................................................183 
Human Rights ....................................................................................183 
Public Policy ......................................................................................184 
Education ...........................................................................................185 
Business and Economy ......................................................................187 
Other Subject Areas ...........................................................................188 
Discussion......................................................................................................189 
 
CHAPTER 8.  CONCLUSION..................................................................................193 
Overview........................................................................................................193 




APPENDIX A.  NED GRANT ACTIVITY, 1990-1999...........................................215 
 
 iv
APPENDIX B.  SUMMARY OF NED GRANT ACTIVITY BY COUNTRY........268 
 
APPENDIX C.  DATA BY COUNTRY AND YEAR USED 
                           IN CHAPTER 4’S REGRESSION MODELS ...............................273 
 
APPENDIX D.  CORRELATION TABLES FOR VARIABLES USED  
IN CHAPTER 4, 1990-1999............................................................283 
 
APPENDIX E.  DATA BY COUNTRY USED TO ESTIMATE 
                          CHAPTER 5’S REGRESSION MODELS......................................293 
 
APPENDIX F.  CORRELATION TABLES FOR VARIABLES USED  






 Billions of dollars have been spent to promote democracy and economic freedom 
through U.S. foreign aid, but little is known about its impact.  The National Endowment 
for Democracy (NED) is the leading U.S. organization that promotes democracy and 
economic freedom throughout the world.  Since its founding, NED has been the subject 
of immense discussion and controversy.  The goal of this dissertation is to provide insight 
into the promotion of democracy and economic freedom through an analysis of NED’s 
activities during the 1990s.  The analysis does not find evidence that NED was successful 
at promoting democracy and economic freedom during the 1990s.  Even though NED 
grant money appears to have been appropriately awarded to countries based on their 
need, the grant money did not have a significant impact on political and economic 
freedom.  This calls into question the wisdom of using the U.S. government’s scarce 
resources to promote democracy and economic freedom – not only through NED, but in 
any similar manner.   
 
CHAPTER 1 
PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM THROUGH 





In the post-Cold War world, promoting democracy and economic freedom has 
become a cornerstone of United States (U.S.) foreign policy, and foreign aid has become 
the instrument of choice for their promotion.  Even though billions of dollars have been 
spent to promote democracy and economic freedom through U.S. foreign aid, little is 
known about the impact that this money has had on political and economic freedom 
throughout the world.  Even those who adamantly advocate democracy and free market 
promotion in U.S. foreign policy are unsure whether it really has a positive impact.  
Much of the evidence about the impact of democracy and free market promotion through 
foreign aid is based on anecdotal evidence, not sophisticated analysis of objective 
aggregate data gathered over a substantial period of time.   
An objective and thorough analysis of political and economic freedom promotion 
through U.S. foreign aid is required so that the utility of the activity can be properly 
assessed.  Such an analysis will help policy makers and the American people assess the 
value of this activity and help policy makers gain a better understanding of this often-
used foreign policy tool, allowing them to make adjustments to U.S. democracy and free 
market promotion efforts that can improve its quality and effectiveness.  This dissertation 
will provide such an analysis by using data on the grant activities of the National 
Endowment for Democracy (NED) – the most visible and most controversial U.S. 
organization devoted to promoting democracy and economic freedom – during the 1990s.  
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This rest of this chapter reviews the evolution of U.S. foreign policy in regard to 
democracy and free market promotion since World War II and provides the background 
needed to understand the role that democracy and free market promotion currently plays 
in U.S. foreign policy. 
1950s – CONTAINING THE SOVIETS 
 The 1950s are regarded as the most frigid years of the Cold War.  During the 
1950s, foreign aid was a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy regarding underdeveloped 
countries, but the promotion of democracy and economic freedom in underdeveloped 
countries was not a goal or motivation of U.S. foreign aid.  U.S. foreign aid decisions 
were dictated by the Cold War and were almost exclusively based on geopolitical and 
security interests – the U.S. sought to “contain” Soviet expansionism (Carothers 1999, 
19).   
In the late-1950s, the U.S. and the Soviet Union were competing for influence in 
the world through their allocation of foreign aid.  For both countries, foreign aid was 
considered a competitive endeavor that could eventually help determine which country 
and which ideology would conquer the world.  The U.S. primarily used its foreign aid to 
preserve good relations with friendly countries and support friendly regimes – whether 
the regime was democratic or not.  By helping these friendly regimes remain in power, 
the U.S. believed that it could immunize these third world countries from the spread of 
communism.  Unfortunately, the policy of containment did not embody a proactive, 
comprehensive strategy for promoting U.S. interests; instead, it was a policy that reacted 
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to Soviet foreign policy activity (Carothers 1999, 19; Heymann 1960, 525 and 534; 
Macdonald 1995-1996).    
1960s – KENNEDY’S MODERNIZATION 
 When President John F. Kennedy took office at the start of the 1960s, he faced a 
difficult and hostile international political environment.  U.S. foreign policy thought and 
action had been dictated by rabid anticommunism, especially in regard to the third world.  
In the third world, the U.S. saw itself in a “zero-sum game” with the Soviet Union – no 
coexistence was possible.  The two superpowers were looking to expand their power, and 
the countries of the third world appeared to be ripe for influence.  The U.S. and the Soviet 
Union were in competition for allies, and the Soviet Union – at the start of the 1960s – 
appeared to be winning.  Communist regimes were coming to power throughout the third 
world, and non-communist regimes were beginning to be challenged by pro-communist 
political movements.  The Kennedy administration decided that U.S. foreign policy 
toward the third world was not working.  Kennedy wanted to initiate a new policy that 
would not only be more effective in fighting the spread of communism, but would also 
focus on improving the lives of people in the third world (Carothers 1999, 19-21; 
Forsythe 1990, 438; Mahajani 1965, 658; Packenham 1966 and 1973; Zakaria 1990, 
390).   
The Kennedy administration based its new policy on “modernization theory” – a 
theoretical framework for thinking about third world development described and 
advocated by future Kennedy foreign policy adviser W.W. Rostow in his book The 
Stages of Economic Development (1960).  Modernization theory holds that U.S. 
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economic assistance to a third world country will help bring about the wealth, education, 
and societal structure (the “preconditions” of democracy as concluded by Seymour 
Martin Lipset in his influential 1959 article in the American Political Science Review) 
needed to bring democracy to the country.   
Therefore, U.S. foreign aid can help third world countries develop economically 
and, as a result, develop democratically by making carefully targeted infusions of foreign 
aid that would “launch” these countries into “economic takeoff.”  Modernization theory 
saw development as a predictable, linear process that eventually resulted in a developed 
country that had political and economic qualities similar to those found in the U.S.    By 
helping these countries develop economically and politically, modernization theory also 
held that they would be much less fertile ground for communism (Almond and Coleman 
1960; Apter 1965; Rostow 1960).   
To help fulfill the promise of modernization theory and become more positively 
involved in the third world, the Kennedy administration created the U.S. Agency for 
International Development (USAID) and the Peace Corps.  Both focused their efforts 
largely on Latin America, but were also active in Africa, Asia, and the Middle East.  The 
Kennedy administration’s emphasis on Latin America resulted from Fidel Castro’s 1959 
rise to power in Cuba.  The U.S. feared that the communist takeover in Cuba could 
spread to the rest of Latin America and eventually pose a threat to U.S. security. 
In addition to focusing a large proportion of the activities of USAID and the 
Peace Corps on Latin America, the Kennedy administration, in 1961, founded the 
“Alliance for Progress.”  The Alliance for Progress was an economic aid program that 
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originally focused on bringing economic development and democracy to countries in 
Latin America as a means for fighting communist influence.  However, the Kennedy 
administration underestimated the dire situation – intense poverty, lack of education, lack 
of civil rights, etc. – that every Latin American country faced in the early-1960s.  As a 
result, the Alliance for Progress pursued its goals vigorously, but was unable to help 
bring any countries closer to democracy (Carothers 1999, 22; Levinson and de Onis 
1970; Packenham 1973; Scheman 1988; Smetherman and Smetherman 1971; Smith 
1994).   
In fact, after the Kennedy administration gained some experience in dealing with 
Latin America, the Alliance for Progress abandoned its focus on promoting democracy 
and economic freedom and focused exclusively on improving the standard-of-living in 
the region’s countries, regardless of their regime-type (Smetherman and Smetherman 
1971).  This new ambivalence toward regime-type meant that many of the countries that 
the Alliance for Progress was most active in were either dictatorships or eventually 
became dictatorships.  Since the U.S.-friendly dictators were vehemently anticommunist, 
the Kennedy administration grudgingly accepted the situation.  Later in the decade, 
President Lyndon Johnson turned this grudging acceptance into open support for friendly 
dictators (Carothers 1999, 22; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 539; Schoultz 1981, 
150).   
In the late-1960s, USAID foreshadowed much of what was to come in the field of 
democracy promotion in the 1990s.  USAID began to use, especially in Latin America, 
foreign aid to support education programs for citizens, legislatures, legal institutions, 
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labor unions, and local governments.  While democracy was part of the motivation for 
these innovative programs, anticommunism was the driving force behind them.  
Ironically, these pro-democracy education programs were taught in countries run by U.S.-
friendly dictators who did not feel threatened by them (Drezner 2000, 741; Packenham 
1966, 209-210).          
 The Kennedy administration also worked with Congress to formalize the link 
between foreign aid, democracy, and economic freedom in Title IX of the Foreign 
Assistance Act of 1961.  The administration and Congress both saw that U.S. aid to third 
world countries tended to only benefit the countries’ elites and was not helping the 
intended beneficiaries – the country’s destitute and disenfranchised.  They realized that 
U.S. aid was actually working against democracy and economic freedom in these 
countries by reinforcing the dominance of undemocratic regimes that strictly controlled 
their economies.  For the first time in U.S. foreign policy, Title IX explicitly stated that 
U.S. foreign aid was to be used to promote political and economic participation in third 
world countries.  Title IX spawned a lot of discussion and academic research, but it was 
never fully implemented and had relatively little impact (Carothers 1999, 22-23; Frank 
and Baird 1975, 148; Lyman 1970; Packenham 1973).              
 The Johnson administration continued many of the new foreign policy initiatives 
of the Kennedy administration.  However, the Vietnam War eventually became the 
exclusive focus Johnson’s foreign policy and brought a renewed emphasis to countering 
Soviet expansion (Forsythe 1990, 438; Mahajani 1965, 664).  Therefore, at the end of the 
1960s, U.S. foreign policy was in upheaval.  The Kennedy administration’s ideas on the 
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use of foreign aid to help third world countries appeared to have failed.  U.S. leaders 
were disillusioned with the use of aid funds in the third world.  They knew that, despite 
large increases in spending during the 1960s, third world countries remained poor, and 
pro-communist sentiment had dramatically increased in them (Carothers 1999, 27; Frank 
and Baird 1975, 144).   
The final blow to Kennedy’s foreign policy strategy came when its theoretical 
framework – modernization theory – came under sharp attack in the academic world.  In 
1968, Samuel Huntington’s Political Order in Changing Societies not only questioned 
modernization theory, but it cogently argued that economic development in 
underdeveloped countries actually led to authoritarianism, instead of democracy.  
Huntington claimed that economic “takeoff” in a poor country would lead to widespread 
instability within the country.  This instability would make the country fertile ground for 
authoritarianism, not democracy (Huntington 1968).   
1970s – DÉTENTE AND HUMAN RIGHTS 
 The Vietnam War left U.S. foreign policy in chaos.  Many in government and 
academia saw the need for U.S. foreign policy to move beyond the Cold War and its 
rivalry with the Soviet Union.  In the early-1970s, the administration of President Richard 
M. Nixon challenged Cold War thinking by introducing the concept of “détente.”  
Détente sought to improve relations with the Soviet Union and hoped to provide stability 
in the international system through recognition of Soviet economic and military parity 
with the U.S.  The Nixon administration hoped that recognition of Soviet power by the 
U.S. would prompt the Soviets to accept the status quo in world affairs and result in the 
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end of the Soviet’s expansionist foreign policy.  Improving U.S. relations with the Soviet 
Union also held the possibility of drawing the Soviets further into the global economy.  
The Nixon administration thought that, if the Soviet Union were more dependent on the 
global economy, it could be more easily influenced and would have a greater interest in 
preserving system stability (Cox 1990, 32-33; Skidmore 1993-1994, 699).   
In pursuing détente, the Nixon administration focused almost all of its foreign 
policy on superpower relations.  Nixon’s foreign policy appeared to have little interest in 
helping poor countries or providing any type of humanitarian aid (Carothers 1999, 28).  
While détente could herald important accomplishments, it did not halt the expansion of 
Soviet influence throughout the world and was heavily criticized by the U.S. foreign 
policy establishment (Cox 1990, 33).     
The administration of President Jimmy Carter faced the same foreign policy 
challenge as Nixon’s.  The U.S. was still desperately searching for a new foreign policy 
identity.  Nixon’s détente had not successfully filled the void.  Carter’s solution was to 
make human rights a central foreign policy issue.  Carter’s focus on human rights 
provided the U.S. with an idealist foreign policy mission that appealed to a country that 
was weary of the Cold War (Carothers 1999, 28; Skidmore 1993-1994, 699 and 701; 
Williams 1987, 577).   
However, the Carter administration never developed an overall strategy to guide 
its human rights policy and did not have many successes (Carothers 1999, 29; Forsythe 
1990, 443; Williams 1987, 579).  The policy was used on a case-by-case basis and was 
frequently ignored when the human rights abuser was a powerful or strategically 
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important country (Forsythe 1990, 443).  Near the end of Carter’s presidency, the 
emphasis on human rights disappeared as Soviet antagonistic behavior – for example, the 
invasion of Afghanistan – caused the Carter administration’s optimism about world 
affairs to wane.  At the close of his presidency, Carter’s foreign policy returned to the 
traditional Cold War posture – the U.S. became more aggressive in countering Soviet 
expansionism in the third world and a rapid U.S. military buildup began (Skidmore 1993-
1994, 701-702).   
1980s – THE “RE-FREEZE” AND THE THAW 
 Following a decade of failed foreign policy innovation, President Ronald Reagan 
began his eight years in office determined to return U.S. policy to its traditional Cold War 
roots.  The Reagan administration explicitly rejected Nixon’s détente and Carter’s 
emphasis on human rights and sought a complete return to a traditional Cold War foreign 
policy (Anderson and Kernek 1985, 392 and 394; Williams 1987, 579; Zakaria 1990, 
373).  The rise to power of the Sandinistas in Nicaragua combined with strong 
communist movements in Guatemala and El Salvador convinced the Reagan 
administration that the Soviets were attempting to undermine U.S. security through an 
ideological takeover of Central America.  To combat the specter of Soviet influence, 
friendly relations were reestablished with the anticommunist dictators that President 
Carter had quarreled with over human rights issues in the late-1970s.  As was true during 
many periods of the Cold War under other U.S. Presidents, Reagan’s foreign policy in the 
early-to-mid 1980s valued anticommunism above democracy and free markets and 
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focused its assistance on keeping Soviet influence in check (Anderson and Kernek 1985, 
392 and 397; Carothers 1999, 33; Lafeber 1984, 1 and 10-23; Zakaria 1990, 378).   
The main foreign policy doctrine for fighting Soviet expansion was the “Reagan 
Doctrine.”  It held that the U.S. would aggressively support anticommunist revolutionary 
movements throughout the third world.  By doing so, the Reagan administration hoped to 
“turn-the-tables” on the Soviet Union and pose the same expansionist threat to the 
Soviets that they posed to the U.S.  (Cox 1990, 34; Lagon 1992, 39-70; Williams 1987, 
579 and 581).  In the eyes of many observers, the aggressiveness of the Reagan Doctrine 
and the harsh anti-Soviet public statements of President Reagan launched a second Cold 
War (Ward and Rajmajra 1992, 343).   
 In Reagan’s second term, a more moderate U.S. foreign policy emerged.  As 
relations with the Soviet Union improved, the administration’s adamant support for 
anticommunism in Central America moderated into genuine support for democracy and 
economic freedom in the region (Anderson and Kernek 1985, 392 and 397; Lafeber 1984, 
1 and 10-23; Zakaria 1990, 378).  The main focus of Reagan’s democracy promotion in 
Central America was election assistance.  Its first use occurred in 1982 when the U.S. 
paid to automate voter registration in El Salvador’s Constituent Assembly elections.  In 
the mid-to-late-1980s, the U.S. expanded its use of election assistance and provided aid to 
Guatemala, Honduras, Haiti, and Chile (Carothers 1991).  This assistance contributed to 
the strides made toward democracy in these countries.  
The Reagan administration extended this pro-democracy aid to few countries 
outside of Central America.  The most notable example was the Philippines.  In 1985, 
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Philippine leader Ferdinand Marcos – whose pro-U.S. regime was slowly crumbling – 
surprised his country and the U.S. by calling for elections.  U.S. election assistance 
helped uncover the illegal nature of the elections and, in a later election, led to the defeat 
of the Marcos regime.  Since U.S. election assistance was instrumental in the downfall of 
a fervent, anticommunist U.S. ally, the international community gave great credibility to 
future U.S. election assistance, seeing it as a legitimate tool for promoting open and 
honest elections.  However, in other Asian countries, the U.S. made little effort to 
promote democracy and continued to follow the Cold War strategy of supporting 
anticommunists, whether they were democratic or not (Carothers 1999, 37-38; Jacoby 
1986; Zakaria 1990, 390)).    
 The genuine support for democracy and economic freedom shown by the Reagan 
administration in the latter part of the 1980s should not have surprised the international 
community.  Early in his presidency, Reagan, in a speech to the British Parliament, 
publicly advocated a “crusade for freedom” in which the U.S. would come to the aid of 
reformers around the world in their fight for democracy and economic freedom  
(Kondracke 1989, 10; Weigel 1993, 3).  Reagan followed this speech by presenting two 
policy proposals to Congress aimed at carrying-out this crusade.  The first proposal was 
entitled “Project Democracy.”  This far-reaching program was to be coordinated by the 
U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and would be the centerpiece of U.S. democracy and 
economic freedom promotion efforts.  The second proposal was meant to compliment the 
first by providing a vehicle for promoting democracy and free markets in a more indirect, 
non-governmental way.  It intended to create NED, a foundation that would promote 
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democracy primarily through acquiring and disseminating books, films, and other 
materials to reformers around the world  (Palmer 1993, 2759).  Both proposals went 
before Congress in 1983.   
Ironically, the broader proposal – Project Democracy – failed (but was later 
passed), while its complimentary proposal – NED – passed immediately  (Carothers 
1994, 125-126).  This outcome resulted in NED becoming a primary focus of U.S. efforts 
to promote democracy and economic freedom around the world.  As a quasi-
governmental organization, NED’s activities are separate from the U.S. government’s 
and details about the organization’s activities are not public.  While the Reagan 
administration was using official U.S. foreign policy in the late-1980s to promote 
democracy and economic freedom in Central America and other countries, NED was 
already active in promoting democracy and free markets throughout the world.  Before 
the end of the Cold War, NED was aiding reformers in the Soviet Union, Poland, 
Hungary, and Czechoslovakia even though U.S. foreign policy would not allow official 
U.S. involvement in these communist countries (Carothers 1999, 39). 
1990 AND BEYOND – FREEDOM PROMOTION REIGNS 
 By the end of the 1980s, the promotion of democracy and economic freedom was 
an integral part of U.S. foreign policy.  The momentum gained by democracy promoting 
activities such as election assistance in the late-1980s carried forward into the 1990s and 
received a tremendous boost when communism collapsed.  The end of the Cold War and 
the breakup of the Soviet Union dramatically elevated the importance of democracy and 
free market promotion in U.S. foreign policy.  In reaction to the fall of communism, the 
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U.S. quickly expanded its assistance into the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe in 
order to keep the former communist states moving toward democracy and a free 
economy.  Both President Bush and President Clinton openly discussed this increased 
emphasis on democracy and free market promotion and made it the central theme of how 
the U.S. interacted with the post-Cold War world (Carothers 1999, 40-42; Miller 1994, 
626).   
In justifying the priority placed by the Clinton administration on democracy and 
free market promotion, Clinton and his foreign policy advisers cite academic research 
showing that democracies do not fight each other and economically interdependent 
countries have much more peaceful relations than countries that are economically 
isolated – both a “democratic peace” and a “liberal peace” exist.  The democratic peace 
and liberal peace propositions provide a strong argument for placing a priority on 
promoting democracy and free markets.  If democracies and economically interdependent 
countries do not fight each other, then more democracies and more free markets in the 
world will help make the world a safer place.  A large body of empirical evidence exists 
supporting the democratic peace proposition (Chan 1984, Maoz and Abdolali 1989, 
Russett 1993, Small and Singer 1976, Weede 1984) and the liberal peace proposition 
(Mansfield 1994; Oneal and Ray 1997; Oneal and Russett 1997 and 1999; Oneal, et al 
1996; Reuveny and Kang 1996; Russett, et al 1998), and both are among the most 
analyzed and discussed subjects in recent academic research.   
According to democratic peace theorists, democracies have structural and 
normative restraints that make them more pacific.  The structural restraint hypothesis 
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states that checks and balances, division of power, and the need for public support for 
decisions prevent military conflict.  First, the decision to go to war could be vetoed by 
another branch of government.  Second, the length of time needed to extract consent from 
the other branches of government and from the public – if ultimately given – allows time 
for tension to wane.  By delaying the finalization of the war decision, time for negotiation 
and reassessment results – a cooling-off period.  This lessens the impact of emotion and 
haste on the decision-making process, resulting in a more rational decision-making 
process by the country’s leadership (Russett 1993, 40).   
The normative restraint hypothesis revolves around so-called “democratic 
norms.”  The democratic norms include a belief in regulated political competition and in 
compromise solutions to conflicts.  Democracies possess these beliefs in regard to their 
own internal politics.  They externalize these norms in their interactions with other 
countries  (Russett 1993, 33).  The democratic norm of regulated political competition 
facilitates peace by taking the sense of injustice out of interstate competition.  
Democracies are less likely to take offense at the fair, competitive practices of other 
countries because competition typifies their domestic political climate. Therefore, 
democracies will not allow disputes over fair, competitive practices to escalate into 
violence.  However, even democracies object vehemently when they are harmed by the 
unfair competitive practices other countries.  In conflicts over unfair competitive 
practices, the second democratic norm – belief in compromise solutions to conflicts – 
helps keep democracies from going to war.  If the conflict is serious enough that war 
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could result, the use of force will only occur after all diplomatic solutions have been 
exhausted.   
Liberal peace theorists argue that economic interactions between two countries 
help to create an interdependent relationship between the countries.  This relationship 
gives each country a stake in the well-being of the other.  It also gives each country a 
powerful incentive to help preserve and perpetuate the well-being and stability of the 
international system.  Countries dependent upon international economic activity to 
maintain their standard-of-living will avoid engaging in any activity that threatens 
important trade partners or threatens to disrupt the international system.  Therefore, 
increased economic interactions among countries promotes accommodation instead of 
conflict (Oneal and Russett 1997, 269-270).  Increased economic interactions also 
promote greater communication and familiarity among countries.  This helps to limit 
misunderstandings and promote compromise (Mansfield and Pollins 2003, 3).  
Democracies that have a free market economy are especially pacific because a free 
market reinforces the structural and normative constraints on war.   A free market makes 
the economic impact of war-decisions even more salient – political leaders and the public 
will be less likely to support any activity that threatens an important economic partner or 
threatens the stability of the international system (Oneal and Russett 1997, 270).   
CONCLUSION 
 Even though billions of dollars have been spent to promote democracy and 
economic freedom through U.S. foreign aid, little is known about the impact that this 
money has had throughout the world.  Even those who adamantly advocate democracy 
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and free market promotion in U.S. foreign policy are unsure whether it really has a 
positive impact.  Some agencies and organizations that engage in this activity have 
performed evaluations of their own programs, but the risk of bias is inherent in these self-
evaluations, rendering them unreliable.  This may help explain why their conclusions 
have overwhelmingly been positive, and the failures of their efforts tend to not be 
assessed as vigorously as their successes.  Also, their conclusions have been based on 
anecdotal evidence that is subject to selection bias and, therefore, cannot be the source of 
conclusions that can be generalized to all cases with any degree of confidence  (Carothers 
1994, 47 and 196).   
Insight into the impact of foreign aid in promoting democracy and economic 
freedom has also not been readily forthcoming from academia.  Academic writings on 
democracy and free market promotion tend to be descriptive, not analytical, and have 
focused almost exclusively on case studies instead of aggregate data analysis.  While the 
case studies have provided great insight into specific instances of democracy and free 
market promotion through foreign aid, the very nature of case studies makes generalizing 
their conclusions problematic (Carothers 1994, 181).  
An objective and thorough analysis of democracy and economic freedom 
promotion through foreign aid is required so that the utility of the activity can be properly 
assessed.  Such an analysis would serve two important purposes.  First, it would help 
policy makers and the American people assess the value of this activity.  Second, it 
would help policy makers gain a better understanding of foreign aid’s effectiveness in 
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promoting democracy and economic freedom, allowing decision makers to make 
adjustments to U.S. promotion efforts that could improve its performance.         
This dissertation will perform such an analysis by evaluating the grant-making 
program of the most visible and controversial U.S. organization that uses foreign aid to 
promote democracy and economic freedom – NED.  As mentioned above, details about 
NED’s activities are not public, and, as shown in Chapter 2, the organization is shrouded 
in a great deal of mystery and controversy.  The data analyzed in this dissertation on 
NED grant-making in the 1990s is not readily available, and this dissertation represents 
the first time that complete data on NED grant activity in the 1990s is presented and 
analyzed.  Therefore, this dissertation contributes badly needed objective knowledge 
about the effectiveness of democracy and economic freedom promotion and contributes 
new details about NED’s activities that will help end the mystery and controversy 
surrounding the organization.     
This chapter introduces the reader to democracy and free market promotion and 
gives an overview of the dissertation and its goals.  Chapter 2 provides a profile of NED, 
discussing the makeup of the organization and all of the issues that surround its activities.  
Chapter 3 provides an overview of NED grant-making during the 1990s, revealing the 
leading recipients of NED assistance and the trends that occurred in NED grant-making 
during the decade.  Chapters 4 and 5 use data from the 1990s to analyze NED’s grant-
making program.  It looks at the organizations that receive NED grants (Chapter 4) and 
whether these grants have been effective at promoting democracy and economic freedom 




respectively, using the case study method.  Much like Chapters 4 and 5, the case studies 
look at the organizations that received NED grant money in these countries, and whether 
the money helped contribute to greater political and economic freedom.  In addition, 
these chapters provide information on how NED grant money was used in these 
countries.  Chapter 8 concludes the dissertation by summarizing its findings and drawing 
broader conclusions about the promotion of democracy and economic freedom through 
U.S. foreign aid based on the insights gained from the preceding chapters. 
  
CHAPTER 2 
AN OVERVIEW OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 
 
As a political creation, the NED is undoubtedly a masterpiece, the Sistine Chapel of our 
legislative arts.  Like all great works of art, it stirs the greatest wonder and awe. 
Samuels 1995, 52 
INTRODUCTION 
 The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is a quasi-governmental 
organization that promotes democracy and economic freedom around the world.  Since 
its founding, the organization has been the subject of much discussion and controversy.  
This chapter will present an overview of NED, detailing its origin, mission, history, and 
the debates that surround it.  The chapter’s goal is to show that further research into the 
organization and its activities is needed. 
 Compiling an objective overview of NED is difficult because the vast majority of 
information about the organization comes from sources that are highly critical of the 
organization.  Unfortunately, NED and its supporters have not been as vocal in their 
support of the organization as NED’s critics have been in their criticism.  This means that 
negative information on NED is abundant and positive information is scarce.  The 
following overview attempts to give fair representation to both NED’s critics and 
supporters, but the lack of positive information on the organization makes this extremely 
difficult.     
NED’S ORIGIN 
 On June 8, 1982, United States (U.S.) President Ronald Reagan spoke to the 
British House of Commons.  In his address, Reagan advocated the beginning of a 
“crusade for freedom” in which the U.S. would come to the aid of democrats around the 
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world in their fight for freedom (Kondracke 1989, 10; Weigel 1993, 3).  Following his 
speech, the Reagan administration presented two policy proposals to Congress aimed at 
carrying-out this crusade. 
 The first proposal was entitled “Project Democracy.”  This far-reaching program 
was to be coordinated by the U.S. Information Agency (USIA) and was to be the 
centerpiece of U.S. freedom promotion efforts  (Carothers 1994, 125-126).  The second 
proposal was meant to compliment Project Democracy by providing a vehicle for 
promoting freedom in a more indirect, non-governmental way.  The proposal intended to 
create NED, a foundation that would promote political and economic freedom primarily 
through acquiring and disseminating pro-democracy and pro-free market books, films, 
and other materials to reformers around the world  (Palmer 1993, 2759). 
 Both proposals went before Congress in 1983.  Ironically, the broader proposal – 
Project Democracy – failed (but was later passed).  However, its complimentary proposal 
– NED – passed immediately  (Carothers 1994, 125-126).  This outcome resulted in NED 
becoming a primary focus of U.S. efforts to promote freedom around the world.  
WHAT WAS CREATED 
 NED came into being in 1984.  Its mission is to assist in the “development of 
democratic institutions, procedures and values” in other countries.  This means that NED 
financially supports projects that attempt to expand political and economic freedom in 
countries around the world  (NED, <http://www.ned.org/page_1/nedbro.html>).  NED 




The right of the people freely to determine their own destiny.  The exercise of this right 
requires a system that guarantees freedom of expression, belief and association, free and 
competitive elections, respect for the inalienable rights of individuals and minorities, free 
communications media, and the rule of law. 
NED, <http://www.ned.org/page_1/nedbro.html> 
 
The organization asserts that a democratic system must be tailored to “local needs and 
traditions” and have open, spirited competition among groups and ideas in society in 
order for freedom to thrive  (NED, <http://www.ned.org/page_6/nedstmt.html>).   
 NED engages in a genre of assistance – political assistance – aimed at developing 
the mechanics of democracy within a society.  While “political assistance” is the term-of-
art used to describe NED’s activities, a more accurate and lucid description of NED’s 
activities would be “assisting democratic consolidation,” since all of NED’s activities are 
aimed at helping a country develop into a full-fledged democracy  (Carothers 1995, 66).   
NED’s assistance typically takes on three forms.  First, helping to develop the 
political institutions that are required for democracy, with a special focus on developing 
meaningful political parties  (Diamond 1995, 40 and 41).  Second, helping to prepare, 
conduct, and monitor elections in order to assure fair outcomes  (Diamond 1995, 40 and 
44).  This “electoral assistance” has been the most visible and common form of assistance 
provided by NED over the past ten years  (Carothers 1995, 66).  Third, NED helps to 
strengthen civil society by assisting independent organizations to develop and thrive.  
These independent organizations help heighten public awareness of both its rights and the 
actions of its government, encourage a tolerant political environment that is conducive to 
compromise, and mobilize groups that are excluded from the political arena – usually 
women and minorities  (Diamond 1995, 40 and 46).     
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In addition to “political” assistance, NED provides “ideological” assistance to 
democrats around the world.  From its genesis, a goal of NED was to create a “worldwide 
community of democrats” that share ideas, experiences, and resources about how 
democracy can be achieved and sustained.  To attain this goal, NED began publishing the 
Journal of Democracy as a resource that democrats could turn to for the latest 
information on the fight for democracy around the world and the latest academic studies 
on democratization.  It also created the Democracy Resource Center as an information 
clearinghouse for contacts and information that would be useful to those struggling for 
democracy.   
Finally, NED began holding regular conferences that allow democrats to network 
with each other.  Face-to-face interaction at these conferences – it is hoped – allows for a 
greater bond between democrats, giving a sense of solidarity to the democracy movement  
(NED, <http://www.ned.org/page_1/nedbro.html>).  As a result of these efforts, NED has 
become “a center of democratic ideology,” promulgating much of the intellectual 
thinking on democratization and serving as an important resource for many democracy 
movements  (Robinson 1996, 99).  Partly because of NED’s work, a more unified 
movement for democracy can be seen in the world – a “democratic international” has 
begun to appear  (Diamond 1992, 41; Progressive Policy Institute, 
<http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/amerfp.txt>)      
 NED is funded by an annual appropriation from Congress, giving it a direct link 
to the U.S. government.  It has an independent board of directors that controls it day-to-
day operations  (Carothers 1994, 126; Diamond 1995, 16; Muravchik 1992, 142).  This 
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combination of public funding and private control has made classifying NED a 
contentious issue. 
 Despite claims by NED and its supporters that the organization is not an arm of 
the U.S. government (Muravchik 1992, 204; NED, 
<http://www.ned.org/page_1/nedbro.html>), NED is widely perceived by leaders in 
Washington, D.C., and – more importantly – by leaders around the world as a 
governmental entity  (Carothers 1994, 129; Robinson 1996, 93; Sims 1990, 4).  An 
accurate representation of NED’s status seems to fall somewhere between categorizing 
the organization as totally dependent on the U.S. government and categorizing it as 
totally independent of the U.S. government.  NED should be categorized as a quasi-
governmental institution because it is tied to the U.S. government for funding, but has the 
freedom – independent of the U.S. government – to decide how it will utilize its funding  
(Robinson 1996, 92; Weigel 1993, 3). 
 NED promotes political and economic freedom through direct and indirect grants 
to groups.  All NED grants are aimed at encouraging political development in five 
functional areas – pluralism; democratic governance and political processes; education, 
culture, and communications; research; and international cooperation  (NED, 
<http://www.ned.org/page_1/about.html> and 
<http://<www.ned.org/page_6/nedstmt.html>).   
Grant applications – for both direct and indirect grants – must contain a one-page 
summary of the proposed program, a summary of the applicant’s background, a complete 
project description, a statement that explains how the project fits into NED’s goals, a 
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detailed budget, and a list of all other prospective sources of funding.  Proposals from 
individuals are not accepted.  Grant applications are reviewed quarterly by NED’s board 
of directors.  The board evaluates each application according to how it fits within NED’s 
overall activities, its urgency, its ability to be successful, and the credibility and track-
record of the applicant  (NED, <http://www.ned.org/page_1/nedbro.html>).    
Direct grants are made through NED’s discretionary grant program.  These grants 
are awarded to groups in unfree countries and are typically smaller than indirect grants.  
The types of activities they support include publishing, training journalists, promoting 
civic education, and monitoring human rights  (Carothers 1994, 127-128).   
Indirect grants are made through NED’s four core grantees – the National 
Democratic Institute for International Affairs (NDI), the International Republican 
Institute (IRI), the American Center for International Labor Solidarity (ACILS), and the 
Center for International Private Enterprise (CIPE) – that represent both major U.S. 
political parties, U.S. labor, and U.S. business.  In making indirect grants, NED money is 
allocated to a core grantee that makes the decision as to which groups should be grant 
recipients.  In a typical year, over two-out-of-three-dollars authorized to NED by 
Congress eventually goes to its core grantees, giving them control over who gets NED 
money and in what amounts  (Carothers 1994, 126; Diamond 1995, 16; Muravchik 1992, 
207). 
The rationale for this dependence on the core grantees is that they are better 
informed than NED about the organizations, labor unions, and business entities that 
comprise the bulk of grant applicants.  This makes their judgment more reliable in 
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identifying worthy applicants.  NDI and IRI focus their attention on countries undergoing 
democratic transitions.  They support activities such as observing elections, civic 
education, and party building.  ACILS – formerly known as the Free Trade Union 
Institute (FTUI) – focuses on developing and strengthening independent trade unions in 
non-democratic countries.  CIPE exclusively works for free markets and more private 
enterprise in non-democratic countries  (Carothers 1994, 127; Progressive Policy Institute 
<http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/amerfp.txt>).  CIPE attempts to synchronize its 
market reforms with whatever political reforms are occurring within the country  
(Robinson 1996, 103). 
NED’S RELATIONSHIP WITH THE CIA 
 NED’s political assistance is reminiscent of the type of activities that the U.S. 
Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) has previously engaged in  (Shipler 1 June 1986, A1).  
This has led most observers – including many NED supporters – to conclude that NED is 
attempting to do overtly what was done covertly by the CIA in the past  (Muravchik 
1992, 142-144; Robinson 1996, 87; Sims 1990, 4, 11, and 14).   
In the 1970s, the CIA and its image were damaged by negative revelations 
unearthed by the Church committee, the Pike committee, and the Rockefeller 
Commission.  Many observers contend that NED provides a way for political actions that 
were formerly performed covertly by the CIA to be performed overtly without being 
tarnished through association with the CIA  (Robinson 1996, 87).  By being overt and 
avoiding a CIA connection, the legitimacy of U.S. political assistance around the world 
increased substantially  (Robinson 1996, 88).  In order to avoid the taint of the CIA’s 
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negative image, NED has been careful to avoid any links with the CIA  (“Reagan’s 
‘Foreign Aid’ for Democracy” 1983, 54).     
NED’S HISTORY 
 To facilitate a better understanding of NED and the issues surrounding it, the 
following reviews the organization’s history.  The review focuses on cases from NED’s 
past that have received the most attention from politicians and the media.  The cases are 
discussed in chronological order and include the following:  the fallout from Iran-Contra, 
the funding of extremist groups in France, the 1988 Chilean plebiscite, the 1989 
Nicaraguan election, and the 1994 Congressional authorization fight.       
The Other “Project Democracy” 
 When Congress voted against the establishment of “Project Democracy” in 1983 
and then, later, voted to implement it, no one expected that “Project Democracy” would 
become one of the most controversial programs in U.S. history.  The “Project 
Democracy” that failed and then finally passed Congress was an overt, Congressionally-
authorized attempt to promote democracy around the world.  Another “Project 
Democracy” – a covert attempt to oust the Sandinistas from power in Nicaragua – almost 
destroyed the Reagan administration (Brinkley 15 February 1987, A1).  The taint from 
the covert “Project Democracy” – even though it was not associated with the overt 
“Project Democracy” or any other U.S. democracy promotion program – had the 
potential to ruin the image of these legitimate programs (“Private, Secret Government” 
17 February 1987, A22). 
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 The covert Project Democracy was implemented after Congress restricted aid to 
Nicaragua’s Contras in 1984.  Under the leadership of Lieutenant-Colonel Oliver North 
and in violation of Congress’ orders, Project Democracy kept money flowing to the 
Contras.  In effect, a secret, invisible “second government” was created to carry-out 
foreign policy operations that Congress would not approve  (“Private, Secret 
Government” 17 February 1987, A22).  Unfortunately, Lt.-Col. North used the name of a 
legitimate, Congressionally-approved program for his own secret program  (“The Good 
Project Democracy” 13 March 1987, A34). 
 Recognizing the potential damage that could be done to NED, its supporters 
quickly came to its defense once the details of Lt. Col. North’s secret program surfaced.  
This quick response was a preemptory response to anyone who would attempt to spread 
the taint of the Iran-Contra scandal to NED.  The most powerful of these responses came 
from former Vice President Walter Mondale and Republican National Committee Chair 
Frank Fahrenkopf.  Both had strong links to NED, having served on the board of either 
the organization or one of its core grantees for many years in the past.  They co-authored 
an editorial in the February 23, 1987, New York Times in which they praised NED and 
excoriated Lt.-Col. North’s Project Democracy.  The main point of the editorial was to 
show that the covert Project Democracy was totally unrelated to NED  (Mondale and 
Fahrenkopf  23 February 1987, A22).  Efforts to protect NED gained momentum when 
the U.S. government’s official analysis of the situation found no links between Lt.-Col. 
North’s Project Democracy and any of the overt democracy promoting aspects of the 
U.S. government.   
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In retrospect, the Iran-Contra revelations had little impact on NED or any other 
U.S. freedom promoting program.  The nervous reaction of NED supporters shows the 
fear that exists of being associated with covert operations.  Such an association could 
make NED appear to be just another “sinister” instrument of illegitimate U.S. 
manipulation of other countries  (“The Good Project Democracy”  13 March 1987, A34).     
France? 
 On November 28, 1985, The New York Times broke a story about NED that 
surprised all of Washington and even troubled some of NED’s strongest supporters – 
NED was giving grant money to groups in France.  The article and many observers 
questioned why the U.S. would be promoting democracy in France.  Was France’s 
democracy in danger and in need of aid?  The answer was clearly “no,” so NED activity 
in the country seemed odd.  Two organizations received grant money – the National 
Inter-university Union (UNI) and Force Ouvriere.  Both groups fervently opposed French 
President Francois Mitterand’s policies  (Bernstein 28 November 1985, A8).   
UNI was a student organization founded in 1969 as a response to the left-wing 
student demonstrations that occurred that year.  The organization called itself “anti-
communist” and was known for being on the extreme right of the political spectrum  
(Bernstein 28 November 1985, A8).  UNI was an “offshoot” of a paramilitary, nationalist 
organization called the Service for Civic Action – a group that had been outlawed in 
France after it was held responsible for six killings in South France in 1981 (Bernstein 28 
November 1985, A8; “Perils of Pushing It” 1986, 26; Schapiro and Levy 1985, 11; 
Shipler 1 June 1986, A1).  It had also been linked to other killings, as well as drug 
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smuggling.  In all, UNI had received $575,000 from NED  (Bernstein 28 November 
1985, A8).   
Force Ouvriere was a right-wing labor union composed of foreign trade union 
activists that come to France from other countries in which they had been persecuted.  
Force Ouvriere had a strong anti-communist reputation and was battling with socialist 
labor unions in France for supremacy.  It had received $830,000 in NED funds  
(Bernstein 28 November 1985, A8). 
Speculation over why the two groups were receiving NED funds centered around 
their strong opposition to President Mitterand and his socialist ideology.  If this was the 
motivation, the U.S. could have been seen – and was seen by many – as attempting to 
help indirectly undermine Mitterand’s government and its policies.  This appearance 
could have damaged U.S.-France relations and have had far-reaching implications for 
U.S. relations with the rest of the world.  Other countries could ask the following 
question:  if the U.S. would do this to a friendly government, what would it do to an 
enemy? 
NED did not offer an explanation for its involvement in France.  The organization 
simply cut all funding to the groups and made no mention of the issue in any of its 
official reports or statements.  The French government also did not make an issue of the 
grants, helping to avert any potential long-term damage to U.S.-France relations. 
1988 Chilean Plebiscite 
 In October 1988, Chile held a plebiscite in which its citizens voted on whether to 
retain the government of General Augusto Pinochet.  If a majority voted in favor of the 
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military leadership, it would remain power.  If a majority voted against the military 
government, competitive elections would be held within a year to elect a new government  
(Christian 15 June 1988, A14). 
 Officially, the U.S. government was neutral about the Chilean plebiscite, but it 
recognized that the plebiscite was an opportunity for Chile to take a large step toward 
democracy.  Seizing the moment, the U.S. became involved in Chile through NED.  From 
its own funds, NED sent $600,000 to opposition groups in Chile.  Many of these groups 
were reluctant to accept the money because they were uncomfortable using foreign 
money to influence Chile’s domestic politics.  However, most groups did eventually 
accept the money because they recognized that their chances of winning without it were 
unlikely  (Christian 15 June 1988, A1).  Congress later gave NED another $1 million to 
distribute in Chile.  Pinochet’s government made U.S. support for its opposition a central 
campaign issue, but was unable to win the plebiscite  (Christian 15 June 1988, A14).   
NED and its supporters cite the 1988 Chilean plebiscite as one of NED’s great 
triumphs.  They claim that NED money and other money distributed by the organization 
allowed the opposition to register voters and get people to the polls.  NED assistance also 
helped the opposition with campaigning and advertising.  Without this help, the defeat of 
Pinochet’s government may not have happened  (Progressive Policy Institute, 
<http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/amerfp.txt>). 
1989 Nicaraguan Election 
Only two years after the Iran-Contra scandal subsided, NED became involved in 
Nicaragua’s 1989 elections by giving overt political assistance to opponents of the 
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Sandinistas.  Specifically, the organization served as a conduit for U.S. funding to be 
channeled to presidential candidate Violetta Chamorro and her party – the National 
Opposition Union (UNO).  Opponents of NED’s involvement questioned both the 
wisdom of the U.S. getting involved in Nicaragua so soon after the Iran-Contra scandal 
and the use of NED as the vehicle for such involvement. 
 In its five-year existence, NED had already become heavily involved in Nicaragua 
before the election-year arrived.  In the five years prior to the election, it is estimated that 
NED had provided over $15 million in overt political assistance to groups within 
Nicaragua  (Nichols 1990, 267).  In 1989 alone, NED provided $12.5 million to promote 
democracy in the country (Sharkey 1990, 22).  Almost all of this assistance went to one 
candidate and one party – Violetta Chamorro and UNO.   
Chamorro was the widow of the owner/publisher of Nicaragua’s pro-democracy 
newspaper La Prensa – Pedro Joaquin Chamorro – who was murdered in 1978 by agents 
of dictator Anastasio Somoza  (MacMichael 1990, 165).  La Prensa was heavily 
connected to the U.S.,  a long-time recipient of CIA assistance, and, since 1984, the 
leading recipient of NED money in Nicaragua  (Sharkey 1990, 24).   
 Defeating the Sandinistas appeared likely because Nicaragua’s economy had 
collapsed under their rule – one year before the election, inflation reached 35,000%.  The 
question to be answered in Nicaragua’s election seemed not to be whether the Sandinistas 
would be defeated, but which group would defeat them.  Due to her connection with La 
Prensa, Chamorro became the hand-picked candidate of the U.S. in the election 
(MacMichael 1990, 165). 
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 Secretary of State James Baker led the Bush administration’s drive for an 
additional appropriation to be given to NED for use in the election.  Baker claimed that 
the money was needed to “level the playing field” in Nicaragua.  Originally, both Baker 
and the administration were clear that the money would go to Chamorro’s campaign, 
even though other opposition candidates existed.  When asked about how the money 
would be used, Baker stated that it would be used for automobiles, telephones, and 
advertising - just as any other campaign would use it  (Felton 1989a, 2406). 
 Early on, the general idea of assisting the opposition in Nicaragua found 
widespread support in Congress, but as details of the plan were revealed, many key 
Democrats became uneasy with it.  They were bothered by the prospect of the U.S. 
becoming active in a foreign election   (Felton 1989a, 2406).  They also noted that NED 
was prohibited from supporting specific candidates or parties with its grants – a 
restriction that the Bush administration wanted Congress to waive as part of the 
appropriation  (Felton 1989a, 2406; Felton 1989b, 2479; “Help Nicaragua’s Democrats, 
Openly” 14 September 1989, A28).   
In the face of this opposition, the Bush administration dropped any mention of 
direct support for Chamorro and UNO from its request  (Felton 1989a, 2406).  Congress 
ultimately passed a $9 million appropriation to be given to NED to distribute in 
Nicaragua for the 1989 election.  The appropriation contained two restrictions – no 
money could be used for partisan purposes and no covert assistance could be used  
(Felton 1987b, 2479). 
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Despite the restriction against the appropriation being used for partisan purposes, 
almost all of the money went to Chamorro and UNO.  Focusing assistance on one party – 
when other opposition parties existed and also needed financial help – gave the 
appearance of partisanship  (Sharkey 1990, 23).  NED officials and the Bush 
administration claimed that the assistance did not violate any prohibition on partisan use 
because it was used to help build UNO’s party infrastructure.  They claimed that the 
money was used to help pay for vehicles, equipment, voter registration drives, and 
political education – not for campaigning.  Even if this were true, it could be argued that 
NED’s assistance in helping to pay for these items and activities helped free-up other 
UNO resources for use in campaigning that would have been used for these 
infrastructure-building projects.  It appeared that instead of leveling the playing field for 
everyone in Nicaragua, the U.S. leveled it only for UNO – a point that Secretary of State 
Baker eventually admitted  (Felton 1989a, 2406; Sharkey 1990, 23).  
U.S. money flowing through NED to UNO took much longer than expected to 
arrive in Nicaragua.  Two factors explained the delay.  First, NED – wary of potential 
controversy – went beyond its usual level of caution in monitoring the money.  Second, 
the Sandinistas did everything within their power to stop its delivery  (Pear 4 February 
1990, A3).  The Sandinista-controlled National Assembly made it a crime for any 
Nicaraguan group to accept U.S. contributions  (Nichols 1990, 266).  Due to pressure 
from the U.S. and the international community, the Assembly backed-off its absolute ban 
on U.S. contributions and replaced it with a 50% tax on all U.S. contributions accepted.  
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The Assembly claimed that the revenue was needed to help pay for the administrative 
costs of the upcoming election  (Nichols 1990, 266-267). 
Nicaragua’s modified policy on U.S. funding was also met with outrage by the 
U.S. government.  However, the U.S. was unable to muster enough support in the 
international community to force another policy change.  Internationally, it appeared that 
many countries became disenchanted with the U.S. attempt to influence Nicaragua’s 
election.  These countries pointed out that U.S. campaign finance laws were even more 
restrictive on foreign contributions than Nicaragua’s (Nichols 1990, 266). 
UNO’s willingness to accept U.S. contributions was used by the Sandinistas as a 
campaign issue.  Chamorro and UNO were portrayed as “tools of a foreign, hostile 
government”  (Nichols 1990, 266).  The money also caused UNO to factionalize.  The 
influx of such large amounts of money resulted in intra-party fights over who controlled 
the money and how it would be used  (Nichols 1990, 266 and 268).  The other opposition 
parties that were not given money by NED became virulently anti-UNO, even more so 
than they were anti-Sandinista.  As U.S. contributions to UNO increased, domestic 
contributions to UNO vanished, leaving questions about whether UNO had any 
significant support within its own country.  The negative results of the influx of U.S. 
money caused many to begin questioning whether the money was doing more harm than 
good.  More importantly, some wondered whether the money was helping to promote 
democracy or actually destroying the natural progress of politics in Nicaragua toward 
more freedom (Nichols 1990, 268). 
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The plan to overtly lead UNO to victory in Nicaragua fell-apart soon after the 
U.S. money arrived.  The Sandinistas were able to turn around the economy, resulting in 
a dramatic increase in their popularity  (MacMichael 1990, 165).  At the same time, UNO 
– partly due to the negative impact of U.S. money – was floundering.  Victory appeared 
likely for the Sandinistas.   
Panicking, the Bush administration pushed to resume funding to the Contras.  The 
Bush administration and its supporters theorized that the lack of an active Contra 
presence in Nicaragua since the Iran-Contra scandal had allowed the Sandinistas to turn 
their attention to issues like the economy.  They also believed that the Sandinistas 
benefited politically because of the peace that resulted from the weakening of the 
Contras.  By unleashing a well-funded and revitalized Contra force on Nicaragua, the 
Bush administration hoped to force Sandinista attention away from the economy and 
cause a return to the violence of the past.  Also, as an added benefit, the Contras could 
help campaign for UNO in the countryside.  Desperate to win in Nicaragua, 
Congressional Democrats betrayed their prior anti-Contra polemics and agreed to the 
plan  (MacMichael  1990, 162 and 165).   
The Contra resurgence elicited a harsh Sandinista response, plunging Nicaragua 
into the worst violence seen in years  (MacMichael 1990, 165).  This helped Chamorro 
and UNO win the election and appeared to justify the policies of the Bush administration 
and the role played by NED.  However, many in Congress and many around the world 
were not comfortable with the means used to achieve victory.  Even supporters of U.S. 
actions in Nicaragua eventually admitted that the whole situation was “troubling.”  In 
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trying to bring democracy to Nicaragua, the U.S. violated many of the democratic 
principles it was claiming to promote  (Sharkey 1990, 22).    
1994 Authorization Fight 
 NED has had a rocky relationship with Congress.  The tone of the relationship 
was set immediately following NED’s creation.  For its first year-of-operations, Congress 
authorized $18 million – an amount that was far below the administration’s request.  
What was significant about the NED’s first authorization process was that it was used as 
a forum for members of Congress to express their misgivings about the organization.  
During the authorization process, more time was spent arguing over NED’s structure than 
was spent discussing how much money the organization needed to function effectively.  
In many ways, the debate surrounding NED’s funding was more intense and better 
informed than the earlier debate on whether to create the organization  (“Crusaders Fall 
Out” 1984, 25).  This set a precedent for NED – the yearly authorization process has 
become the site of some of its greatest political battles. 
 This was especially true in 1993 – during the 1994 authorization process – when 
the Clinton administration asked for a 60% increase in NED funding.  If granted, NED’s 
funding level would have increased from $30 million in 1993 to $48 million in 1994.  
The magnitude of the request caught Congress by surprise and led to a political battle 
over the organization’s existence  (Corn 1993b, 56).   
 In reaction to the Clinton administration’s request, the House voted to eliminate 
all funding for NED by a vote of 243-181  (Corn 1993b, 57; Doherty 1993, 1672).  
NED’s defeat in the House was bipartisan – two-thirds of Republicans and a slight 
 36
  
majority of Democrats voted for its elimination.  The lack of support in the House for the 
organization stemmed from a combination of two factors – the push to cut the federal 
budget and a lack of support for international programs  (Doherty 1993, 1672; Weigel 
1993, 1).  This sentiment was especially high among first-term House members, who 
voted 75-36 to defund NED  (Doherty 1993, 1672; Palmer 1993, 2759).  Therefore, when 
the House searched for programs to cut, international programs – such as NED – became 
endangered.  The Clinton administration’s bloated request drew the ire of House 
members to the organization, making it a prime target for elimination.     
 The House vote sent shockwaves through NED and the Clinton administration.  
Both focused their attention on the Senate and its authorization process, where the 
organization could be saved.  As has been the case in most instances when NED is under-
fire, a long list of high-profile supporters came to its defense.  This time, the list included 
former Presidents Jimmy Carter, George Bush, and Ronald Reagan; Senators Richard 
Lugar, Orrin Hatch, and John McCain; and journalists George Will, A.M. Rosenthal, 
David Broder, and Morton Kondracke.  These “all-stars” inundated the Senate and the 
public with glowing reports about the work NED was doing around the world  (Corn 
1993a, 280; Palmer 1993, 2759). 
 When the issue of NED’s funding reached the Senate, Senators from the left – 
Paul Wellstone, John Kerry, Tom Harkin, Edward Kennedy, and Carol Moseley-Braun – 
joined Senators from the right – Strom Thurmond, Phil Gramm, and Trent Lott – in 
championing its cause  (Corn 1993a, 280).  The Senate saved NED, but it appropriated 
less than the Clinton administration requested.  Instead of $48 million, it authorized $35 
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million – still a $5 million increase over the previous year.  The House later agreed to this 
amount in conference committee  (Palmer 1993, 2759).   
 In analyzing the NED funding crisis, Senator Hank Brown noted that NED has a 
powerful group of supporters with diverse political connections  (Palmer 1993, 2759).  
These connections make NED a formidable political opponent and give it power beyond 
what would be expected of a relatively small organization.  As a result, discussions and 
debates about NED often center around politics, not honest appraisals of NED’s value. 
DEBATES SURROUNDING NED 
 To highlight the issues that are fundamental to discussions about NED, the major 
points-of-argument regarding the organization will be discussed.  The issues include 
whether the U.S. should be interfering in the politics of other countries, whether NED 
makes its own foreign policy irrespective of official U.S. policy, whether NED promotes 
democracy or U.S. interests, whether NED views democracy ethnocentrically, whether 
NED has been successful in its efforts, whether NED is a “political sacred cow,” whether 
NED is redundant, and whether NED escapes proper oversight through purposefully 
vague documentation of its activities. 
Interference in the Politics of Other Countries 
 In his farewell address, George Washington stated the following:  “Foreign 
influence is one of the most baneful foes of republican government”  (Conry 1994, 17).  
If true, Washington’s words suggest that promoting freedom in another country by 
becoming involved in its domestic affairs – as NED does – may ultimately be 
counterproductive.  NED’s critics agree, arguing that there is a fundamental contradiction 
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between NED’s goal of promoting democracy and free markets and its “interference” in 
and “manipulation” of political and economic processes of other countries  (Sims 1990, 
6).  Such meddling has led some to call NED a “loose cannon” that may do more harm 
than good in the fight for freedom around the world  (Carothers 1994, 123; Shipler 1 June 
1986, A1). 
 NED’s supporters have responded to these critics by asserting that the line 
between assistance and interference is not easily drawn  (Carothers 1994, 131).  For 
example, NED’s charter forbids the organization or its grantees from giving money to 
candidates for political office.  Instead, NED money, when given to a political party, goes 
toward building that party’s infrastructure – registering voters, getting voters to the polls, 
etc. – not toward campaigning.  In many of these countries, opposition parties are too 
weak to effectively challenge the establishment.  By enhancing a party’s infrastructure, 
NED helps to guarantee that the political marketplace will have multiple views for voters 
to choose from.   
NED’s assistance for party infrastructure parallels the concept of “soft money” 
contributions in the U.S.  Just as we have found in the U.S. with “soft money” 
contributions, distinguishing between the use of money for general party needs and for 
the support of a specific candidate is almost impossible.  Most NED supporters recognize 
this.  A statement by Joshua Muravchik summarizes their position – “NED does not 
support candidates for office, but it does come close”  (Muravchik 1992, 142).     
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A Separate Right-Wing Foreign Policy 
 Since its founding, NED has been called a conservative – if not reactionary – 
organization.  NED’s structure reveals this to be true.  Of its four core grantees, three – 
IRI, ACILS, and CIPE – have long histories of being highly conservative in their foreign 
policy worldviews and activities.  These grantees represent the Republican party, labor, 
and business, respectively.  The fourth grantee – NDI – represents the Democratic party 
and has a more moderate foreign policy stance.  The three conservative grantees typically 
get 60% of NED grant money, with the moderate fourth grantee getting only 10% (the 
other 30% of grants are discretionary).  This supports the argument that NED is, 
structurally, conservative  (Conry 1994, 17).   
 The conservative leaning of the organization has caused many moderate and 
liberal observers to claim that NED has become a parallel, conservative mini-State-
Department, making its own foreign policy without regard for official U.S. policy  (Corn 
1993b, 57; “Reagan’s ‘Foreign Aid’ for Democracy” 1983, 54).  If true, the possibility 
exists that NED could contradict official U.S. policy regarding a country and cause an 
international incident  (“Crusaders Fall Out” 1984, 25; Shipler 1 June 1986, A1).  
Inconsistencies between NED’s activities and U.S. policy have occurred in the past  
(Carothers 1994, 129; Shipler 1 June 1986, A1).  The most notable inconsistency 
(described above) was when NED funded organizations in France that were fighting the 
policies of a U.S.-friendly French government.  Fortunately, these inconsistencies have 
not caused any foreign policy disasters. 
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 NED’s supporters deny that the organization is a separate right-wing foreign 
policy making organization.  They claim that the organization does not take a position on 
foreign policy questions.  It concentrates only on helping freedom movements and 
activists around the world  (Weigel 1993, 9).  Fortunately, they claim that NED does not 
need to be overly concerned with contravening U.S. foreign policy because U.S. foreign 
policy overwhelming tends to be pro-freedom and, therefore, agrees with the 
organization’s activities.   
According to NED’s supporters, a further safeguard against the organization’s 
activities contradicting U.S. foreign policy is the fact that it is not a “renegade” 
organization.  Its leadership is composed of current and former senior U.S. government 
officials and others who typically agree with U.S. foreign policy and would be highly 
reluctant to contradict it  (Carothers 1994, 129).  Instances of contradiction between NED 
activities and U.S. foreign policy – such as the France example – all occurred in the 
organization’s early years when the grant process was new and still had many 
imperfections.  The process has been improved and such contradictions are not likely to 
occur again  (Shipler 1 June 1986, A1).       
Promoting Freedom or U.S. Interests 
 Some critics question whether NED truly pursues the altruistic goal of promoting 
freedom.  They see within the organization’s activities not altruism, but a selfish motive – 
the promotion of U.S. interests.  They assert that NED is just another means by which the 
U.S. government promotes its interests around the world  (Shipler 1 June 1986, A1). 
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 Critics note that NED has never given money to a group whose agenda conflicts 
with U.S. interests  (Robinson 1996, 105).  NED money has consistently gone to groups 
whose interests reflect the desires of the U.S. in their home-country.  Whether they 
promote freedom or not, these groups help promote U.S. interests  (Sims 1990, 4 and 17).  
In fact, countries in which the organization is most active tend to be countries in which 
the U.S. has already expressed a foreign policy priority  (Robinson 1996, 92). 
 NED supporters deny that the organization’s goal is to promote U.S. interests – its 
goal is to promote democracy and economic freedom around the world.  The correlation 
cited between NED activity and U.S. foreign policy exists because freedom – the driving 
force behind NED activity – is also a central factor in U.S. foreign policy making.  
Therefore, promoting freedom and promoting U.S. interests often go hand-in-hand  
(Albright 1997, <http://secretary.state.gov/www/statements/970409.html>).   
Democratic Ethnocentrism 
 NED’s critics claim that the organization views democracy ethnocentrically – 
NED’s literature and conferences evince a clear preference for democracy “U.S.-style”  
(Carothers 1996, 39).  Following a precedent set in the 1950s and 1960s by U.S. policy 
makers such as W.W. Rostow (discussed in Chapter 1), the organization tends to 
generalize the process of political development in the U.S. to other countries, whether 
such a generalization is appropriate or not  (Carothers 1994, 134 and 135).  These critics 
also note the irony of emphasizing the adoption of U.S.-style democracy at a time when 
the well-being of democracy in the U.S. is impugned by scholars in the U.S. and around 
the world  (Carothers 1996, 35).  NED’s supporters deny that U.S.-style democracy is 
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emphasized in its activities.   In fact, the organization asserts in its mission statement that 
a democratic system must be tailored to “local needs and traditions” (NED, 
<http://www.ned.org/page_6/nedstmt.html>; Weigel 1993, 5).   
NED Success 
 According to its critics, NED and its supporters are unable to cite any “definitive” 
successes that justify its continued existence  (Conry 1994, 17; Shipler 1 June 1986, A1).  
On the other hand, its critics are able to name many NED failures and shortcomings  
(Conry 1994, 17).  The successes highlighted by NED and its supporters – for example, 
the end of the Cold War and the rise of democracy in Eastern Europe – are dismissed by 
critics as being exaggerated  (Carothers 1994, 136). 
 Without proof of its effectiveness, these critics assert that taxpayer dollars are 
being wasted on the organization and could be used more effectively elsewhere in the 
federal budget  (Sims 1990, 4).  The possibility of restructuring NED or its grant-making 
program to make it more effective is rejected because many critics also doubt that NED 
can have an impact on the type of macro-level events that it attempts to influence.  They 
doubt that any organization can really promote freedom in another country  (“Reagan’s 
‘Foreign Aid’ for Democracy” 1983, 54).    
 NED’s supporters claim that the organization has had success, despite its woefully 
inadequate budget  (Diamond 1992, 41; Gergen 1991, 68).  They give the organization 
credit for playing an important role in helping the third-wave of democracy sweep the 
world  (Carothers 1994, 123-124; Progressive Policy Institute 1991, 
<http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/amerfp.txt>).  Specifically, according to its 
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supporters, NED’s claimed successes include helping break-up the Warsaw Pact, 
assisting the triumph of freedom in Chile and Haiti, and supporting democrats in Soviet 
Union and China  (Gergen 1991, 68; Weigel 1993, 11).  They claim that these 
accomplishments show that the organization can effectively promote democracy in other 
countries  (Muravchik 1992, 142).   
Pork Barrel Politics 
 Critics have described NED as a “political sacred cow”  (Corn 1997, 27), valued 
as a source of pork-barrel projects and lavish political junkets abroad for Washington’s 
elites  (Carothers 1994, 123; Corn 1992, 648).  These elites include high-level 
“Republican and Democratic party activists, conservative trade unionists, and free 
marketeers” who use the organization to further their own agendas  (Corn 1993b, 57).  
Critics further allege that NED provides its spoils systematically in an attempt to gain 
friends that can help it politically  (Samuels 1995, 53).  In essence, the elites use NED for 
generous perks, and the organization uses the elites for political gain and protection.  This 
type of “inside-the-beltway political logrolling,” according to critics, makes it the type of 
program that needs to be abolished  (Conry 1994, 16).  However, if true, this “political 
logrolling” helps guarantee NED’s survival, instead of endangering it.  The 
organization’s supporters deny that the organization engages in this type of “political 
logrolling.”  They note that these critics fail to cite specific examples where it has 




 A main argument used in Congress to argue for eliminating NED is that the 
organization performs functions already performed by the U.S. Agency for International 
Development (USAID) and USIA  (Carothers 1994, 130-131; Carothers 1995, 63; Corn 
1997, 27).  In a time of tight federal budgets, especially in regard to international 
programs, the argument that the organization is redundant has great power.   
A 1995 General Accounting Office (GAO) draft report found NED to be 
redundant and recommended its elimination.  GAO was willing to preserve NED if its 
record proved that it was more effective at promoting freedom than USAID and/or USIA.  
If NED was more effective, GAO would have recommended that freedom promotion 
programs at either USAID or USIA be eliminated.  However, GAO’s review of all three 
organizations concluded that NED was the least effective in promoting freedom.  As a 
result, it recommended the organization’s elimination  (Corn 1997, 27).   
NED supporters deny that the organization is redundant.  Unlike USAID and 
USIA, NED’s quasi-governmental status gives it more freedom to act effectively in 
politically-sensitive situations  (Phillips 1993, 
<http://www.heritage.org/library/categories/forpol/em360.html>; Weigel 1993, 10).  
Since it operates autonomously from the dictates of the White House and the State 
Department, it can act more quickly and creatively when confronted with a difficult 
situation  (Carothers 1994, 136; Carothers 1995, 63; Diamond 1992, 39; Weigel 1993, 
10).  Structurally, NED is different from USAID and USIA.  Its lack of bureaucratic 
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restrictions allow it to be more flexible in the kinds of programs it undertakes and how it 
seeks to handle them  (Carothers 1995, 63; Weigel 1993, 10). 
Oversight Problems 
 Critics also charge that Congressional oversight of NED has been insufficient due 
to a lack of clear, candid NED record-keeping.  In overseeing NED, Congress relies 
primarily on records supplied by NED, which have often been purposefully vague and 
misleading  (Sims 1990, 73).  As a result, Congress and GAO have complained that 
tracing the use of NED funds is often impossible  (“The Quiet Americans” 1987, 273).  
This secrecy of the organization conflicts with the openness that it claims to practice, 
promote, and believe-in  (Sims 1990, 5).  Since openness is a fundamental part of 
freedom, NED appears to be setting a bad example for reformers around the world. 
 Despite NED’s alleged obfuscation, Congress and GAO have been able to find 
problems with how the organization operates.  In 1991, a GAO report found misuse of 
funds, improper documentation, and inadequate monitoring of grant recipients  (Diamond 
1992, 41).  GAO investigated thirty-six NED projects and found only one to have been 
properly handled  (Corn 1991, 548).  Critics wonder how many more problems would be 
unearthed if the organization was more forthcoming with details of its activities. 
 NED supporters claim that oversight problems are an inevitable part of promoting 
freedom.  NED deals with many groups who operate in secrecy.  While secrecy may be 
undemocratic and troubling to many, full disclosure could endanger the activities of the 
groups that the organization deals with, as well as the lives of the people who comprise 






reason, any organization dealing with reform groups that operate in unfree countries will 
have problems fully documenting and disclosing its activities. 
CONCLUSION 
Even though critics and supporters of NED disagree on many issues, they agree 
that many aspects of NED are shrouded in secrecy.  This secrecy prevents policy makers 
and the American people from understanding NED’s activities and the results of those 
activities.  The secrecy also prevents the organization from gaining a proper 
understanding of itself.  A thorough analysis of NED is needed in order to break through 
this veil of secrecy.  The analysis would elucidate who gets NED money, how much 
money they get, how the money is used, and whether NED has been successful at 
promoting political and economic freedom around the world.  Such an analysis would 
serve two important purposes.  First, it would help policy makers and the American 
people assess the value of the organization.  Second, it would help NED gain a clearer 
picture of itself.  This would allow the organization to better understand its strengths and 




A STATISTICAL PROFILE OF THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR 
DEMOCRACY’S GRANT MAKING PROGRAM, 1990-1999 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The primary mission of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) is to 
promote democracy and economic freedom around the world.  The main instrument that 
NED uses to accomplish this mission is its grant making program.    Through its grant 
making program, NED financially supports groups in other regions and countries that are 
attempting to bring about more political and economic openness.   
 This chapter will use descriptive statistics to provide an overview of NED grant 
activity during the 1990s.  It will show which regions and countries were the leading 
recipients of grants and grant money.  The trends in NED grant activity that emerged 
during the decade will also be analyzed.  All NED grants – direct and indirect – are 
included in the data.  All money awarded to organizations around the world by NED is 
included, whether it comes from NED’s own budget, or is “flow-through” money from 
other U.S. agencies.   
This chapter represents the first time in the literature on NED that aggregate data 
on NED’s grant activity has been presented and analyzed.  The main reason for the prior 
absence of aggregate data analysis of NED grant activity has been the lack of availability 
of complete NED grant data.  The author of this chapter was fortunate to obtain complete 
data on NED grant activity during a short period of time that the data was made available 




Appendices A and B provide complete data on NED grant activity during the 
1990s.   As shown in Table 3.1, during the 1990s, NED awarded a total of 3,257 grants 
and $267,023,602 in grant money.  This is an average 326 grants and $26,702,360 per 
year.  NED awarded its highest number of grants – 420 – in 1999.  The lowest number of 
grants awarded by NED during the 1990s was 255 in 1991.  NED awarded $31,393,623 
in grant money in 1994 – the highest amount of grant money awarded in any year during 
the 1990s.  The lowest amount of grant money awarded in a single year was $21,274,633 
in 1991.  Both the lowest number of grants and lowest amount of grant money awarded 
by NED during the decade were awarded in 1991.  
 In the first 4 years of the 1990s (1990-1993), the number of grants awarded by 
NED is below the decade’s average of 326 grants per year.  The number of grants 
awarded in these years were the following: 1990 (262), 1991 (255), 1992 (295), and 1993 
(284).  In the last 6 years of the decade, the number of grants awarded by NED is above 
the average.  The number of grants awarded in these years were the following: 1994 
(334), 1995 (345), 1996 (346), 1997 (339), 1998 (377), and 1999 (420).   
In 5 out of 10 years in the decade, the amount of grant money awarded by NED is 
below the decade’s yearly average of $26,702,360.  These years include 1991 
($21,274,633), 1992 ($22,926,281), 1993 ($23,922,521), 1997 ($26,623,447), and 1998 
($26,689,279).  It should be noted that the amount of grant money awarded by NED in 
1997 and 1998 is barely below the decade’s average.  In the other 5 years of the 1990s, 




                  Table 3.1: NED Grant Activity by Year 
     
Year Grants % of Total NED $ % of Total 
1990 262 8.04% $27,481,743 10.29% 
1991 255 7.83% $21,274,633 7.97% 
1992 295 9.06% $22,926,281 8.59% 
1993 284 8.72% $23,922,521 8.96% 
1994 334 10.25% $31,393,623 11.76% 
1995 345 10.59% $29,389,463 11.01% 
1996 346 10.62% $28,722,155 10.76% 
1997 339 10.41% $26,623,447 9.97% 
1998 377 11.58% $26,689,279 10.00% 
1999 420 12.90% $28,600,457 10.71% 
Total 3,257 100.00% $267,023,602 100.00% 




include 1990 ($27,481,743), 1994 ($31,393,623), 1995 ($29,389,463), 1996 
($28,722,155), and 1999 ($28,023,602). 
 Figures 3.1 and 3.2 show the trends that occurred in NED grant making during the 
1990s.  Figure 3.1 shows that the number of grants awarded by NED increased over the 
course of the decade.  In 1999, NED awarded 420 grants – 158 more than it awarded in 
1990.  The biggest increases in the number of grants awarded by NED came in 1992, 
1994, 1998, and 1999.  In 1992, the number of grants awarded by NED increased by 40 
over the number awarded in 1991 (295 compared to 255).  In 1994, the number of grants 
awarded increased by 50 over the number awarded in 1993 (334 compared to 284).  In 
1998, the number of grants awarded increased by 31 over the number awarded in 1997 
(377 compared to 339).  In 1999, the number of grants awarded increased by 43 over the 
number awarded in 1998 (420 compared to 377).  The number of grants awarded by NED 
in 1991, 1993, 1995, 1996, and 1997 did not show a dramatic increase over the number 
awarded in the previous year. 
Figure 3.2 shows that, even though the amount of grant money awarded by NED 
at the beginning and end of the decade was similar ($27,481,743 in 1990 and 
$28,600,457 in 1999), the decade saw strong variation from year-to-year.  After 
beginning the decade by awarding $27,481,743 in 1990, the amount of NED grant money 
awarded dropped sharply in 1991 to $21,274,633 and stayed at a low level in 1992 
($22,926,281) and 1993 ($23,922,521).  The amount of NED grant money increased 
dramatically to $31,393,623 in 1994.  Then, the amount decreased to $29,389,463 in 
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1995, $28,722,155 in 1996, and $26,623,447 in 1997.  It held steady at $26,689,279 in 
1998 and, finally, increased to $28,600,457 in 1999. 
REGION OVERVIEW 
 Table 3.2 breaks-down NED grant activity by region.  For each year, the table 
lists the number of NED grants and the amount of NED grant money received by 
organizations that are active within the 8 regions that have been defined by NED.  These 
regions are Africa, Asia, Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, 
the Middle East, Multi-Region (grants involving recipients that are active in more than 
one of the other 7 regions), the Newly Independent States, and Other.   
 Figure 3.3 shows the total number of NED grants received by groups in each 
region from 1990-1999.  Groups in Asia received the highest number of NED grants with 
612 (18.79% of the total number of grants),  Latin America and the Caribbean is second 
with 582 grants (17.87% of the total), Central and Eastern Europe is third with 567 grants 
(17.41% of the total), the Newly Independent States are fourth with 565 grants (17.35% 
of the total), Africa is fifth with 540 grants (16.58% of the total), the Middle East is sixth 
with 301 grants (9.24% of the total), Multi-Region is seventh with 89 grants (2.73% of 
the total), and Other is last with 1 grant (0.03% of the total).     
What these totals do not show are the fluctuations that occurred in NED grant-
making during the 1990s.  Many of the regions saw their percent-share of NED grants 
change dramatically over the course of the decade.  Figure 3.4 reveals these fluctuations 
by showing the percent of the total number of NED grants that each region received in 






















































Figure 3.2: Amount of NED Grants, 1990-1999
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                              Table 3.2: NED Grant Activity by Region  
      
   % of  % of 
Year Region Grants Yearly Total NED $ Yearly Total
1990 Africa 16 6.11% $1,724,750 6.28% 
1990 Asia 34 12.98% $2,646,537 9.63% 
1990 C/E Europe 99 37.79% $13,544,180 49.28% 
1990 Latin Am./Caribbean 80 30.53% $7,239,666 26.34% 
1990 Middle East 1 0.38% $50,000 0.18% 
1990 Multi-Region 6 2.29% $608,865 2.22% 
1990 Newly Independent Sts. 25 9.54% $1,396,807 5.08% 
1990 Other 1 0.38% $270,938 0.99% 
1990 Total 262 100.00% $27,481,743 100.00% 
1991 Africa 48 18.82% $3,334,682 15.67% 
1991 Asia 38 14.90% $3,550,559 16.69% 
1991 C/E Europe 53 20.78% $5,165,868 24.28% 
1991 Latin Am./Caribbean 63 24.71% $4,798,252 22.55% 
1991 Middle East 15 5.88% $636,553 2.99% 
1991 Multi-Region 8 3.14% $1,097,427 5.16% 
1991 Newly Independent Sts. 30 11.76% $2,691,292 12.65% 
1991 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1991 Total 255 100.00% $21,274,633 100.00% 
1992 Africa 56 18.98% $4,155,908 18.13% 
1992 Asia 53 17.97% $4,020,900 17.54% 
1992 C/E Europe 60 20.34% $4,385,164 19.13% 
1992 Latin Am./Caribbean 62 21.02% $4,804,719 20.96% 
1992 Middle East 10 3.39% $596,333 2.60% 
1992 Multi-Region 10 3.39% $1,227,916 5.36% 
1992 Newly Independent Sts. 44 14.92% $3,735,341 16.29% 
1992 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1992 Total 295 100.00% $22,926,281 100.00% 
1993 Africa 53 18.66% $3,627,651 15.16% 
1993 Asia 50 17.61% $3,933,005 16.44% 
1993 C/E Europe 44 15.49% $3,458,143 14.46% 
1993 Latin Am./Caribbean 47 16.55% $4,362,483 18.24% 
                  (table continued) 
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   % of  % of 
Year Region Grants Yearly Total NED $ Yearly Total
1993 Middle East 21 7.39% $1,429,812 5.98% 
1993 Multi-Region 8 2.82% $1,514,880 6.33% 
1993 Newly Independent Sts. 61 21.48% $5,596,547 23.39% 
1993 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1993 Total 284 100.00% $23,922,521 100.00% 
1994 Africa 57 17.07% $3,780,529 12.04% 
1994 Asia 57 17.07% $5,889,536 18.76% 
1994 C/E Europe 48 14.37% $4,454,400 14.19% 
1994 Latin Am./Caribbean 65 19.46% $6,006,411 19.13% 
1994 Middle East 36 10.78% $2,490,072 7.93% 
1994 Multi-Region 16 4.79% $2,615,350 8.33% 
1994 Newly Independent Sts. 55 16.47% $6,157,325 19.61% 
1994 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1994 Total 334 100.00% $31,393,623 100.00% 
1995 Africa 53 15.36% $3,310,015 11.26% 
1995 Asia 74 21.45% $6,965,107 23.70% 
1995 C/E Europe 54 15.65% $4,708,871 16.02% 
1995 Latin Am./Caribbean 63 18.26% $5,416,991 18.43% 
1995 Middle East 42 12.17% $2,691,472 9.16% 
1995 Multi-Region 10 2.90% $1,604,426 5.46% 
1995 Newly Independent Sts. 49 14.20% $4,692,581 15.97% 
1995 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1995 Total 345 100.00% $29,389,463 100.00% 
1996 Africa 53 15.32% $3,246,362 11.30% 
1996 Asia 75 21.68% $8,957,918 31.19% 
1996 C/E Europe 43 12.43% $3,246,395 11.30% 
1996 Latin Am./Caribbean 54 15.61% $4,629,947 16.12% 
1996 Middle East 51 14.74% $3,399,439 11.84% 
1996 Multi-Region 14 4.05% $1,377,673 4.80% 
1996 Newly Independent Sts. 56 16.18% $3,864,421 13.45% 
1996 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1996 Total 346 100.00% $28,722,155 100.00% 
1997 Africa 56 16.52% $3,335,228 12.53% 
                  (table continued) 
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   % of  % of 
Year Region Grants Yearly Total NED $ Yearly Total
1997 Asia 68 20.06% $6,879,224 25.84% 
1997 C/E Europe 42 12.39% $3,546,066 13.32% 
1997 Latin Am./Caribbean 46 13.57% $4,395,061 16.51% 
1997 Middle East 45 13.27% $3,070,271 11.53% 
1997 Multi-Region 8 2.36% $757,667 2.85% 
1997 Newly Independent Sts. 74 21.83% $4,639,930 17.43% 
1997 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1997 Total 339 100.00% $26,623,447 100.00% 
1998 Africa 72 19.10% $3,608,657 13.52% 
1998 Asia 77 20.42% $6,641,769 24.89% 
1998 C/E Europe 51 13.53% $3,108,479 11.65% 
1998 Latin Am./Caribbean 49 13.00% $3,378,392 12.66% 
1998 Middle East 40 10.61% $3,171,468 11.88% 
1998 Multi-Region 9 2.39% $1,434,922 5.38% 
1998 Newly Independent Sts. 79 20.95% $5,345,592 20.03% 
1998 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1998 Total 377 100.00% $26,689,279 100.00% 
1999 Africa 76 18.10% $3,405,770 11.91% 
1999 Asia 86 20.48% $7,242,423 25.32% 
1999 C/E Europe 73 17.38% $5,138,387 17.97% 
1999 Latin Am./Caribbean 53 12.62% $4,889,172 17.09% 
1999 Middle East 40 9.52% $3,105,904 10.86% 
1999 Multi-Region 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1999 Newly Independent Sts. 92 21.90% $4,818,887 16.85% 
1999 Other 0 0.00% $0 0.00% 
1999 Total 420 100.00% $28,600,543 100.00% 
Total Africa 540 16.58% $33,529,552 12.56% 
Total Asia 612 18.79% $56,726,978 21.24% 
Total C/E Europe 567 17.41% $50,755,953 19.01% 
Total Latin Am./Caribbean 582 17.87% $49,921,094 18.70% 
Total Middle East 301 9.24% $20,641,324 7.73% 
Total Multi-Region 89 2.73% $12,239,126 4.58% 
                  (table continued) 
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% of % of 
Year Region Grants Yearly Total NED $ Yearly Total
Total Newly Independent Sts. 565 17.35% $42,938,723 16.08% 
Total Other 1 0.03% $270,938 0.10% 




































































































 Two of the eight regions – Central and Eastern Europe and Latin American and 
the Caribbean – began the 1990s as the leading recipients of NED grants and saw their 
percent-share of NED grants deteriorate throughout the decade.   Central and Eastern 
Europe began the decade as the top recipient of NED grants, but saw its percent-share of 
NED grants drop by over 50% by 1999.  From 1990-1999, Central and Eastern Europe’s 
percent-share of the total number of NED grants in each year and its rank among the 
eight regions for that year was the following:  37.79% (1st), 20.78% (2nd), 20.34% (2nd), 
15.49% (5th), 14.37% (5th), 15.65% (3rd), 12.43% (6th), 12.39% (6th), 13.53% (4th), and 
17.38% (4th).   
During the 1990s, Latin America and the Caribbean was the top recipient of NED 
grants in 1991, 1992, and 1994, but also experienced a sharp decline in its share of the 
total number of NED grants by the end of the decade.  Its percent-share and rank among 
the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  30.53% (2nd), 24.71% (1st), 21.02% (1st), 
16.55% (4th), 19.46% (1st), 18.26% (2nd), 15.61% (3rd), 13.57% (4th), 13.00% (5th), and 
12.62% (5th). 
 Four of the eight regions – the Newly-Independent States, Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia – saw their percent-share of NED grants increase over the course of the 
decade.  The Newly-Independent States region began the decade as the fourth leading 
recipient of NED grants awarded that year (received 9.54% of the total number) and 
ended the decade in 1997, 1998, and 1999 as the top recipient of NED grants awarded in 
these year (received 21.83%, 20.95%, and 21.90%, respectively).  Its percent-share and 
rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  9.54% (4th), 11.76% (5th), 
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14.92% (5th), 21.48% (1st), 16.47% (4th), 14.20% (5th), 16.18% (2nd), 21.83% (1st), 
20.95% (1st), and 21.90% (1st).   
Africa also experienced a large increase in its percent-share of NED grants.  In 
1990, Africa was the fifth leading recipient of NED grants (received 6.11% of the total 
number); in 1999, it was the third leading recipient of NED grants (received 18.10%).  
Africa’s percent-share of grants reached a high of 19.10% in 1998 (making it the third 
leading recipient that year).  Its percent-share and rank among the regions from 1990-
1999 was the following:  6.11% (5th), 18.82% (3rd), 18.98% (3rd), 18.66% (2nd), 17.07% 
(2nd), 15.32% (4th), 16.52% (3rd), 19.10% (3rd), and 18.10% (3rd).   
The Middle East began the decade by receiving only 1 grant in 1990 (0.38% of 
the total number of grants awarded).  In 1999, the Middle East’s number of grants had 
increased to 40 (9.52% of the total).  The Middle East percent-share of NED grants hit a 
high of 14.74% (making it the fifth leading recipient) in 1996.  However, despite 
receiving an increased share of NED grants, the Middle East was not able to rise above 
fifth place among the eight regions in any year.  Its percent-share and rank among the 
regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  0.38% (7th), 5.88% (6th), 3.39% (6th), 7.39% 
(6th), 10.78% (6th), 12.17% (6th), 14.74% (5th), 13.27% (5th), 10.61% (6th), and 9.52% 
(6th).  
Asia also experienced an increase in its share of NED grants.  In 1990, Asia was 
awarded 12.98% of the grants awarded by NED, making it the third leading recipient of 
NED grants awarded that year.  In 1995 and 1996, Asia ranked first among the eight 
regions with shares of 21.45% and 21.68%, respectively.  In 1999, it was awarded 
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20.48% of the total number of NED grants, making it the second leading recipient.  Its 
percent-share and rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  12.98% 
(3rd), 14.90% (4th), 17.97% (4th), 17.61% (3rd), 17.07% (2nd), 21.45% (1st), 21.68% (1st), 
20.06% (2nd), 20.42% (2nd), and 20.48% (2nd).    
The two remaining regions – Multi-Region and Other – experienced no growth in 
the number of NED grants that they received in the 1990s.  In 1990, Multi-Region was 
only awarded 6 grants (2.29% of the total number), making it the seventh leading 
recipient of NED grants.  The share of grants awarded to Multi-Region hit a high of 
4.79% in 1994 (making it the sixth leading recipient that year).  However, the region 
ended the decade in 1999 by receiving 0 grants from NED.  Multi-Region’s percent-share 
and rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  2.39% (6th), 3.14% (7th), 
3.39% (7th), 2.82% (7th), 4.79% (7th), 2.90% (7th), 4.05% (7th), 2.36% (7th), 2.39% (7th), 
and 0.00% (7th).  The last region – Other – received its only grant of the decade in 1990.    
Figure 3.5 shows the total amount of NED grant money received by groups in 
each region from 1990-1999.  Groups in Asia received the most NED grant money with 
$56,726,978 (21.24% of the total amount given), Central and Eastern Europe was second 
with $50,755,953 (19.01% of the total), Latin America and the Caribbean was third with 
$49,921,094 (18.70% of the total), the Newly Independent States were fourth with 
$42,938,723 (16.08% of the total), Africa was fifth with $33,529,552 (12.56% of the 
total), the Middle East was sixth with $20,641,324 (7.73%% of the total), Multi-Region 
was seventh with $12,239,126 (4.58% of the total), and Other was last with $270,938 
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As with the number of NED grants by region, these totals do not show the 
fluctuations that occurred during the 1990s.  Many of the regions saw their percent-share 
of NED grant money change dramatically over the course of the decade.  Figure 3.6 
shows these changes.  It shows the percent of the total amount of NED grant money that 
each region received in each year from 1990-1999.  Only three regions – Central and 
Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Other – saw their percent-share of 
NED money decrease over the course of the decade.  Central and Eastern Europe began 
the decade as the dominant recipient of NED money.  In 1990, 49.28% of money 
awarded by NED went to Central and Eastern Europe.  This percentage was almost twice 
as much as the next highest recipient of NED money (Latin America and the Caribbean 
with 26.34%).  In 1991, Central and Eastern Europe saw its percent-share of NED money 
decrease by more than 50% (dropped from 49.28% to 24.28%).  For the remainder of the 
decade, the percent-share of NED grant money awarded to Central and Eastern Europe 
ranged from 11.30% (in 1996) to 17.97% (in 1999).  Central and Eastern Europe’s 
percent-share and rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  49.28% 
(1st), 24.28% (1st), 19.13% (2nd), 14.46% (5th), 14.19% (4th), 16.02% (4th), 11.30% (6th), 
13.32% (4th), 11.65% (6th), and 17.97% (2nd).   
Latin America and the Caribbean began the decade by receiving 26.34%, 22.55%, 
and 20.96% of the NED grant money awarded in 1990, 1991, and 1992.  These 
percentages ranked Latin American and the Caribbean second, second, and first, 
respectively, among the eight regions for those years.  After 1992, with only one 


































Figure 3.6: Percent of NED Grant Money by Region, 1990-1999 
 66
 
to-upper-teens.  The exception was in 1998 when the region’s percent-share of NED 
grant money hit a low of 12.66%.  Latin American and the Caribbean’s percent-share and 
rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  26.34% (2nd), 22.55% (2nd), 
20.96% (1st), 18.24% (2nd), 19.13% (2nd), 18.43% (2nd), 16.12% (2nd), 16.51% (3rd), 
12.66% (4th), and 17.09% (3rd).  The Other region was awarded $270,938 in 1990.  It did 
not receive any more NED grant money during the rest of the decade. 
 Four of the eight regions – Asia, the Newly Independent States, the Middle East, 
and Africa – saw their percent-share of NED grant money increase during the 1990s.  In 
1990, Asia received 9.63% of all grant money awarded by NED, making it the third 
leading recipient of NED grant money that year.  This percentage represents the lowest 
share of NED money that Asia would be awarded during any year of the 1990s.  From 
1991-1999, Asia was the leading recipient of NED funding.  For example, in every year 
from 1995-1999, Asia was awarded the most NED grant money of any region.  Asia’s 
percent-share reached its zenith in 1996 when the region received 31.19% of NED grant 
money.  Its percent-share and rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  
9.63% (3rd), 16.69% (3rd), 17.54% (4th), 16.44% (3rd), 18.76% (3rd), 23.70% (1st), 31.19% 
(1st), 25.84% (1st), 24.89% (1st), and 25.32% (1st).   
The Newly Independent States began the 1990s as the fifth leading recipient of 
NED grant money.  In 1990, the Newly Independent States received 5.08% of the grant 
money awarded by NED.  This percent-share was easily its lowest of the decade.  In the 
rest of the decade, its share was above 10% in every year, above 15% in seven years, and 
above 20% in two years.  The region’s highest percent-share of NED grant money was in 
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1993, when it received 23.39% and ranked first among the regions.  Its percent-share and 
rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was the following:  5.08% (5th), 12.65% (5th), 
16.29% (5th), 23.39% (1st), 19.61% (2nd), 15.97% (3rd), 13.45% (3rd), 17.43% (2nd), 
20.03% (2nd), and 16.85% (4th).   
 Out of all eight regions, the Middle East’s share of NED grant money has 
experienced the most dramatic rise.  In 1990, the Middle East was awarded only $50,000 
by NED.  This was 0.18% of the total amount of grant money awarded by NED.  From 
1991-1995, the Middle East’s percent-share of NED grant money steadily increased.  In 
1996, its percent-share exceeded 10% for the first time in the decade.  In the three years 
that followed, its share of NED money remained above 10.00%, reaching a high of 
11.88% in 1998 (ranking it fifth among the regions).  Despite this dramatic rise in its 
share of NED grant money, the Middle East ranked sixth or seventh among the regions in 
every year except 1996 and 1998.  Its percent-share and rank among the regions from 
1990-1999 was the following:  0.18% (7th), 2.99% (7th), 2.60% (7th), 5.98% (7th), 7.93% 
(7th), 9.16% (6th), 11.84% (4th), 11.53% (6th), 11.88% (5th), and 10.86% (6th).   
 Africa also witnessed a strong increase in its share of NED grant money.  In 1990, 
Africa was awarded 6.28% of all NED grant money (ranking fourth among the regions).  
By the end of the decade, this share had risen to 11.91% (ranking it fifth).  From 1991-
1999, Africa received more than 10% of NED grant money in each year.  Its highest 
share of NED grant money was in 1992, when it received 18.13% (ranking it third for 
that year).  The region also surpassed the 15% level in 1991 and 1993, when it was 
awarded 15.67% and 15.16% of NED grant money (ranking it fourth in both years, 
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respectively).  Africa’s percent-share and rank among the regions from 1990-1999 was 
the following:  6.28% (4th), 15.67% (4th), 18.13% (3rd), 15.16% (4th), 12.04% (5th), 
11.26% (5th), 11.30% (5th), 12.53% (5th), 13.52% (3rd), and 11.91% (5th).    
In 1990, the last region – Multi-Region – was awarded only 2.22% of all NED 
grant money, making it the seventh leading recipient that year.  The share of grants 
awarded to Multi-Region hit a high of 8.33% in 1994 (making it the sixth leading 
recipient that year).  However, in 1999, the region ended the decade by receiving no 
funding from NED.  Multi-Region’s percent-share and rank among the regions from 
1990-1999 was the following:  2.22% (6th), 5.16% (6th), 5.36% (6th), 6.33% (7th), 8.33% 
(6th), 5.46% (7th), 4.80% (7th), 2.85% (7th), 5.38% (7th), and 0.00% (7th). 
COUNTRY OVERVIEW 
 Table 3.3 shows the ten countries whose organizations were awarded the highest 
number of NED grants during the 1990s.  These totals include NED grants that were 
awarded to a single organization or multiple organizations that are active within a single 
country.  During the 1990s, China and Russia were easily awarded the highest number of 
NED grants with 222 and 221, respectively.  The third highest recipient – Nigeria with 93 
grants – was awarded fewer than half of the number of NED grants that China and Russia 
were awarded.  The rest of the ten leading recipients and the number of grants that each 
received in the 1990s was the following:  Ukraine was fourth with 92, Cuba was fifth 
with 81 grants, Romania and Zaire were tied for sixth with 69 grants, Burma was eighth 




Table 3.3: 10 Leading Recipients of NED Grants, 
                   1990-1999   
  # of  
Rank Country NED Grants  
1 China 222  
2 Russia 221  
3 Nigeria 93  
4 Ukraine 92  
5 Cuba 81  
6 Romania 69  
7 Zaire 69  
8 Burma 67  
9 Poland 64  





Table 3.4: 10 Leading Recipients of NED Grant    
                  Money, 1990-1999 
   
Rank Country Total NED $  
1 China $20,999,229  
2 Russia $15,522,687  
3 Poland $9,166,499  
4 Ukraine $8,611,558  
5 Nicaragua $7,541,963  
6 South Africa $6,016,424  
7 Romania $5,833,829  
8 Cuba $5,707,893  
9 Mexico $5,373,409  
10 Bulgaria $5,356,105  
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Table 3.4 shows the ten countries that NED awarded the most grant money to 
during the 1990s.  Again, these totals include NED grant money that was awarded to a 
single organization or multiple organizations that were active within a single country.  
China was awarded $20,999,229 by NED – easily the most grant money awarded to any 
country during the 1990s.  Russia was awarded the second highest amount with 
$15,522,687.  Poland was a distant third with $9,166,499 in NED grant money.  The rest 
of the ten leading recipients of NED grant money and the amount that each received in 
the 1990s was the following:  Ukraine was fourth with $8,611,558; Nicaragua was fifth 
with $7,541,963; South Africa was sixth with $6,016,424; Romania was seventh with 
$5,833,829; Cuba was eighth $5,707,893; Mexico was ninth with $5,373,409; and 
Bulgaria was tenth with $5,356,105.   
 Tables 3.5 and 3.6 show the countries that were the ten leading recipients of NED 
grants and grant money for each individual year during the 1990s.  In 1990, Poland was 
the leading recipient of NED grants (19) and grant money ($4,969,613).  Russia received 
the most grants and grant money in 1991 with 17 and $1,091,392, respectively.  In 1992, 
Burma was the leading recipient of grants (27) and grant money ($2,150,082).  From 
1993 through the end of the decade, China and Russia were the dominant recipients of 
NED grants and grant money.  China received the most grants of any country in 1993, 
1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998.  China also received the most grant money in 1995, 1996, 
1997, 1998, and 1999.  Russia was the leading recipient of NED grants in 1994 and 1999.  




Table 3.5: 10 Leading NED Grant 
             Recipients by Year 
    
   # of 
Year Rank Country Grants 
1990 1 Poland 19 
1990 2 Romania 16 
1990 3 Bulgaria 14 
1990 4 Mexico 12 
1990 5 Hungary 9 
1990 6 Nicaragua 9 
1990 7 China 7 
1990 8 Haiti 7 
1990 9 Paraguay 7 
1990 10 Argentina 6 
1991 1 Russia 17 
1991 2 China 10 
1991 3 Nicaragua 10 
1991 4 Poland 10 
1991 5 South Africa 9 
1991 6 Chile 7 
1991 7 Cuba 7 
1991 8 Hungary 7 
1991 9 Burma 6 
1991 10 Romania 6 
1992 1 Burma 27 
1992 2 Russia 18 
1992 3 Cuba 13 
1992 4 South Africa 13 
1992 5 Poland 12 
1992 6 Nicaragua 10 
1992 7 China 8 
1992 8 Ethiopia 6 
1992 9 Mexico 5 
1992 10 Nigeria 5 
                       (table continued)
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   # of 
Year Rank Country Grants 
1993 1 China 27 
1993 2 Russia 24 
1993 3 Ukraine 17 
1993 4 South Africa 12 
1993 5 Cuba 9 
1993 6 Slovakia 8 
1993 7 Peru 7 
1993 8 Hungary 6 
1993 9 Kenya 6 
1993 10 Nicaragua 6 
1994 1 Russia 25 
1994 2 China 23 
1994 3 Ukraine 11 
1994 4 Mexico 10 
1994 5 Cuba 8 
1994 6 Nicaragua 8 
1994 7 South Africa 8 
1994 8 Romania 7 
1994 9 Kenya 6 
1994 10 Peru 6 
1995 1 China 28 
1995 2 Russia 21 
1995 3 Cambodia 11 
1995 4 Cuba 9 
1995 5 Nigeria 9 
1995 6 Nicaragua 8 
1995 7 Mexico 7 
1995 8 Romania 7 
1995 9 Ukraine 7 
1995 10 Venezuela 7 
1996 1 China 29 
1996 2 Russia 23 
1996 3 Cambodia 12 
                       (table continued)
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   # of 
Year Rank Country Grants 
1996 4 Nigeria 11 
1996 5 Ukraine 10 
1996 6 Zaire 10 
1996 7 Bosnia 8 
1996 8 Cuba 8 
1996 9 Romania 7 
1996 10 Venezuela 7 
1997 1 China 30 
1997 2 Russia 28 
1997 3 Nigeria 16 
1997 4 Belarus 13 
1997 5 Ukraine 10 
1997 6 Zaire 10 
1997 7 Mexico 8 
1997 8 Romania 8 
1997 9 Cuba 7 
1997 10 Lybia 7 
1998 1 China 40 
1998 2 Russia 35 
1998 3 Nigeria 21 
1998 4 Ukraine 15 
1998 5 Zaire 14 
1998 6 Belarus 13 
1998 7 Slovakia 11 
1998 8 Mexico 8 
1998 9 Venezuela 8 
1998 10 Colombia 7 
1999 1 Russia 30 
1999 2 Burma 28 
1999 3 Belarus 20 
1999 4 China 20 
1999 5 Zaire 18 
1999 6 Nigeria 16 
                       (table continued)
 75
 
   # of 
Year Rank Country Grants 
1999 7 Slovakia 15 
1999 8 Ukraine 14 
1999 9 Bosnia 10 





Table 3.6: 10 Leading NED Grant Money 
Recipients by Year 
    
   NED $ 
Year Rank Country Awarded 
1990 1 Poland $4,969,613 
1990 2 Bulgaria $2,210,686 
1990 3 Romania $1,724,551 
1990 4 Nicaragua $1,309,329 
1990 5 Haiti $1,234,000 
1990 6 Hungary $897,461 
1990 7 Mexico $834,740 
1990 8 Burma $608,865 
1990 9 Brazil $583,122 
1990 10 South Africa $545,500 
1991 1 Russia $1,091,392 
1991 2 Poland $892,025 
1991 3 South Africa $887,928 
1991 4 Albania $848,136 
1991 5 Burma $806,932 
1991 6 Nicaragua $750,130 
1991 7 Hungary $671,585 
1991 8 China $579,537 
1991 9 Chile $545,200 
1991 10 Bulgaria $538,786 
1992 1 Burma $2,150,082 
1992 2 South Africa $1,778,720 
1992 3 Nicaragua $1,278,034 
1992 4 Poland $751,539 
1992 5 Russia $747,219 
1992 6 Cuba $655,643 
1992 7 Hungary $569,480 
1992 8 China $409,000 
1992 9 Philippines $398,000 
                           (table continued) 
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   NED $ 
Year Rank Country Awarded 
1992 10 Romania $397,960 
1993 1 Russia $2,379,059 
1993 2 China $1,791,011 
1993 3 Ukraine $1,408,483 
1993 4 South Africa $1,164,809 
1993 5 Nicaragua $998,491 
1993 6 Hungary $806,145 
1993 7 Cuba $520,100 
1993 8 Peru $479,335 
1993 9 Slovakia $445,304 
1993 10 Poland $392,421 
1994 1 Russia $2,212,595 
1994 2 Ukraine $2,150,656 
1994 3 China $1,866,835 
1994 4 Nicaragua $1,218,532 
1994 5 Mexico $898,090 
1994 6 South Africa $616,459 
1994 7 Poland $585,058 
1994 8 Lithuania $579,141 
1994 9 Cuba $577,965 
1994 10 Dem Rep Vietnam $565,770 
1995 1 China $2,276,516 
1995 2 Russia $2,166,461 
1995 3 Ukraine $1,131,289 
1995 4 Cambodia $986,478 
1995 5 Cuba $873,563 
1995 6 Nicaragua $697,739 
1995 7 Mexico $694,483 
1995 8 Poland $623,402 
1995 9 Bulgaria $537,636 
1995 10 Romania $472,892 
1996 1 China $3,856,228 
1996 2 Russia $1,541,660 
                           (table continued) 
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   NED $ 
Year Rank Country Awarded 
1996 3 Cambodia $1,248,363 
1996 4 Cuba $719,780 
1996 5 Ukraine $678,665 
1996 6 Venezuela $612,130 
1996 7 Romania $575,273 
1996 8 Bosnia $548,746 
1996 9 Nigeria $470,056 
1996 10 Poland $462,914 
1997 1 China  $3,308,026 
1997 2 Russia $1,519,683 
1997 3 Cambodia $1,176,691 
1997 4 Mexico $1,103,450 
1997 5 Nigeria $1,024,953 
1997 6 Romania $952,124 
1997 7 Belarus $752,967 
1997 8 Ukraine $707,145 
1997 9 Turkey $673,695 
1997 10 Lithuania $670,396 
1998 1 China $3,859,193 
1998 2 Russia $2,471,603 
1998 3 Nigeria $1,089,978 
1998 4 Ukraine $994,678 
1998 5 Turkey $760,616 
1998 6 Slovakia $760,548 
1998 7 Mexico $714,354 
1998 8 Belarus $673,984 
1998 9 Venezuela $601,334 
1998 10 Egypt $496,255 
1999 1 China $2,649,133 
1999 2 Burma $1,648,200 
1999 3 Russia $1,393,015 
1999 4 Venezuela $1,051,370 
1999 5 Ukraine $1,023,502 
                           (table continued) 
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   NED $ 
Year Rank Country Awarded 
1999 6 Belarus $909,074 
1999 7 Cuba $744,453 
1999 8 Slovakia $723,555 
1999 9 Turkey $651,214 




Russia received the most grant money in 1993 and 1994.  It was also the second leading 
recipient of grant money in 1995, 1996, 1997, and 1998. 
 Figures 3.7 and 3.8 show the percent of all NED grants and grant money that were 
awarded to top ten recipients in each year.  The figures reveal that, in each year of the 
1990s, NED concentrated a high percentage of its grants and grant money in the ten 
leading recipients of each.  In every year during the decade, over 30% of NED grants and 
grant money were concentrated in its top ten recipients.  In five out of ten years (1990, 
1993, 1997, 1998, and 1999), over 40% of NED grants and grant money were 
concentrated in its top ten recipients.  One year – 1990 – saw over 50 percent of grant 
money awarded to NED’s top ten recipients that year.  This indicates that NED focused 
its yearly grant making on a select few countries.  For the entire decade, this conclusion 
also holds true – 31.96% of NED grants and 33.75% of NED grant money in the 1990s 
went to the top ten overall recipients of each.  
CONCLUSION 
This chapter provides an overview of NED grant activity during the 1990s.  It 
reveals which regions and countries were the leading recipients of grants and grant 
money.  It also reveals the trends in NED grant activity that emerged during the decade.   
The analysis finds that the number of grants awarded by NED increased during 
the 1990s.  In the first four years of the decade (1990-1993), the number of grants 
awarded in each year is below the decade’s average number of yearly grants.  Over the 
























































the decade’s average.  Throughout the 1990s, the amount of NED grant money awarded 
also varied – it was lower in 1991, 1992, and 1993 than in other years.   
Central and Eastern Europe and Latin American and the Caribbean began the 
1990s as the leading recipients of NED grants and saw their percent-share of grants 
deteriorate throughout the decade.  The Newly-Independent States, Africa, the Middle 
East, and Asia saw their percent-share of NED grants increase over the course of the 
decade.  The two remaining regions – Multi-Region and Other – experienced no growth 
in the number of NED grants that they received.   
Central and Eastern Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Other saw 
their percent-share of NED grant money decrease over the course of the decade.  Asia, 
the Newly Independent States, the Middle East, and Africa saw their percent-share of 
NED grant money increase.  Multi-Region saw little change in the amount of NED grant 
money that it received in the 1990s.   
Among individual countries, China and Russia were the dominant recipients of 
NED grants and grant money.  They were awarded the most NED grants and grant money 
in the 1990s.  Just as NED awarded a large number of grants and a large amount of grant 
money to just these two countries, it also concentrated a high percentage of its grants and 




THE DETERMINANTS OF NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY 
GRANT RECIPIENTS AND HOW MUCH THEY RECEIVE, 1990-1999 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 The National Endowment for Democracy (NED) exists to promote democracy 
and economic freedom in countries around the world.  The goal of this chapter is to 
analyze aggregate data on NED’s grant making program in order to gain insight into the 
determinants of which organizations are awarded NED grants and how much grant 
money they receive.  Until now, such an analysis has not been performed, leaving a 
gaping hole in the literature on NED.   
LITERATURE REVIEW 
 This analysis will use the rich theoretical and empirical literature that analyzes the 
determinants of U.S. foreign aid funding decisions as its foundation and starting point.  
This extensive literature covers three decades and includes Blanton 1994; Carleton and 
Stohl 1987; Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985; Hofrenning 1990; Lebovic 1988; 
McCormick and Mitchell 1988; McKinlay and Little 1979; Meernik, Krueger et al. 1998; 
Pasquarello 1988; Poe 1991 and 1992; Poe, et al. 1994; Poe and Sirirangsi 1994; Stohl 
and Carleton 1985; Stohl, Carleton, and Johnson 1984; and Wittkopf 1972.  From this 
literature, certain factors have been mentioned as potentially important in U.S. foreign aid 
funding decisions.  The factors include the following: 
- Level of U.S. Military Presence within a Given Country (Poe 1991, 1992; Poe and 
Meernik 1995; and Meernik, et al. 1998).   
- Level of a Given Country’s Openness to U.S. Trade (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
1995; McKinlay and Little 1979; Meernik, et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik 1995; 
Poe et al. 1994; and Wittkopf 1972).   
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- Level of a Given Country’s Economic Development  (McKinlay and Little1979; 
Meernik et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik, 1995; Poe et al. 1994).  
- Whether the Given Country is a U.S. Alliance Partner (Meernik et al. 1998; Poe 
1991, 1992; Poe and Meernik, 1995).   
- Population of a Given Country (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, McKinlay and 
Little 1979, Meernik et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik 1995; Poe et al. 1994; Wittkopf 
1972).  
- Size of a Given Country’s Economy (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, 
McKinlay and Little 1979, Meernik et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik 1995; Poe et al. 
1994; Wittkopf 1972).  
 
These variables – plus one other (U.S. foreign aid allocations in the same year) – will be 
used as control variables in the analysis that follows.  The operationalizations used for 
these variables largely come from the articles in this literature and will be described at 
length below.  They will control for the traditional motivations behind U.S. foreign aid 
decisions and help allow for the true impact of our independent variables-of-interest 
(democracy and economic freedom) on NED grant making decisions to be analyzed.   
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 The analysis of NED’s grant making will be performed in two stages.  The first 
stage will compare the means of countries that received NED grant money and countries 
that did not receive NED grant money in regard to the independent variables-of-interest, 
all of the control variables gleaned from the literature on U.S. foreign aid allocations, and 
the U.S. foreign aid allocation variable.  The difference of means test on these variables 
will give us preliminary evidence about how recipients and non-recipients compare and 
show which variables appear to have the most impact on NED grant decisions.    
The second stage of the analysis will use regression techniques to further analyze 
these variables.  The regression analysis will have two parts. The first looks at the 
countries that receive NED grants.  The second looks at how much grant money countries 
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receive from NED.  Data for all variables are available for 1990-1999, except for the 
economic freedom variable, which is only available from 1994-1999.  Due to this data 
limitation, each model will be estimated twice.  First, a model including data from 1994-
1999 will be estimated that includes both independent variables of interest (democracy 
and economic freedom).  Second, a model including only the democracy independent 
variable will be estimated for the years 1990-1999.  In all models estimated, variables are 
included to control for traditional motivations for the granting of United States (U.S.) 
foreign aid.  This will allow for the true influence of democracy and economic freedom 
on NED funding decisions to be established. 
Data from all countries – industrialized and unindustrialized – will be included in 
all of these models.  Even though NED’s activities are primarily aimed at 
unindustrialized, third world countries, the organization is not restricted from making 
grants to industrialized, first world countries.  Groups from any country are eligible to 
apply for and receive NED funding.  Even though NED rarely funds groups that are 
active in industrialized countries, instances of such assistance exist.  For example, as 
discussed in Chapter 2, NED awarded grant money to opposition groups in France during 
the mid-1980s.  Also, in 1990, an organization representing activist labor unions in 
Portugal received $270,938 from NED to help it mobilize workers and promote their 
rights in the country.  Since assistance to industrialized countries is not restricted by NED 
and such assistance has been given in the past, the inclusion of data from industrialized 
countries in this analysis seems appropriate.  In fact, estimating all models with and 
without data from industrialized countries made, in almost every instance, no difference 
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in the coefficients and significance of variables in each model.  Ultimately, the exclusion 
of data from industrial countries would have made no impact on the broader conclusions 
drawn from the results of these models.    
Appendix C contains tables that show the observations that will be used to 
estimate each of the models.  Unfortunately, data for every country and every year are not 
available.  The countries that have missing data tend be third world countries that are 
either in chaos and/or isolated from the rest of the world.  Since wealthier countries are 
more likely to have sufficient data to be included in the analysis, the possibility exists that 
the analysis’ results could be skewed toward these wealthier countries and might not 
provide accurate representation to poorer countries.  As discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, all of the models were estimated with and without data from industrialized 
countries and, in almost every instance, there was no difference in the coefficients and 
significance of the variables.  This suggests that the results are not skewed toward 
wealthier countries to such an extent that they render any conclusions unreliable.  In 
Appendix D, year-by-year correlation tables are provided that allow for further inspection 
of the data used in this chapter.         
In the first model, the dependent variable will be dichotomous.  For each country, 
NED Grant Recipient will be coded “1” if any group that was active within the given 
country received NED grant money that year and “0” if no groups received NED grant 
money that year.  NED’s Democracy Projects Database contains data on all grant 




<http://www.ned.org/database/projects.asp>.  Since the dependent variable of the first 
model is dichotomous, logit regression will be used for its estimation. 
In the second model, the dependent variable – Amount of NED Grants – will be 
the total amount of funding received by groups that were active within the given country 
during that year.  The data are also available from the NED’s Democracy Projects 
Database.  Tobit regression will be used to estimate this model because the dependent 
variable is censored.  A dependent variable is considered to be censored when the 
variable’s data cannot have a value below a certain lower limit or above a certain upper 
limit, and a substantial number of observations are clustered at the lower or upper limit 
(Breen 12, 1996; Frone 3, 1997; McDonald and Moffitt 318 and 319, 1980; and Tobin 24 
and 25, 1958).  Since a substantial number of countries received no NED grant money in 
each year (giving a substantial number of observations for the dependent variable used in 
this model a value at the lower limit of “0”), the dependent variable used in this model is 
censored.     
Using ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression to estimate a model with a 
censored dependent variable is problematic.  Among the problems caused by using OLS 
are the following: nonsensical predicted values, biased regression coefficients, error 
terms that are not normally distributed, and heteroskedasticity  (Breen 12-16, 1996; Frone 
3, 1997; McDonald and Moffitt 318, 1980; and Tobin 25, 1958).  Tobit regression 
overcomes these problems by using the maximum likelihood (ML) method of estimation.  
ML estimation for the Tobit model divides the censored dependent variable’s 
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observations into two sets – a set containing all of the variable’s uncensored observations 
(those not clustered at the given limit) and a set containing its censored observations 
(those clustered at the limit).  ML uses these two sets to find estimates that would have 
most likely generated the observed data.  ML tests various population parameters in order 
to find the set of parameters that maximizes the likelihood of finding the variable’s 
observations (Breen 12-27, 1996; McDonald and Moffitt 318 and 319, 1980; and Tobin 
25-30, 1958).  The use of ML estimation has been shown to produce consistent estimates 
for models containing censored dependent variables (McDonald and Moffitt 319, 1980).          
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES-OF-INTEREST 
 Level of Democracy.  This variable measures the level of democracy in a country 
in a given year.  The data-sources for this variable will be the Polity 3d and Polity 4 data-
sets.  The Polity data-sets operationalize democracy through the following factors: 
participation, competitiveness, openness, and constraints on the executive.  These factors 
are combined into one number that captures the level of democracy found in a country in 
a given year.  The variable’s value ranges from 1 (low democracy) to 10 (high 
democracy).  In studies of the democratic peace proposition, the Polity datasets are 
commonly used to quantify the level of democracy in a given country (see Bremer 1992, 
Farber and Gowa 1995, Gowa 1995, Mansfield and Snyder 1995, Maoz and Abdolali 
1989, Maoz and Russett 1993, Oren 1995, Russett 1993, and Weede 1992).  Data for this 
variable are available for every country during the time-period under study, unless a 
country is undergoing tremendous upheaval and is considered to be in a period of 
political transition or uncertainty.  The variable will be included as an independent 
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variable of interest to help show how much a country’s level of democracy factors into 
NED’s grant making decisions. 
 Level of Economic Freedom.  This variable measures the level of governmental 
interference in the economic life of a given country.  The economic freedom variable will 
come from the annual Index of Economic Freedom compiled by The Heritage Foundation 
and The Wall Street Journal.  It focuses on ten economic factors - trade policy, taxation, 
general government intervention, monetary policy, capital flows/foreign investment, 
banking, wage/price controls, property rights, regulation, and the black market.  The 
average of these ten factors represents the level of total economic freedom experienced 
by a country in a given year.  This is the only available measure that includes all of these 
factors. 
The variable’s value ranges from 1.00 to 5.00.  Countries are categorized as 
“Free,” “Mostly Free,” “Mostly Unfree,” and “Repressed” based on their economic 
freedom score.  The values associated with each categorization are the following: 
- 1.00 and 1.99 – Free 
- 2.00 and 2.99 – Mostly Free 
- 3.00 and 3.99 – Mostly Unfree 
- 4.00 and 5.00 – Repressed 
 
This variable will be included as an independent variable of interest to help show how 
much a country’s level of economic freedom factors into NED’s grant-making decisions.   
CONTROL VARIABLES 
U.S. Military Presence.  This value of this variable equals the number of U.S. 
military personnel that are stationed within a given country during a given year.  The 
presence of U.S. military personnel in a country shows that the U.S. has a special military 
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interest in the country.  Financial support of the country by the U.S. through traditional 
foreign aid (or NED funding) could be seen as an effort to protect and/or supplement U.S. 
military and security interests by reinforcing positive relations with the host country and 
helping to keep the leadership of the host country in power  (Poe 1991, 1992; Poe and 
Meernik 1995; and Meernik, et al. 1998).  The U.S. Military Presence variable will help 
control for the impact of U.S. geopolitical self-interest on NED’s grant making decisions.  
The source for military personnel data used here is the Worldwide Manpower 
Distribution by Geographical Area report published by the Directorate for Information 
Operations and Reports of the U.S. Department of Defense’s Washington Headquarters 
Service.   
Openness to U.S. Trade.  This variable controls for U.S. economic self-interest, 
instead of geopolitical self-interest.  The primary impetus for promoting the economic 
self-interest of the United States comes from private political pressure on the government 
to help open markets to U.S. trade and help create more money-making opportunities for 
U.S. business interests.  By using financial assistance to promote U.S. business interests, 
the government can be seen as promoting further U.S. economic development 
(Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1995; McKinlay and Little 1979; Meernik, et al. 1998; Poe 
and Meernik 1995; Poe et al. 1994; and Wittkopf 1972).   
Awarding NED funding to a country that is open to U.S. trade may be seen as a 
reward for trading with the U.S., and/or an inducement to even more trade in the future.  
Withholding NED funding to a country could also be seen as a punishment to countries 
that do not trade with the U.S.  As with the U.S. Military Presence variable, if NED 
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money goes to frequent trade partners of the U.S., NED funding could be seen as a 
supplement of existing U.S. trade policy.  A given country’s openness to U.S. Trade will 
be measured by dividing the total amount of bilateral trade between the country and the 
U.S. by the country’s gross-domestic product (in 1995 dollars).  The data for this variable 
will come from various editions of the International Monetary Fund’s (IMF) Direction of 
Trade Statistics Yearbook and International Financial Statistics Yearbook.     
Level of Economic Development.  This variable reflects the standard of living 
found in a country during a given year.  It helps control for a traditional motive of foreign 
aid – humanitarianism.  Financial assistance awarded to a country with a low level of 
economic development can be seen as an altruistic attempt to improve the lives of people 
who are in distress, not as a calculated attempt for geopolitical and/or economic gain 
(McKinlay and Little1979; Meernik et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik, 1995; Poe et al. 1994).  
This variable will help control for how much a country’s financial need impacts NED’s 
grant-making decisions.  A country’s per-capita gross domestic product (in 1995 dollars) 
will be used to measure its level of development.  This source for this variable will be 
various editions of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook.   
Alliance Partner.    This variable takes into account the possibility that a 
government may give preferential treatment in foreign aid decisions (including NED 
grant making) to countries that it has an amicable relationship with, feels that it has a 
commitment to protect, and/or needs to keep in a given alliance.  Giving financial 
assistance to allies promotes U.S. geopolitical and economic interests by protecting the 
country’s standing with military and economic partners (Meernik et al. 1998; Poe 1991, 
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1992; Poe and Meernik, 1995).  Ally countries include Japan, the Philippines, South 
Korea, as well as formal members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Rio 
Pact, and the South-East Asian Treaty Organization.  The alliance partner variable helps 
control for how positive prior military and economic relationships – as expressed through 
alliances – impact NED grant-making decisions.       
Population and Size of Economy.  Both of these variables control for the relative 
importance of a given country – militarily and economically.  Countries with large 
populations or large economies (as measured by gross domestic product) may garner 
special attention due to their importance and, as a result, be given a disproportionate 
amount of financial assistance (including NED grant money).  Large countries 
(population-wise and economy-wise) can be seen as having greater political and 
economic weight than small countries and, therefore, can be considered as more 
“important.”  Small countries, despite their potentially greater need for assistance, could 
be overlooked due their lack of political and/or economic impact.  They can be perceived 
as less “important.”  (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, McKinlay and Little 1979, 
Meernik et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik 1995; Poe et al. 1994; Wittkopf 1972).  Financial 
assistance to large countries can be seen as furthering U.S. political and economic 
interests.  Both measures will come from various editions of the IMF’s International 
Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
Level of U.S. Foreign Aid.  This variable controls for the possibility that NED 
funding is just an extension of the entire U.S. foreign aid program.  If true, NED grant 
decisions would be dictated by the same factors and have the same goals as traditional 
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U.S. foreign aid, and NED’s grant money would flow to countries who are already 
regular recipients of U.S. foreign aid.  Data on U.S. foreign aid will come from the 
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development’s (OECD) Development  
Assistance Committee (DAC). 
DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST RESULTS 
 As shown in Table 4.1, the average U.S. military presence in countries that 
received NED grants (5,110) is lower than the average U.S. military presence in countries 
that did not receive NED grants (5,571), but the difference is not statistically significant.  
Since the presence of U.S. military personnel is an indicator of the level of U.S. military 
interest in the country (Poe 1991, 1992; Poe and Meernik 1995; and Meernik, et al. 
1998), the suggestion that NED grants may be used to protect and/or supplement U.S. 
military and security interests is not supported.     
The average level of openness to U.S. trade in recipient countries (0.068) is less 
than the average level of openness to U.S. trade in non-recipient countries (0.092).  The 
difference is statistically significant.  As the literature on the impact of U.S. trade 
interests on foreign aid allocations discusses (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1995; 
McKinlay and Little 1979; Meernik, et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik 1995; Poe et al. 1994; 
and Wittkopf 1972), assistance to these less-open countries may be an inducement to 
even more trade in the future.  This indicates that NED grants could be a tool to help 
open markets to U.S. business interests.  
The average level of economic development found in recipient countries ($1,840) 
is much less than the average level of economic development in non-recipient countries  
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Table 4.1: Difference of Means Test Results for Recipients and Non- 
                              Recipients of NED Grant Money, 1990-1999 
       
          Variable              Recipient        Non-Recipient         T-Value
U.S. Military Presence 5,110 5,571 -0.243
Openness to U.S. Trade 0.068 0.092 -4.205*
Level of Economic Development $1,840 $9,727 -7.889*
U.S. Alliance Partner 0.304 0.293 0.480
Population 238,440,152 38,492,195 5.358*
Size of Economy  $318,363,565,910 $360,979,164,211 -0.098
Level of U.S. Foreign Aid $127,021,954 $2,739,821 4.523*
Level of Democracy 4.446 5.480 -4.875*
Level of Economic Freedom 3.445 2.896 11.498*




($9,727).  The difference is statistically significant.  According to the literature on U.S. 
foreign aid allocations (McKinlay and Little1979; Meernik et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik, 
1995; Poe et al. 1994), this indicates that NED grant decisions may be based on the need 
of the applicant country and that geopolitical and/or economic gain for the U.S. is not a 
driving force behind NED grant decisions.   
Recipients of NED grant money tend to participate in slightly more alliances with 
the U.S. than non-recipients.  30.4% of NED grant recipients are alliance members, and 
29.3% of non-recipients are alliance members.  However, the difference is not 
statistically significant.  According to the literature on U.S. foreign aid allocations 
(Meernik et al. 1998; Poe 1991, 1992; Poe and Meernik, 1995), this indicates that 
geopolitical interests, economic interests, and/or an interest in protecting our country’s 
standing with military and economic partners may not guide NED grant decisions.  
The average population of recipient countries (238,440,152) is dramatically 
higher than the average population of non-recipient countries (38,492,195), and the 
difference is statistically significant.  According to the literature on U.S. foreign aid 
allocations (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 1985, McKinlay and Little 1979, Meernik et al. 
1998; Poe and Meernik 1995; Poe et al. 1994; Wittkopf 1972), this indicates that 
countries with large populations may attract more attention from NED because they may 
be seen as “more important.”   
Whereas a larger population means more NED grants, a larger economy does not.  
The average economic size of recipients ($318.4 billion) is less than the average 
economic size of non-recipients ($361.0 billion).  The difference is not statistically 
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significant.  This indicates that the economic size of applicant countries may not have a 
large impact on NED grant decisions.  The possibility raised in the literature (Cingranelli 
and Pasquarello 1985, McKinlay and Little 1979, Meernik et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik 
1995; Poe et al. 1994; Wittkopf 1972) that economically “more important” countries are 
shown favoritism in funding decisions does not seem to be true.   
The average level of U.S. foreign aid received by recipient countries ($127.0 
million) is far greater than the average level received by non-recipient countries ($2.7 
million).    The difference is statistically significant.  This indicates that NED funding 
tends to be awarded to countries that are already receiving U.S. foreign aid and may be 
guided by many of the same motivations that guide traditional U.S. foreign aid.   
Recipients of NED grants have a lower average level of democracy (4.446) than 
non-recipients (5.480).  The difference is statistically significant.  This indicates that the 
“democratic need” of a country may be a factor in NED grant awards.  Countries that are 
in greater need of assistance in developing democracy tend to get more grants.  The same 
appears to be true regarding economic freedom.  The average level of economic freedom 
in recipient countries (3.445) is lower (remember, a higher economic freedom rating 
means that a country has less economic freedom) than the average level in non-recipient 
countries (2.896).  The difference is also statistically significant.  This indicates that 
economic freedom may be a factor in NED grant decisions – the more “needy” countries 
in terms of economic freedom are more likely to receive NED grants. 
 Using information from the variables in which significant differences have been 
found, a rough profile of NED grant recipients and non-recipients can be sketched.   
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  The average recipient country is: 
      
  -         Less open to U.S. trade.  
  -         Far less economically developed. 
  -         Much higher population.  
  -         Receives much more U.S. foreign aid. 
  -         Less democratic.  
  -         Less economic freedom.  
      
  The average non-recipient country is: 
      
  -         More open to U.S. trade.  
  -         Much more economically developed. 
  -         Much lower population.  
  -         Receives much less U.S. foreign aid. 
  -         More democratic.  
  -         More economic freedom.  
 




Figure 4.1 contains the characteristics of each.  The average recipient country is much  
poorer and has a much larger population than the average non-recipient country.  It is less 
open to trade with the U.S., but receives much more U.S. foreign aid.  The average 
recipient has less political and economic freedom than a non-recipient.   
REGRESSION RESULTS 
  Table 4.2 shows the results for the first regression model.  Logit regression is 
used to estimate the model because the dependent variable – NED grant recipient – is  
dichotomous (coded “1” if any group within the given country received NED grant  
money that year and “0” if no groups within the given country received NED grant 
money that year).  The independent variables-of-interest are a country’s level of 
democracy and a country’s level of economic freedom.  The remaining variables are 
included to control for the traditional motivations behind U.S. foreign aid.  The model 
includes observations for these variables from 1994-1999, since data for the economic 
freedom variable are only available for these years.     
 As shown in Table 4.2, the impact of these variables on a country’s chances of 
getting an NED grant is the following: 
- U.S. Military Presence: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and not 
significant. 
- The higher the number of U.S. military personnel that are stationed in a country, 
the lower the likelihood that the country will receive an NED grant. 
- Openness to U.S. Trade: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- The more open a country is to U.S. trade, the lower the likelihood that the 
country will receive an NED grant.  
- Level of Economic Development: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and 
significant. 
- The higher the level of economic development in a country, the lower the 




Table 4.2:  Logit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of 
                   NED Grant Recipients, 1994-1999  
     
 Coefficient 
Variable  (Standard Error) 
Constant 0.175 
 (0.688) 
U.S. Military Presence -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Openness to U.S. Trade -3.076** 
 (0.726) 
Level of Economic Development -0.000** 
 (0.000) 




Size of Economy 4.18E-13 
 (3.60E-13) 
Level of U.S. Foreign Aid 2.70E-06** 
 (7.50E-07) 
Level of Democracy -0.048* 
 (0.029) 
Level of Economic Freedom 0.169 
 (0.182) 
N 787 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.267 
Log Likelihood  -397.3 




- U.S. Alliance Partner: positively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- A country that is a U.S. alliance partner has a higher likelihood of receiving an 
NED grant. 
- Population: positively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- The higher the population of a country, the higher the likelihood that the country 
will receive an NED grant. 
- Size of Economy: positively related to receiving an NED grant and not significant. 
- The larger a country’s economy is, the higher the likelihood that the country will 
receive an NED grant. 
- Level of U.S. Foreign Aid: positively related to receiving an NED grant and 
significant. 
- The more U.S. foreign aid that a country receives, the higher the likelihood that 
the country will receive an NED grant. 
- Level of Democracy: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- The more democratic that a country is, the lower the likelihood that the country 
will receive an NED grant. 
- Level of Economic Freedom: positively related to receiving an NED grant and not 
significant. 
- The more free a country is economically, the lower the likelihood that the 
country will receive an NED grant. 
 
Table 4.3 shows the results for the second regression model.  Since this model has 
the same dichotomous dependent variable as the first model, logit regression is also used.  
This model excludes the economic freedom variable (whose data are only available from 
1994-1999) in order to utilize data from the entire decade (1990-1999).  With the 
economic freedom variable excluded, only the level of democracy variable is left as an 
independent variable-of-interest. 
The exclusion of the economic freedom variable and the inclusion of a full decade 
of data does not change the impact and significance of six variables – U.S. military 
presence, openness to U.S. trade, level of economic development, U.S. alliance partner, 
population, and size of economy.  Two variables – level of U.S. foreign aid and level of 
democracy – do experience a change.  The U.S. foreign aid variable remains positively 
related to a country receiving an NED grant, but it is no longer significant in the second  
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    Table 4.3:  Logit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of 
                       NED Grant Recipients, 1990-1999  
     
 Coefficient 
Variable  (Standard Error) 
Constant 0.216* 
 (0.104) 
U.S. Military Presence -0.000 
 (0.000) 
Openness to U.S. Trade -3.265** 
 (0.604) 
Level of Economic Development -0.000** 
 (0.000) 




Size of Economy 1.03E-13 
 (2.24E-13) 
Level of U.S. Foreign Aid 1.49E-09 
 (9.29E-10) 
Level of Democracy -0.000 
 (0.019) 
N 1,460 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.212 
Log Likelihood  -784.5 




model.  In the first model, the democracy variable is negatively related to a country 
receiving an NED grant, and the variable is significant.  In the second model, it is still 
negatively related, but is not significant.    
Table 4.4 shows the results for the third regression model.  In this model, the 
dependent variable – amount of NED grants – is the total amount of NED funding 
received by groups that are active within a given country during a given year.  Since a 
substantial number of countries received no NED grant money in each year (giving a  
substantial number of observations for the dependent variable a value at the lower limit of 
“0”), Tobit regression will be used to estimate the model.  The independent variables-of-
interest are a country’s level of democracy and a country’s level of economic freedom.  
The remaining variables are included to control for the traditional motivations behind 
U.S. foreign aid.  The model includes observations for these variables from 1994-1999, 
since data for the economic freedom variable are only available for these years.     
 As shown in Table 4.4, the impact of these variables on the amount grant money 
awarded by NED to a country is the following: 
- U.S. Military Presence: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- The higher the number of U.S. military personnel that are stationed in a country, 
the lower the amount of NED grants that the country will receive. 
- Openness to U.S. Trade: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- The more open a country is to U.S. trade, the lower the amount of NED grants 
that the country will receive.  
- Level of Economic Development: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and 
significant. 
- The higher the level of economic development in a country, the lower the amount 
of NED grants that the country will receive. 
- U.S. Alliance Partner: positively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 




   Table 4.4:  Tobit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of 
                      NED Grant Amounts, 1994-1999  
     
 Coefficient 
Variable  (Standard Error) 
Constant -298,807.3 
 (204,380.5) 
U.S. Military Presence -20.645** 
 (5.637) 
Openness to U.S. Trade -803,392.5** 
 (232,703.4) 
Level of Economic Development -50.885** 
 (8.183) 




Size of Economy 1.67E-07* 
 (8.06E-08) 
Level of U.S. Foreign Aid -0.001** 
 (0.000) 
Level of Democracy -12,291.96 
 (8,584.19) 
Level of Economic Freedom 116,725.4* 
 (53,592.32) 
N 787 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.027 
Log Likelihood  -5,444.4 





- Population: positively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- The higher the population of a country, the higher the amount of NED grants that 
the country will receive. 
- Size of Economy: positively related to receiving an NED grant and significant. 
- The larger a country’s economy is, the higher the amount of NED grants that the 
country will receive. 
- Level of U.S. Foreign Aid: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and 
significant. 
- The more U.S. foreign aid that a country receives, the lower the amount of NED 
grants that the country will receive. 
- Level of Democracy: negatively related to receiving an NED grant and not 
significant. 
- The more democratic that a country is, the lower the amount of NED grants that 
the country will receive. 
- Level of Economic Freedom: positively related to receiving an NED grant and 
significant. 
- The more free a country is economically, the lower the amount of NED grants 
that the country will receive. 
 
Table 4.5 shows the results for the fourth regression model.  Since this model has 
the same censored dependent variable as the previous model, Tobit regression is also 
used.  This model excludes the economic freedom variable (whose data are only available 
from 1994-1999) in order to utilize data from the entire decade (1990-1999).  With the 
economic freedom variable excluded, only the level of democracy variable is left as an 
independent variable-of-interest.  The exclusion of the economic freedom variable and  
the inclusion of a full decade of data only changes the impact and significance of one 
variable – size of economy.  The variable is still positively related to NED funding, but is 
no longer significant.   
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
Based on the difference of means test results, NED funds projects in countries that 
have a large, poor population that has little political or economic freedom.  This indicates  
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Table 4.5: Tobit Regression Estimates of the Determinants of 
                    NED Grant Amounts, 1990-1999  
     
 Coefficient 
Variable  (Standard Error) 
Constant -35,472.26 
 (36,429.51) 
U.S. Military Presence -9.324** 
 (3.390) 
Openness to U.S. Trade -1,057,048.0** 
 (214,288.9) 
Level of Economic Development -58.742** 
 (5.515) 




Size of Economy 9.10E-08 
 (5.65E-08) 
Level of U.S. Foreign Aid -0.000* 
 (0.000) 
Level of Democracy -2,392.35 
 (6,567.47) 
N 1,460 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.021 
Log Likelihood  -9,528.4 




that NED does not base its grant decisions on promoting selfish U.S. interests, but, 
instead, bases its decisions more on a country’s need for assistance.  The only selfish 
motivation suggested by the difference of means test results can be found in the 
explanation for why recipients of NED grants are less open to U.S. trade than non-
recipients.  The literature on U.S. foreign aid allocations (Cingranelli and Pasquarello 
1995; McKinlay and Little 1979; Meernik, et al. 1998; Poe and Meernik 1995; Poe et al. 
1994; and Wittkopf 1972) would contend that the desire to open these countries’ markets 
to U.S. companies may help explain this result.   
Table 4.6 summarizes the regression results for all four models.  Openness to U.S. 
trade, level of economic development, U.S. alliance partner, and population are 
significant in all four regression models.  The two independent variables-of-interest – 
level of democracy and level of economic freedom – have the same impact on the 
dependent variables (remember, due to the coding of data for each variable, a negative 
impact for level of democracy and a positive impact for level of economic freedom 
indicate that a greater amount of each means fewer NED grants and less NED grant 
money).  However, level of democracy is significant in the first model and not significant 
in the second, third, and fourth models.  Level of economic freedom (included in only the 
first and third models due to data limitations) is not significant in the first model, but is 
significant in the third model.   The inconsistent significance of these two variables 
across the regression models casts doubt on their importance to NED grant making 
decisions.  At the very least, democracy and economic freedom do not have the same 
level of importance as some of the other variables. 
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                       Table 4.6: Comparison of Regression Model Results   
     
  Recipient/Non-Recipient    How Much Awarded
    Model 1    Model 2    Model 3    Model 4 
          Variable Sign Sig. Sign Sig. Sign Sig. Sign Sig.
U.S. Military Presence - No - No - Yes - Yes
Openness to U.S. Trade - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
Level of Economic Development - Yes - Yes - Yes - Yes
U.S. Alliance Partner + Yes + Yes + Yes + Yes
Population + Yes + Yes + Yes + Yes
Size of Economy + No + No + Yes + No 
Level of U.S. Foreign Aid + Yes + No - Yes - Yes
Level of Democracy - Yes + No - No - No 
Level of Economic Freedom + No n/a n/a + Yes n/a n/a 






The regression results are consistent with the difference of means test results in 
showing that poorer countries with larger populations are more likely to receive NED 
grants and more likely to receive more overall NED funding.  This indicates that a 
country’s need for assistance at least partly motivates NED funding decisions.  However, 
selfish motivations may also exist.  As seen in the difference of means test results, the 
regression results show that more NED grants and funding tend to be awarded to 
countries who are less open to trade with the U.S.  The regression results also show that  
NED awards more grants and funding to countries that are U.S. alliance partners.  This 
indicates that NED may be using its grant making program to help open foreign markets 
to U.S. companies that were previously closed and to help promote the U.S.’s 
geopolitical and economic interests by financially supporting its military and economic 
partners.    
 
CHAPTER 5 
A QUANTITATIVE ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPACT OF NATIONAL 
ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY GRANTS, 1990-1999 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In the post-Cold War world, promoting democracy and economic freedom has 
become a cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy, and foreign aid has become the instrument 
of choice for its promotion by the U.S.  Even though billions of dollars have been spent 
to promote democracy and free markets through U.S. foreign aid, little is known about 
the impact that this money has had.  Even those who adamantly advocate the practice are 
unsure whether it has a positive impact.  Much of the evidence about the impact of 
promoting democracy and economic freedom through foreign aid is based on anecdotal 
evidence, not sophisticated analysis of objective aggregate data gathered over a 
substantial period of time.   
This chapter will provide an objective and thorough assessment of the impact of 
promoting democracy and economic freedom by analyzing the grant activities of the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED) – the most visible and most controversial 
U.S. organization devoted to promoting democracy and free markets – during the 1990s.  
A review of the literature on NED reveals that this chapter will be the first attempt to use 
aggregate data to gauge the impact of NED’s grant making program.  It is hoped that this 
analysis will help policy makers and the American people assess the value of promoting 
democracy and economic freedom through foreign aid and help policy makers gain a 
better understanding of this popular foreign policy tool.  By better understanding the use 
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of foreign aid to promote democracy and economic freedom, adjustments can be made to 
help improve its quality and effectiveness. 
BACKGROUND 
As discussed in Chapter 1, NED’s critics claim that they can cite many failures 
and shortcomings of the organization and are unable to cite any of NED’s successes  
(Conry 1994, 17; Shipler 1 June 1986, A1).  These critics dismiss almost all of the 
successes claimed by NED and its supporters as being exaggerated and impossible to 
prove (Carothers 1994, 136).  Many of NED’s critics doubt that any organization can 
really promote democracy and economic freedom in another country, much less change 
the entire political and economic landscape of the world  (“Reagan’s ‘Foreign Aid’ for 
Democracy” 1983, 54).   
Therefore, when NED takes credit for helping to bring about systemic change in 
world affairs (for example, the end of the Cold War and the rise of democracy in Eastern 
Europe), NED’s critics are quick to protest.  They are doubtful that any single 
organization can have an impact on these types of earth-shaking, macro-level events.  
Without some objective proof of NED’s effectiveness in promoting democracy and 
economic freedom, NED’s critics will remain steadfast in their opposition to the 
organization and continue to worry that taxpayer dollars are being wasted or used 
counterproductively (Sims 1990, 4).   
 NED’s supporters claim that the organization has had many successes and has 
been a profitable investment by the U.S. government  (Diamond 1992, 41; Gergen 1991, 
68).  They say that NED’s track record has conclusively shown that the organization can 
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effectively promote democracy and economic freedom in other countries  (Muravchik 
1992, 142).  NED’s supporters claim that the organization played an important role in 
helping the third-wave of democracy sweep the world through its involvement in 
breaking-up the Warsaw Pact, assisting the triumph of freedom in Chile and Haiti, and 
supporting democrats in the Soviet Union and China  (Carothers 1994, 123-124; Gergen 
1991, 68;  Progressive Policy Institute 1991, 
http://www.dlcppi.org/texts/foreign/amerfp.txt; Weigel 1993, 11).  They claim that 
NED’s involvement in promoting the global resurgence of democracy and economic 
freedom justifies not only the continued existence of the organization, but a dramatic 
increase in its funding by the U.S. government (Diamond 1992, 41; Gergen 1991, 68).        
As this shows, NED’s impact on political and economic freedom in countries 
throughout the world is hotly debated.  Unfortunately, the literature on NED does not 
contain a thorough analysis of the organization’s effectiveness.  This chapter will attempt 
to contribute such an analysis to the literature.  The impact of NED’s main tool for 
promoting democracy and economic freedom – its grant making program – will be 
analyzed.  By providing some insight into NED’s effectiveness, the analysis will help 
policy makers gain a clearer picture of NED and help NED gain a clearer picture of itself.  
It is hoped that this analysis will provide objective evidence that policy makers can use to 
make better-informed decisions regarding NED and help the organization to better 
understand its own impact on the world.  The results of the analysis will also attempt to 
answer the broader question of whether democracy can be effectively promoted through 




 The effectiveness of NED’s grant making program will be analyzed in two stages.  
The first stage will have two parts.  The first part will compare countries that experienced 
an increase in their level of democracy during the 1990s to countries that experienced no 
increase or a decline in their level of democracy.  The means of these two groups in 
regard to how much NED funding that they received and in regard to a series of control 
variables will be compared.  The included variables will be explained at length below.  
The second part will be similar to the first part, except that countries will be grouped 
according to their change in economic freedom from 1994-1999 (the only data available 
for the economic freedom variable), instead of their change in democracy during the 
entire 1990s.  Difference of means tests will be performed on these variables to provide 
preliminary evidence about how countries that experienced gains in democracy and 
economic freedom during the 1990s compare to countries that did not experience gains.   
The second stage of the analysis will use regression techniques to further analyze 
these variables.  The regression analysis will estimate two models. The first model looks 
at the impact of NED grant money and other control variables on changes in the level of 
democracy found in all countries throughout the 1990s.  The second model looks at the 
impact of the same variables on changes in the level of economic freedom found in all 
countries from 1994-1999.   
Even though NED’s activities are primarily aimed at unindustrialized, third world 
countries, the organization is not restricted from making grants to industrialized, first 
world countries.  Groups from any country are eligible to apply for and receive NED 
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funding.  Even though NED rarely funds groups that are active in industrialized 
countries, instances of such assistance exist.  For example, as discussed in Chapter 2, 
NED awarded grant money to opposition groups in France during the mid-1980s.  Also, 
in 1990, an organization representing activist labor unions in Portugal received $270,938 
from NED to help it mobilize workers and promote their rights in the country.  Since 
assistance to industrialized countries is not restricted by NED and such assistance has 
been given in the past, the following analysis will focus on the results of estimating 
models with data from all countries.  In fact, estimating both models with and without 
data from industrialized countries makes little difference in the coefficients and 
significance of variables in each model.  Even though the analysis that follows will focus 
on data from all countries, estimates for models with data from only unindustrialized 
countries will be included to show that little, if any, difference exists.     
Appendix E contains tables that show the observations that will be used to 
estimate each of the models.  Unfortunately, data for every country and every year is not 
available.  The countries that have missing data tend be third world countries that are 
either in chaos and/or isolated from the rest of the world.  Since wealthier countries are 
more likely to have sufficient data to be included in the analysis, the possibility exists that 
the analysis’ results could be skewed toward these wealthier countries and might not 
provide accurate representation to poorer countries.  As discussed in the preceding 
paragraph, all of the models were estimated with and without data from industrialized 
countries and, in almost every instance, there was no difference in the coefficients and 
significance of the variables.  This suggests that the results are not skewed toward 
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wealthier countries to such an extent that they render any conclusions unreliable.  In 
Appendix F, correlation tables are provided that allow for further inspection of the data 
used in this chapter.         
In the first model, the dependent variable will be Change in Level of 
Democracy.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the Polity 3d and 4 data-sets operationalize 
democracy through the following factors: participation, competitiveness, openness, and 
constraints on the executive.  These factors are combined into one number that captures 
the level of democracy found in a country in a given year.  The variable’s value ranges 
from 1 (low democracy) to 10 (high democracy).  The change in level of democracy 
variable that is utilized as the dependent variable in this model is the result when a 
country’s earliest level of democracy during the 1990s is subtracted from its latest level 
of democracy in the decade.  For example, a country with a level of democracy of “3” in 
1990 and a level of democracy of “7” in 1999 would have a change in level of democracy 
of “4.”  A positive value indicates that the country’s level of democracy has increased, 
while a negative value indicates that the country’s level of democracy has decreased.      
In the second model, the dependent variable will be Change in Level of 
Economic Freedom.  As discussed in Chapter 4, the level of economic freedom variable 
measures the level of governmental interference in the economic life of a given country.  
The economic freedom variable is found in the annual Index of Economic Freedom 
compiled by The Heritage Foundation and The Wall Street Journal.  It focuses on ten 
economic factors - trade policy, taxation, general government intervention, monetary 
policy, capital flows/foreign investment, banking, wage/price controls, property rights, 
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regulation, and the black market.  The average of these ten factors represents the level of 
total economic freedom experienced by the country in a given year.  The variable’s value 
ranges from 1.00 to 5.00.  Countries are categorized as “Free,” “Mostly Free,” “Mostly 
Unfree,” and “Repressed” based on their economic freedom score.  The values associated 
with each categorization are the following: 
- 1.00 and 1.99 – Free 
- 2.00 and 2.99 – Mostly Free 
- 3.00 and 3.99 – Mostly Unfree 
- 4.00 and 5.00 – Repressed 
 
The change in level of economic freedom variable that is utilized as the dependent 
variable in this model is the result when a country’s earliest level of economic freedom 
from 1994-1999 is subtracted from its latest level of economic freedom in the decade.  
For example, a country with a level of economic freedom of “3.55” in 1994 and a level of 
economic freedom of “2.20” in 1999 would have a change in level of economic freedom 
of “-1.35.”  A negative value indicates that the country has increased its level of 
economic freedom, and a positive value indicates that the country’s level of economic 
freedom has decreased.      
At first glance, tobit regression may appear to be the appropriate method to 
estimate both models because both dependent variables appear to be censored – they have 
a lower limit and an upper limit.  As discussed in Chapter 4, a dependent variable is 
considered to be censored when the variable’s data cannot have a value above a certain 
higher limit or cannot have a value below a certain lower limit, and a substantial number 
of observations are clustered at the lower or upper limit (Breen 1996, 12; Frone 1997, 3; 
McDonald and Moffitt 1980, 318 and 319; and Tobin 1958, 24 and 25).   
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Change in level of democracy cannot have a value above 10 and cannot have a 
value below –10.  A country would have the highest possible value for the variable (10) if 
it had the lowest level of democracy (0) in 1990 and has the highest level of democracy 
(10) in 1999.  A country would have the lowest possible value for the variable (-10) if it 
had the highest level of democracy (10) in 1990 and had the lowest level of democracy 
(0) in 1999.  Similarly, change in level of economic freedom cannot have a value above 4 
and cannot have a value below –4.  However, since neither variable has a single 
observation at its higher limit or lower limit, neither of these dependent variables fit the 
definition of a censored variable because a substantial number of observations are not 
clustered at the upper and/or lower limits.  Since the dependent variable in each model is 
not censored, ordinary-least-squares (OLS) regression can be used to estimate both 
models. 
FACTORS ASSOCIATED WITH DEMOCRACY AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM 
 In order to accurately analyze the impact that NED grant money had on 
democracy and economic freedom during the 1990s, variables are included that control 
for factors that are commonly associated with change in democracy and economic 
freedom.  These factors are modernization/wealth and external influences (discussed in 
Andrain 1984; Arat 1988; Burkhart and Lewis-Beck 1994; Dix 1994; Helliwell 1994; 
Muller and Seligson 1994; Olson 1993; Weiner 1987).  Controlling for these structural 
influences on democracy and economic freedom will help the true impact of NED grant 
money to be found.         
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 Democratization scholars have noted that the spread of democracy is a recent 
occurrence (Fukuyama 1992 and Huntington 1991).  This observation seems to confirm 
Seymour Martin Lipset’s seminal conclusion (discussed in Chapter 1) that modernization 
and the wealth that results from modernization makes democracy more likely.  In Lipset’s 
words, “The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance that it will sustain 
democracy”  (Lipset 1959, 75).  Theoretically, modernization and wealth are linked to 
democracy because other democracy-friendly-factors – literacy, education, urbanization, 
and the development of a mass media – are consistently found in modern, wealthy 
countries  (Lipset 1959 and 1994; Dahl 1971).  However, while Lipset’s conclusion about 
modernization and wealth is almost universally accepted as true, it is not always accurate.  
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and some Latin American countries have become 
modernized and wealthy, but not democratic  (discussed in O’Donnell 1973).   
 Democratization scholars also agree that international politics and economics 
have an impact on whether democracy and economic freedom evolve within a country.  
In comparison with the first two factors, the types of external factors and their impact are 
much more varied and complex, making this set of factors difficult to grasp.  Researchers 
do agree that smaller, poorer countries of the third world are the most susceptible to 
external factors.  This susceptibility leaves them vulnerable to the influence of wealthier 
first world countries.   
However, researchers differ on whether this vulnerability bodes well for 
democracy in poor countries.  As discussed in Chapter 1, modernization theorists (for 
example, Rostow 1960) see first world influence as positive for democracy because it 
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brings wealth into poor countries, and, as discussed above, wealth and democracy tend to 
be positively related.  Dependency theorists (for example, Caporaso 1978) disagree, 
claiming that first world influence has historically caused great economic and social 
inequality in poor countries.  This economic and social inequality makes democracy less 
likely to evolve. 
CONTROL VARIABLES 
Change in Level of Economic Development.  This variable helps control for the 
impact that a change in a country’s standard of living – an indicator of modernization and 
wealth – can have on its political and economic freedom.   A country’s per-capita gross 
domestic product (GDP) in 1995 dollars at the beginning of each time period will be 
compared to its per-capita GDP at the end of the decade to arrive at the value of this 
variable.  For example, if a country’s level of economic development in 1990 was 264.25, 
and its level of economic development in 1999 was 292.42.  Since the country’s level of 
economic development increased by 10.7% in the 1990s, its change in level of economic 
development value is 0.107.  The source for this variable will be various editions of the 
IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook.   
Change in Size of Economy.  This variable helps control for how a change in the 
size of a country’s economy – another indicator of modernization/wealth – impacts the 
level of political and economic freedom found in the country.  A country’s GDP in 1995 
dollars at the beginning of each time period will be compared to its GDP at the end of the 
decade.  For example, if a country’s GDP was $6.86 billion in 1990 and was $9.22 billion 
in 1999.  This represents a 34.4% increase in GDP during the decade.  Therefore, the 
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country’s change in size of economy value is 0.344.  The data used for this variable 
comes from various editions of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook.   
Change in Population.   This variable helps control for the impact that a change 
in a country’s population can have on its political and economic freedom.  Population 
growth has a fundamental impact on the level of economic prosperity and the standard of 
living that evolves within a country.  A country’s population at the beginning of each 
time period will be compared to its population at the end of the decade.  For example, a 
country had a population of 7,199,838 in 1990 and a population of 7,729,131 in 1999.  
The country’s population increased by 7.3% during the 1990s.  This gives it a 0.073 
change in population.  The population data used for this variable comes from various 
editions of the IMF’s International Financial Statistics Yearbook. 
Change in Openness to U.S. Trade.  This variable helps control for the impact 
that an increase or decrease in trade with the U.S. (a powerful, external force) can have 
on a country’s political and economic freedom.    A country’s openness to U.S. Trade is 
measured by dividing the total amount of bilateral trade between the country and the U.S. 
by the country’s GDP in 1995 dollars.  Change in a country’s openness to U.S. trade will 
be measured by comparing its openness at the beginning and end of the time period 
involved (1990-1999 for the first model and 1994-1999 for the second model).  For 
example, a country’s openness to U.S. trade for 1990 was 0.013, and its openness in 1999 
was 0.029.  The country’s openness to U.S. trade increased by 123.1% during the decade.  
This gives it a value of 1.231 for the change in openness to U.S. trade variable.   The data 
for this variable will come from various editions of the International Monetary Fund’s 
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(IMF) Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook and International Financial Statistics 
Yearbook.     
Change in Level of U.S. Foreign Aid.  This variable helps control for the impact 
that a change in the amount of U.S. foreign aid that a country receives (another powerful, 
external factor) has on the level of political and economic freedom found in the country. 
The amount of foreign aid received by a country at the beginning of each time period will 
be compared to the amount of foreign aid received by the country at the end of the 
decade.  For example, a country received $27.68 million in foreign aid during 1990 and 
received $24.98 million in 1999.  The country’s level of U.S. foreign aid decreased by 
9.8% during the 1990s.  This gives it a -0.098 level of foreign aid value.  Data on U.S. 
foreign aid will come from the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development’s (OECD) Development Assistance Committee (DAC). 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLE-OF-INTEREST 
Total Amount of NED Grant Money.  This is the total amount of NED funding 
received by groups within the given country during the time period under study – 1990-
1999 for the first model and 1994-1999 for the second.  The sign and significance of this 
variable will indicate whether NED’s grant making program is having a positive impact 
on political and economic freedom around the world and whether the impact is 
significant.  This data is available from NED’s Democracy Projects Database.  The 
database is available on the internet at <http://www.ned.org/database/projects.asp>.   
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DIFFERENCE OF MEANS TEST RESULTS 
 As shown in Table 5.1, the average country that experienced an increase in its 
level of democracy during the 1990s had an increase in its openness to U.S. trade of 
1.363, in its level of economic development of 0.559, and in its size of economy of 0.551 
during the decade.  The average country that experienced no increase or a decline in their 
level of democracy had larger increases in all three variables (1.606, 0.664, and 1.097, 
respectively).  The opposite is true is of population change.  Countries that experienced 
an increase in democracy, on average, had a larger increase in population than countries 
that experienced no increase or a decline in democracy.  The difference in the means of 
all four variables is not significant.   
The only control variable that had a significant difference is change in level of 
U.S. foreign aid.  Countries that experienced an increase in democracy had a much larger 
average increase in their level of U.S. foreign aid that they received during the 1990s 
(196.2) than countries that experienced no increase or a decline in democracy (7.2).  This 
indicates that U.S. foreign aid may be assisting these countries in their quest for greater 
political freedom. 
 The average country that experienced an increase in its level of democracy 
received $2.1 million of NED grant money during the 1990s.  Countries that experienced 
no increase or a decline in their level of democracy received, on average, $1.9 million 




   Table 5.1: Difference of Means Test Results for Countries that Experienced either an    
                     Increase or No Increase/Decline in Their Level of Democracy, 1990-1999 
       
          Variable            Increase        No Increase/Decline         T-Value
Change in Level of Economic Development 0.559 0.664 0.161
Change in Size of Economy 0.551 1.097 0.248
Population Change 0.319 0.164 -0.877
Change in Openness to U.S. Trade 1.363 1.606 0.251
Change in Level of U.S. Foreign Aid 196.2 7.2 -1.454*
Total Amount of NED Grant Money $2,052,554 $1,899,169 -0.203





  Table 5.2: Difference of Means Test Results for Countries that Experienced either an 
                  Increase or No Increase/Decline in Their Level of Economic Freedom, 1994-1999 
  
   
          Variable            Increase        No Increase/Decline         T-Value
Change in Level of Economic Development 0.125 0.632 0.943
Change in Size of Economy 0.208 0.157 -1.164
Population Change 0.072 0.183 1.102
Change in Openness to U.S. Trade 0.419 0.864 1.418*
Change in Level of U.S. Foreign Aid 1,613 3,837 0.748
Total Amount of NED Grant Money $984,697 $812,362 -0.482




our independent variable-of-interest – total NED grant money – is not having a strong, 
positive impact on democracy. 
 As shown in Table 5.2, the average country that experienced an improvement in 
its level of economic freedom from 1994-1999 had an increase in its openness to U.S. 
trade of 0.419, in its level of economic development of 0.125, in its population of 0.072, 
and in its level of U.S. foreign aid of 1,613, during the time-period.  The average country 
that experienced no improvement or a decline in their level of economic freedom had 
larger increases in all four variables (0.864, 0.632, 0.183, and 3,837, respectively).  
Among these variables, only the difference in openness to U.S. trade variable is 
significant.  On average, countries that improved their level of economic freedom saw the 
size of their economies increase by 20.8% from 1994-1999.  This is a higher rate of 
growth than the 15.7% increase in economic size that occurred in countries that 
experienced no improvement in their level of economic freedom.  The difference is not 
significant.   
The average country that experienced an improvement in its level of economic 
freedom received $984,697 of NED grant money from 1994-1999.  Countries that 
experienced no improvement or a decline in their level of economic freedom received, on 
average, $812,362 from NED.  The difference is not significant.  This indicates that our 
independent variable-of-interest is also not having a strong, positive impact on economic 




Table 5.3:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates of the Determinants 
                   of Change in Level of Democracy, 1990-1999  
        
                             Coefficient 
                          (Standard Error) 
Variable   All Countries Unindustrialized
Constant  1.223* 1.321* 
  (0.238) (0.276) 
Change in Level of Economic Development -0.070 -0.077 
  (0.125) (0.130) 
Change in Size of Economy 0.034 0.039 
  (0.092) (0.096) 
Population Change  -0.117 -0.146 
  (0.298) (0.310) 
Change in Openness to U.S. Trade 0.000 0.046 
  (0.031) (0.062) 
Change in Level of U.S. Foreign Aid 0.000 0.000 
  (0.000) (0.000) 
Total Amount of NED Grant Money -6.11E-08 -7.61E-08 
  (4.99E-08) (5.28E-08) 
N  125 106 
R-Squared   0.019 0.034 




REGRESSION RESULTS   
Table 5.3 shows the results for the first regression model.  OLS regression is used 
to estimate the model.  The dependent variable is a country’s change in its level of 
democracy during the 1990s.  A positive coefficient for an independent variable indicates 
that the independent variable had a positive impact on change in level of democracy, and 
a negative coefficient for an independent variable indicates that the independent variable 
had a negative impact on change in level of democracy.  The independent variable-of- 
interest is the total amount of NED grant money awarded to the country during the 
decade.  The remaining variables are included to control for other commonly recognized 
factors that impact on a country’s level of political freedom.       
 The independent variable-of-interest – total amount of NED grant money – is 
negatively related to the dependent variable and is not significant.  This means that, 
during the 1990s, the more NED grant money that a country received, the slower the 
country’s rate of democratization, if any, was.   Among the control variables, three – 
change in size of economy, change in openness to U.S. trade, and change in level of U.S. 
foreign aid – are positively related to change in level of democracy and are not 
significant.  Two control variables – change in level of economic development and 
change in population – are negatively related to change in level of democracy and are not 
significant. 
Table 5.4 shows the results for the second regression model.  OLS regression is 








Table 5.4: Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates of the Determinants 
                   of Change in Level of Economic Freedom, 1994-1999  
        
                             Coefficient 
                         (Standard Error) 
Variable  All Countries Unindustrialized
Constant  0.066* 0.067 
  (0.029) (0.058) 
Change in Level of Economic Development -0.481 -0.560 
  (0.583) (0.702) 
Change in Size of Economy -0.391 -0.456 
  (0.475) (0.572) 
Population Change  -0.525 -0.623 
  (0.477) (0.864) 
Change in Openness to U.S. Trade -0.025* -0.025* 
  (0.012) (0.012) 
Change in Level of U.S. Foreign Aid -1.55E-06 -1.50E-06 
  (1.31E-06) (1.39E-06) 
Total Amount of NED Grant Money 7.15E-09      7.62E-09 
  (1.19E-08) (1.31E-08) 
N  146 121 
R-Squared   0.125 0.052 
*p<.01    
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of economic freedom from 1994-1999.  A negative coefficient for an independent 
variable indicates that the independent variable had a positive impact on change in level  
of economic freedom.  A positive coefficient for an independent variable indicates that 
the independent variable had a negative impact on change in level of economic freedom.  
The same independent variables used in the first model are also used in this model.   
Total amount of NED grant money is positively related to the independent 
variable, but it is not significant.  This indicates that, during the 1990s, the more NED 
grant money that a country received, the less positive change the country experienced in 
regard to economic freedom.  Among the control variables, only one – change in 
openness to U.S. trade – was negatively related to the dependent variable and significant.  
In the 1990s, as countries grew more open to U.S. trade, their move toward greater 
economic freedom accelerated.  All of the other independent variables are negatively 
related to change in economic freedom and are not significant.   
DISCUSSION OF RESULTS 
 The first difference of means tests show that countries that experienced an 
increase in democracy in the 1990s received a much larger increase in their share of U.S. 
foreign aid than countries that experienced no increase.  The difference is the only 
significant one among the variables tested.  This suggests that traditional U.S. foreign aid 
– an external factor – has the potential to be an effective tool for promoting democracy.  
The difference of means tests also showed that countries that experienced an increase in 
democracy received slightly more NED grant money than countries that experienced no 
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increase in democracy.  The difference is not significant.  This casts doubt on the impact 
that NED grant money had on democracy around the world.   
The second difference of means tests show that countries that experienced an 
increase in economic freedom during the 1990s had a smaller increase in their openness 
to U.S. trade than countries that experienced no increase.  The difference is the only 
significant one among the variables tested.  This indicates that U.S. trade either was not 
an effective tool for promoting economic freedom, or it was not strategically used for that 
purpose.  The difference of means tests also showed that, even though the difference in 
NED grant money awarded to countries that increased their economic freedom and to 
countries that did not increase their economic freedom is larger than the difference 
regarding democracy, the lack of a sizable difference in NED grant money and the lack of 
a significant relationship casts doubt on NED’s impact on economic freedom around the 
world. 
 In the first regression model, none of the independent variables are significant, 
and the r-squared statistic is very low (0.019).  This indicates that the independent 
variables and the entire model have little explanatory power regarding the dependent 
variable – change in level of democracy.  The explanatory power of the second regression 
model is better.  One independent variable – change in openness to U.S. trade – is 
significant, and the r-squared statistic is higher (0.125).  However, its explanatory power 
still appears to be weak.   
NED grant money is negatively related to change in level of democracy in the 
first model, and positively related to change in level of economic freedom in the second 
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model.  This means that the more NED grant money awarded to a country during the 
1990s, the less progress the country made toward democracy and a free market during the 
decade (remember, a higher economic freedom rating means that a country has less 
economic freedom).  However, neither relationship is significant.  Since countries that 
received more NED grant money did not make as much progress toward political and 
economic freedom as countries that received less or no money, this indicates that NED 
funding was not a positive factor – much less a strong, positive factor – in promoting 
democracy and economic freedom during the 1990s.   
As a further check on whether NED funding has an impact on political and 
economic freedom.  Two additional regression models were estimated that contained the 
same variables as the above models.  Instead of measuring the dependent variables – 
change in level of democracy and change in level of economic freedom – at the 
beginning and end of the 1990s, the models look at the impact of the independent  
variables on each dependent variable on a yearly basis, creating a pooled, cross-sectional 
time series of data.  The dependent variable is lagged by one year on the independent 
variables.  For example, the values of the independent variables in 1994 for a country will 
be associated with the change in democracy and economic freedom the country 
experiences in 1995.  Tables 5.5 and 5.6 show the results for these models.  They also 
show that NED grant money does not have a significant impact on political and economic 




Table 5.5:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates of the Determinants of 
                   Change in Level of Democracy (1-Year Lag), 1990-1999  
       
                                   Coefficient 
                               (Standard Error) 
Variable  All Countries Unindustrialized
Constant  0.141* 0.145* 
  (0.052) (0.056) 
Change in Level of Economic Development -0.225 -0.211 
  (0.192) (0.190) 
Change in Size of Economy 0.218 0.211 
  (0.188) (0.190) 
Population Change  -1.673 -1.472 
  (1.327) (1.374) 
Change in Openness to U.S. Trade 0.011 -0.408 
  (0.029) (0.245) 
Change in Level of U.S. Foreign Aid -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Total Amount of NED Grant Money -3.85E-08 -4.00E-08 
  (1.02E-07) (1.08E-07) 
N  1,139 952 
R-Squared  0.018 0.046 







Table 5.6:  Ordinary Least Squares Regression Estimates of the Determinants of  
                   Change in Level of Economic Freedom (1-Year Lag), 1990-1999 
        
                                   Coefficient 
                               (Standard Error) 
Variable   All Countries Unindustrialized
Constant  -0.031* -0.029* 
  (0.010) (0.011) 
Change in Level of Economic Development -0.033 -0.030 
  (0.037) (0.037) 
Change in Size of Economy 0.010 0.007 
  (0.036) (0.036) 
Population Change  -0.408 -0.378 
  (0.365) (0.363) 
Change in Openness to U.S. Trade 0.013 -0.003 
  (0.024) (0.025) 
Change in Level of U.S. Foreign Aid 0.001 0.001 
  (0.002) (0.002) 
Total Amount of NED Grant Money 1.22E-08 9.59E-09 
  (1.80E-08) (1.82E-08) 
N  498 417 
R-Squared  0.061 0.073 






The difference of means test results and the regression results do not show that 
NED had a strong, positive impact on political and economic freedom in the world during 
the 1990s.  The results of this analysis do not provide evidence of any “definitive” NED 
success during the 1990s that will help justify the organization’s existence or help it 
argue for more funding.  However, the lack of “definitive” success does not mean that 
democracy and economic freedom cannot be successfully promoted in other countries. 
The lack of significant independent variables in all of the regression models 
suggests that both dependent variables are not highly reactive to outside stimuli.  They 
appear to be strongly path dependent, requiring significant external influence to change 
their course. Since its birth, NED’s supporters have complained that it has been woefully 
underfunded and could have accomplished much more with additional money.  NED’s 
supporters could argue that, with more money, the organization would have had a much 
more measurable impact on democracy and economic freedom during the 1990s.  $25 to 
$35 million per year might not be enough to have a significant impact on one country, 
much less the entire world.  NED’s supporters could also argue that the types of indirect, 
grassroots activities that are supported by the organization often take many years to have 




THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY  
IN NICARAGUA, 1990-1999 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides a case study of National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 
involvement in Nicaragua during the 1990s.  As discussed in Chapter 2, Nicaragua is a 
country that NED has been very active in over the past two decades.  In Nicaragua, NED 
has funded groups that opposed the government of the Sandinistas and was intimately 
involved in funding the campaign of Violetta Chamorro and the UNO during the 1989 
presidential election.  Throughout the 1990s, NED continued to award grants to groups 
that were active in Nicaragua in an attempt to help strengthen the country’s commitment 
to democracy and to help move the country toward a free economy.   
A case study of NED activity in Nicaragua will show the organization at work in 
a dynamic political environment that has made major strides toward democracy since 
1990, but whose economy still remains stagnant and unfree.  What follows is an overview 
of Nicaragua’s recent political and economic history and an overview of the major 
political and economic freedom issues face by the country during the 1990s.  The groups 
that received NED funding during the decade will be identified, and their use of NED 
grant money will be discussed.   
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 
 In 1838, almost two decades after gaining independence from Spain, the Republic 
of Nicaragua was founded.  Throughout its existence, Nicaragua has constantly faced 
dictatorship and domestic tumult.  The most infamous period of authoritarian rule and 
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internal strife occurred during the reign of Anastasio Somoza, which was forcibly ended 
in 1979 by the Sandinista National Liberation Front (discussed in Crow 1992, 763-769; 
Robinson 1996, 201-214; Tulchin and Walter 1991, 113-131; Walker 1997, 1-8; Walker 
2000, 67-88). 
 The Sandinistas – led by Daniel Ortega – ruled Nicaragua through a Marxist 
dictatorship  (discussed in Robinson 1996, 215-255; Soule 1990; Staines 1989; Tulchin 
and Walter 1991, 131-138; Vanden and Prevost 1993; Walker 1991; Walker 1997; 
Walker 2000).  The specter of Marxism drew the ire of many groups within Nicaragua 
and caused the U.S. government to become involved in Nicaragua through its 
controversial support of the Contras – anti-Sandinista, paramilitary forces within 
Nicaragua (discussed in LeoGrande 1986; Moore 1986; Sobel 1995; Tulchin and Walter 
1991, 131-138).  In 1987, due to both domestic and international pressure, the Sandinistas 
acquiesced to a new constitution for Nicaragua that provided for a president and a 
national assembly to be elected at six-year-intervals.  The constitution set the first 
elections for 1989.  Despite their agreement to the constitution and their public claims 
that they had reformed, the Sandinistas enacted a land reform program on the eve of the 
election that gave them and their supporters many of the most prized properties and 
businesses in the country.  This action destroyed any legitimacy possessed by the 
Sandinistas and helped lead to their defeat by the reform-minded National Opposition 
Union (UNO) in both the presidential and legislative elections  (Dominguez and 
Lowenthal 1996; Walker 1997, 8-14). 
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As discussed in Chapter 2, NED was heavily involved in Nicaragua’s 1989 
elections, giving overt political assistance to opponents of the Sandinistas.  Specifically, 
NED served as a conduit for U.S. funding to be channeled to the winning presidential 
candidate and her party – Violetta Chamorro and UNO.  For a detailed discussion of 
NED involvement in Nicaragua’s 1989 elections, please refer to Chapter 2. 
 After the elections, newly elected president Violetta Chamorro disappointed her 
UNO allies and the Nicaraguan voters by making compromises with the still-powerful 
Sandinistas.  In particular, Chamorro allowed the Sandinistas to maintain control of the 
Nicaraguan military.  Control of the military guaranteed continued Sandinista influence 
over the country and gave the Sandinistas the ability to forcibly take back control of the 
government.  This arrangement guaranteed continued strife within Nicaragua, and 
Chamorro’s compromises led to further factionalizing of UNO.  Having lost many of her 
political allies, Chamorro found herself in need of new political friends.  In an effort to 
gain more favor with the Sandinistas, she began to oppose almost all legitimate attempts 
at governmental reform  (McConnell 1997, 45-60; Premo 1997, 65-80; Vickers and 
Spence 1992).  
 In the 1995 presidential election, Chamorro was constitutionally prohibited from 
seeking a second term.  Sandinista leader and former dictator Daniel Ortega attempted a 
political comeback in the election, portraying himself as a moderate who had renounced 
his Marxist, authoritarian past.  Ortega’s chief opponent was the popular, conservative 
mayor of Managua – Arnoldo Aleman.  Aleman focused his campaign on the need for 
economic reform, the need for ending Sandinista influence, and the need for reforming 
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the military.  He defeated Ortega in a landslide  (McCoy and McConnell 1997, Patterson 
1997, and Walker 1997, 305-311). 
 Aleman interpreted his landslide victory as a mandate from the people to 
challenge the Sandinista establishment that had dominated the country for almost two 
decades.  To do so, he instituted sweeping land reforms and economic reforms that were 
aimed at undercutting the foundation of the Sandinista’s power.  Ironically, despite his 
claim of a mandate from the people, Aleman’s reforms elicited massive protests from 
both Sandinistas and non-Sandinistas  (“Nicaragua. Land Reform Reformed,” 33).   
 To the surprise of many, Aleman’s reforms actually made the Sandinistas more 
cooperative in reforming Nicaragua.  They did not object to Aleman’s future 
governmental reforms and even participated constructively in the discussions surrounding 
them.  This new spirit of cooperation was deepened in 1998 when the country was 
devastated by Hurricane Mitch.  Facing the need to rebuild the ravaged country, Aleman 
and Sandinista leader Ortega joined political forces to save lives and get the country 
moving again.  This new-found spirit of cooperation could be the key to a prosperous 
future for Nicaragua  (“Nicaragua: A Revolution’s Aging Children,” 52). 
MAJOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM ISSUES OF THE 1990S 
A review of the literature on Nicaragua in the 1990s reveals that certain issues – 
civilian-military relations, the rule of law, the judiciary, the media, and labor unions – 
were commonly considered to be fundamental to the future of Nicaragua’s political and 
economic freedom.  These issues are discussed here in order to give the reader a grasp of 
what outside observers and Nicaragua’s leaders/citizens saw as the pivotal issues that 
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would determine whether democracy and economic freedom would make progress in the 
country during the decade.  Later on, when NED-funded activities in Nicaragua are 
discussed, we will be able to see whether any of NED’s activities were aimed at having a 
positive impact on these fundamental issues.           
Civilian-Military Relations 
 The lack of civilian control of the military has been a major contributor to 
Nicaragua’s long history of internal strife.  In order to end this internal strife and provide 
a peaceful environment in which a prosperous democracy and a free economy can exist, 
the military must be fully brought under civilian control.  This fundamental reform must 
be accomplished before Nicaragua can have a stable future.   
As discussed above, President Chamorro campaigned in 1989 as a reformer, but 
actually lessened civilian control of the military.  In addition to allowing continued 
Sandinista control of the military, Chamorro, in 1994, spearheaded the passage of a law 
that ended all civilian oversight of the military and allowed the military to exist free from 
taxation on its vast holdings.  This made the Nicaraguan military accountable only to 
itself.  Policies such as this caused Chamorro’s legitimacy with the Nicaraguan people to 
dwindle.  Sensing this, Chamorro’s government back-peddled on its support for the 
military a year later.  However, it did not lessen the military’s autonomy – it reduced the 
number of military personnel from 90,000 to 15,000.  This back-peddling was done out 
of political necessity and was not opposed by the Sandinistas or the military because they 




When he took office in 1996, President Aleman made reforming the military one 
of his top priorities.  Early in his presidency, he passed a new law that placed the military 
back under civilian control.  This new level of civilian control represented the highest 
level of civilian control in the country’s history.  Even so, the military remains a powerful 
force in Nicaragua and still has the ability – due to its vast property ownership and 
financial means – to impact the government and society  (Nicaraguan Foundation for 
Democracy and Development, <http://www.nfdd.org>). 
The Rule of Law 
 Particularly in rural areas, the rule of law in Nicaragua is not guaranteed 
(discussed in Armony 1997, 203-218).  The most disturbing example of an inadequate 
rule of law is the more than twenty paramilitary groups – comprised of former military 
soldiers and former Contra fighters – that terrorized rural dwellers in the northern part of 
Nicaragua throughout the 1990s.  The groups were a result of governmental decisions 
regarding the military and the Contras.   
In 1994, when the government reduced the number of military personnel from 
90,000 to 15,000, it did little to help the 75,000 former military personnel transist back 
into civil society.  Unfortunately, not enough jobs existed to support this new influx of 
job seekers.  Unable to find employment and unable to support themselves financially, 
some turned to crime.  In 1990, in order to finally disband the Contras and bring peace to 
Nicaragua, the government promised land grants and credits toward the purchase of land 
to all former Contras.  Through this promise, the government hoped to end any animosity 
that existed between the former Contras and the government.  However, the government 
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failed to deliver on its promises – it stopped making land grants because they were not 
politically popular and stopped redeeming land credits because they could not be 
afforded.  Since the government failed to deliver on its promises, all of the former 
Contras were not able to successfully assimilate into society and became angry at the 
government.  Many turned to crime as a way to support themselves and as a way to 
express their outrage. 
The Judiciary 
 Even though Nicaragua’s constitution makes the country’s judiciary structurally 
independent, it has been repeatedly swayed by political influence and compromised by 
corruption.  Court dockets are backlogged, causing trials to be delayed.  In most cases, 
the delays result in the accused being detained longer than is usually deemed acceptable 
in a democracy.  Making the situation worse are the poor conditions of Nicaragua’s 
prisons and the often-arbitrary nature of police arrests.  The judiciary must also deal with 
confessions forced from detainees by police.  Much discussion over reforming the 
judiciary has taken place within Nicaragua’s Supreme Court and National Assembly, but 
little concrete reform has been initiated (McConnell 1997, 47-48 and 55-56). 
The Media 
 Shortly before turning over power to UNO in 1990, the Sandinistas moved to 
cement its power outside of the governmental apparatus by privatizing the nation’s public 
radio network – the dominant source of information for Nicaraguans.  The new private 
owners of the network were either Sandinistas or pro-Sandinista.  Control of these 
privatized radio stations allowed the Sandinistas to get their message across to 
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Nicaraguans and to engage in informational warfare against their political foes.  The print 
media is much more diverse.  While the Sandinistas do have a strong presence in the print 
media, other groups also express their views through Nicaragua’s newspapers and 
magazines.   
The diversity found in print media suffered a severe blow in 1990 when the 
government passed a law requiring all journalists to have either a bachelor’s degree in 
journalism or five years of experience in journalism in order to report on the government. 
The new law disproportionately impacted on upstart newspapers and magazines that had 
an anti-establishment message.  These publications lacked the money to hire reporters 
with the required education, and the publications had not been in existence long enough 
to have reporters who met the five-year experience requirement.  Opponents of the law 
claim that it is an unacceptable restriction on freedom of expression and freedom of the 
press  (Dominguez and Lowenthal 1996; Norsworthy 1997, 282-292). 
Labor Unions 
 In the 1990s, labor unions controlled by the Sandinistas had full legal rights, 
while non-Sandinista unions had no guaranteed legal rights.  For non-Sandinista unions, 
laws are applied arbitrarily, depending upon the political and economic stakes involved.  
The lack of equal treatment for labor unions means that, frequently, Nicaraguans who 
have been harmed by labor violations or face unfair work environments can find no 
remedy to their situation.  The preferential treatment afforded Sandinista unions has its 
roots in the Sandinista’s historic use of labor unions as instruments to advance their 
interests.  Before taking power in 1979, Nicaragua’s major unions were used by the 
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Sandinistas to influence the government’s economic decisions and to harass the political 
and economic establishment.  Through their involvement in these unions, the Sandinistas 
gained control of almost forty privatized (formerly state-controlled) enterprises  
(Enriquez 1991; Jonakin 1997, 97-111; Stahler-Sholk 1995). 
NED ACTIVITY IN NICARAGUA DURING THE 1990S 
 The Polity data-sets (discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) operationalize democracy 
through the following factors: participation, competitiveness, openness, and constraints 
on the executive.  These factors are combined into one number that captures the level of 
democracy found in the country in a given year.  The variable’s value ranges from 1 (low 
democracy) to 10 (high democracy).  Table 6.1 shows that, according to the Polity data- 
sets, Nicaragua began the 1990s with a level of democracy of 6.  In 1995, Nicaragua’s 
level of democracy increased to an 8, where it remained through the end of the decade.  
Nicaragua’s increase in democracy from a 6 to an 8 in the middle of the decade and its 
retention of the increase throughout the rest of the 1990s shows that political freedom 
made strong, sustainable progress during the decade.     
 The economic freedom ratings published by The Heritage Foundation and The 
Wall Street Journal (also discussed in Chapters 4 and 5) measure the level of 
governmental interference in the economic life of a given country.  The ratings focus on 
ten economic factors – trade policy, taxation, general government intervention, monetary 
policy, capital flows/foreign investment, banking, wage/price controls, property rights, 
regulation, and the black market – and the ratings are available beginning in 1994.  The 




Table 6.1: Level of Democracy and   
                  Economic Freedom in 
                  Nicaragua, 1990-1999     
                    
   Level of Level of 
Year Democracy Ec. Freedom 
1990 6 n/a 
1991 6 n/a 
1992 6 n/a 
1993 6 n/a 
1994 6 3.90 
1995 8 3.60 
1996 8 3.60 
1997 8 3.50 
1998 8 3.50 




by the country in a given year.  The variable’s value ranges from 1.00 to 5.00.  Countries 
are categorized as “Free,” “Mostly Free,” “Mostly Unfree,” and “Repressed” based on 
their economic freedom score.  The values associated with each categorization are the 
following: 
- 1.00 and 1.99 – Free 
- 2.00 and 2.99 – Mostly Free 
- 3.00 and 3.99 – Mostly Unfree 
- 4.00 and 5.00 – Repressed 
 
Table 6.1 also shows that Nicaragua’s level of economic freedom in 1994 (the 
first year that data is available) was 3.90, placing the country in the “mostly unfree” 
category and almost placing it in the “repressed” category.  Nicaragua’s rating improved 
to 3.60 in 1995 and 3.50 in 1997.  At the end of the decade, Nicaragua’s level of 
economic freedom returned to 3.60.  Even though Nicaragua’s level of economic freedom 
increased during the 1990s, the country remained in the “mostly unfree” category 
throughout the decade.  This shows that progress was made in regard to economic 
freedom, but Nicaragua still has to undergo revolutionary change in order to have a free 
economy.      
Figure 6.1 shows the trend in NED funding to Nicaragua during the 1990s.  NED 
funding to Nicaragua was much higher in the first half of the decade than in the second 
half.  In the first half, Nicaragua received more than $1 million in three years – 1990,  
1992, and 1994.  In 1993, the country received just under $1 million.  In the second half 
of the decade, NED funding to Nicaragua remained below $750,000 in each year and 
below $500,000 in every year but one (1995).  The drop in NED funding that began in 






























         
     
  
       
      
         
        
      
      
       
       
       
      
    
         
        
     
        
       
         
      
        
         
         
        
         
        
                             Table 6.2: NED Grant Activity in Nicaragua by Subject Area, 1990-1999











Equipment Rights Labor Legislatures
  1990 $0 $0 $283,316 $0 $410,000 $0 $566,013 $0





 1992 $0 $0 $864,300 $0 $102,500 $0 $0 $0
1993 $0 $0 $740,682 $0 $38,500
 
$0 $0 $0





$0 $40,000 $0 $0




$0 $0 $0 $0
1997 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $135,844
 1998 $0 $0 $18,150 $294,246
  
$0 $0 $0 $0
















Parties Policy of Law Women
 
Youth Total
1990 $0 $0 $50,000
 
$0 $0 $0 $1,309,329
1991 $0 $190,000
 
$0 $0 $0 $0 $750,130





$0 $0 $0 $998,491
1994 $0 $0 $0 $0 $40,000
 
$0 $1,218,532
1995 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $697,739
1996 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $393,634
1997 $0 $0 $0 $0 $38,476
 
$0 $174,320
1998 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $312,396
1999 $0 $0 $274,459 $0 $0 $0 $409,358
Total $81,175 $190,000 $773,827 $0 $78,476 $0 $7,541,963
 
to an 8) and the improvement of the country’s economic freedom rating (from 3.90 to 
3.60) that occurred that year.   
OVERVIEW OF NED ACTIVITY IN NICARAGUA BY SUBJECT AREA 
 NED categorizes each of its grants according to the subject area that the grant 
money will be used to influence.  Table 6.2 shows NED’s grant activity in Nicaragua for 
each year during the 1990s by subject area.  As Table 6.2 shows, NED recognizes 14  
subject areas – business and economy, conflict resolution, education, elections, 
equipment, human rights, labor, legislatures, media and publishing, political parties, 
public policy, rule of law, women, and youth – that its funding can target.  In the data 
used for this dissertation, NED expressly identifies the primary subject area of each grant.  
As a review of the subject areas indicates, there is potential overlap among them.  
Researchers must be cognizant that the primary subject area that NED identifies may 
only be one of multiple subject areas that the grant will ultimately impact. 
 As shown in Table 6.2, $3,891,452 (over 50%) of the $7,541,963 that NED 
awarded to Nicaragua was targeted at education.  This made education easily the leading 
recipient of NED funding in Nicaragua during the 1990s.  The rest of the subject areas in 
order of how much NED grant money they received are the following: equipment 
($803,011), public policy ($773,827), labor ($634,643), elections ($514,325), legislatures 
($335,369), political parties ($190,000), business and economy ($170,685), media and 
publishing ($81,175), women ($78,476), human rights ($69,000), conflict resolution ($0), 







































Figure 6.2: NED Grant Money Awarded by Subject Area to Nicaragua, 1990-1999
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 Figure 6.2 shows the trends that occurred in NED’s funding of subject areas 
during the 1990s.  In 6 out of 10 years (1992-1996 and 1999), education received the 
most NED grant money.  Elections received the most funding in 1991, legislatures 
received the most in 1997, and elections received the most in 1998.  Figure 6.2 also 
illustrates the massive decrease in NED funding to Nicaragua during the last half of the 
decade.  Only business and economy, elections, human rights, and legislatures received 
more NED grant money in the second half of the decade than in the first half.   
SPECIFIC GROUPS/ACTIVITIES FUNDED WITHIN EACH SUBJECT AREA 
 In its 1990s grant data, NED provides a short description of each project that it 
funded.  Many of the project descriptions provide detailed information about the recipient 
organization and how it intends to use the grant money.  Other project descriptions are 
more vague.  The data does not include any information on the outcome of the activity or 
whether the activity had any measurable impact.  The following section of this chapter 
looks at the groups within each subject area that received NED grant money in Nicaragua 
during the 1990s.  This information will be the basis of the chapter’s conclusions about 
whether NED grant money in Nicaragua was used for worthwhile, positive activities that 
contributed to democracy and economic freedom in the country.     
Education 
 In the 1990s, NED awarded $3,891,452 for education in Nicaragua.  The 
American Federation of Teachers received $550,000 in 1992, $494,538 in 1994, and 




total of $1,153,634 from NED during the 1990s – the most of any group in any subject 
area.  The American Federation of Teachers was awarded all of the grant money to 
develop and continually update a civic education curriculum for use in Nicaraguan public 
schools that emphasized democratic values and to continually train Nicaraguan teachers 
in how to effectively teach the civic education curriculum. 
 Grupo Fundemos was the second largest recipient of NED education funding in 
the 1990s.  Grupo Fundemos received four grants totaling $597,543 for its education 
efforts in Nicaragua.  It was awarded $180,000 in 1992, $195,112 in 1993, $204,873 in 
1994, and $17,558 in 1996.  Grupo Fundemos’ grants in 1992, 1993, and 1994 were for 
the same purpose – to support civic education in Nicaragua through sponsoring public 
issue forms/debates, taking public opinion surveys, and making the survey results known 
to Nicaragua’s leaders.  The much smaller grant received by Grupo Fundemos in 1996 
helped support the organization’s program to provide democratic education to 
Nicaragua’s party leaders. 
 One of NED’s core grantees – the National Democratic Institute for International 
Affairs (NDI) – was the third largest recipient of NED education funding.  NDI received 
three grants totaling $380,822 to help support its ongoing education efforts in Nicaragua.  
NDI received $138,160 in 1994, $139,774 in 1995, and $102,888 in 1999.  All three 
grants were awarded to NDI to create an education program on civilian-military relations 
and support the program’s dissemination to the Nicaraguan people.  The goal of the 
education program was to make Nicaraguans more aware of their rights in regard to the 
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military and to increase popular sentiment in favor of heightening civilian oversight of 
military activities. 
Hagamos Democracia was the fourth leading recipient of NED education 
funding.  The organization received one grant in 1996 for $264,304.  Hagamos 
Democracia was awarded the grant to develop an education program for Nicaragua’s 
mayors and civic leaders.  The proposed curriculum included training on ethics, 
accountability, fiscal management, conflict resolution, and political participation.  
Hagamos Democracia would follow-up this training by providing continuing education 
to participants and by monitoring the performance of participants in regard to these 
issues. 
 Conciencia – Nicaragua received three NED education grants totaling $194,000, 
making it the fifth largest recipient.  It received $44,000 in 1992, $70,000 in 1994, and 
$80,000 in 1994.  The goal of all three grants was to promote greater political 
participation in Nicaraguan politics at the grassroots level, especially among women, 
youth, and the working poor.  To promote greater participation, Conciencia – Nicaragua 
sponsored a series of educational programs targeted at these groups that informed them of 
their political rights.        
 The last group to receive to receive a substantial amount of NED education 
funding was Va Civica.  The organization received three grants – $27,769 in 1990, 
$153,000 in a second 1990 grant, and $10,300 in 1992 – for a total of $191,069.  The first 
two grants were awarded to use grassroots voter education and training to promote 
greater political participation by Nicaraguans.  The last grant was awarded to support Va 
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Civica’s efforts to train political leaders at the local level in democratic practices and 
values.                                         
Equipment 
 During the 1990s, NED awarded $803,011 for purchasing equipment in 
Nicaragua.  Nicaragua’s Radio Corporacion received almost 30% of this grant money in 
a single grant that it was awarded in 1990.  In what appears to be an emergency situation, 
NED awarded $235,000 to Radio Corporacion to pay for “urgently” needed radio 
equipment that would replace equipment that was destroyed during an “attack” on the 
radio station.  The grant money was provided so that the radio station’s broadcasts could 
be quickly resumed.  The rest of the grant money for equipment was awarded through 
seven separate grants to various radio and television stations for equipment purchases.  
These organizations include La Prensa, Radio Dario, Radio San Cristobal, and Telenica 
S.A.       
Public Policy 
 NED awarded $773,827 through 7 separate grants to Nicaragua for public policy 
activities in the 1990s.  Recipients of the grants included the Nicaraguan Development 
Institute, the Nicaraguan Development Foundation, the Nicaraguan Institute of Municipal 
Administration, and two of NED’s core grantees – NDI and the International Republican 
Institute (IRI) – for their ongoing activities in Nicaragua.  The grant money was used to 
sponsor political training programs for Nicaragua’s party leaders, to support worker 
cooperatives and professional associations, and to sponsor a conference on municipal 




During the 1990s, NED awarded $634,643 to support labor activities in 
Nicaragua.  Nicaragua’s Confederation of Labor Unity received over 75% of this grant 
money in a single grant that it was awarded in 1990.  The Confederation of Labor Unity 
is an umbrella organization that unifies Nicaragua’s independent labor unions.  The 
organization was awarded $493,013 for the purpose of mobilizing workers and their 
families to participate in and monitor elections in Nicaragua.  The Confederation of 
Labor Unity also received a $73,000 grant in 1990 and a $43,630 grant in 1991 to help 
educate more workers about their rights and help them mobilize into unions.   
Elections  
NED awarded $514,325 during the 1990s for activities related to elections in 
Nicaragua.  Hagamos Democracia received $400,264 (over 75%) of the grant money for 
elections.  The organization received two grants – one in 1995 for $106,018 and one in 
1998 for $294,246.  Both grants helped Hagamos Democracia hold multiple town 
meetings with government officials and establish grassroots committees consisting of 
local leaders that helped pick topics for the town meetings.     
Legislatures 
 During the 1990s, NED awarded $335,369 for activities related to Nicaragua’s 
legislature and legislative processes.  Nicaragua’s Superior Council of Private Enterprise 
received $279,395 (over 80%) of this grant money.  The organization received a grant in 
1991 for $89,500, in 1994 for $110,025, and in 1997 for $79,870.  All three grants 
supported the organization in providing Nicaragua’s legislature with objective analysis of 
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proposed economic legislation.  The organization’s analysis and reports would also be 
made available to the public and publicized through Nicaragua’s media. 
Other Subject Areas 
 NED awarded one grant in the amount of $190,000 targeted at political parties in 
Nicaragua.  The grant was awarded in 1991 to one of NED’s core grantees – IRI – to 
support its democracy-training program for Nicaragua’s party leaders.  NED awarded two 
grants in the business and economy subject area totaling $170,685.  Both grants were 
awarded in 1995 to the Nicaraguan Small and Medium Business Association to support 
its efforts in lobbying for an open market and its efforts in expanding its membership.  In 
1993, NED awarded its only grant targeting media and publishing (although all of the 
equipment grants assisted media and publishing).  The grant was awarded to Telenica SA 
to help establish the new, independent television station in Nicaragua.  NED awarded two 
grants aimed at promoting women’s issues.  The first was a $40,000 grant awarded in 
1994 to The Center for Research and Action for Latin American Women.  The second 
was a $38,476 grant awarded in 1997 to Pro Women Nicaragua.  In the human rights 
subject area, Comision Permanente de Derechos Humanos received a $29,000 grant in 
1991 and a $40,000 grant in 1995 to support its human rights monitoring program in 
Nicaragua.  NED did not make any grants in the conflict resolution, rule of law, and 
youth subject areas during the 1990s.            
DISCUSSION 
 The literature on Nicaragua in the 1990s identifies certain issues – civilian-
military relations, the rule of law, the judiciary, the media, and labor unions – as the most 
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fundamental issues impacting on political and economic freedom in the country.  While it 
can be argued that almost all of the activities funded by NED in Nicaragua had an 
indirect impact on these fundamental issues, NED grants were used to directly influence 
civilian-military relations, the media (through NED’s funding of extensive equipment 
purchases by independent radio and television stations), and labor unions in Nicaragua.  
Any impact that NED had on the rule of law and the judiciary in Nicaragua would only 
be an indirect result of its grants that supported civic education programs and democracy 
training.   
In the area of civilian-military relations, NED awarded $380,822 to create an 
education program on civilian-military relations that would help make Nicaraguans more 
aware of their rights in regard to the military and help increase popular sentiment in favor 
of heightening civilian oversight of military activities.  In regard to Nicaragua’s media, 
NED awarded $884,186 for the purchasing needed equipment for independent radio and 
television stations and to help establish a new, independent television station.  To support 
Nicaragua’s labor movement, NED awarded $634,643 to help inform workers about their 
rights and mobilize them into unions.  NED awarded almost $1,899,651 to groups that 
were active in these important subject areas – about 25% of the total funding awarded to 
Nicaragua.   
 In Chapter 2, the major debates surrounding NED were discussed.  This case 
study of NED activity in Nicaragua during the 1990s provides evidence that can help 
resolve many of these debates and show whether NED’s critics or supporters are correct 
in their assessment of the organization.   These debates include the following: whether 
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the U.S. should be interfering in the politics of other countries, whether NED makes its 
own foreign policy irrespective of official U.S. policy, whether NED promotes 
democracy or U.S. interests, whether NED has been successful in its efforts, and whether 
NED escapes proper oversight through purposefully vague documentation of its 
activities.  While the information in this case study will not settle any of these debates, it 
does provide objective, concrete information about NED activity that will help observers 
make better-informed judgments about the organization.   
 NED’s critics argue that there is a fundamental contradiction between NED’s goal 
of promoting political and economic freedom and its interference in and manipulation of 
political and economic processes in other countries.  Such meddling has led some to call 
NED a “loose cannon” that may do more harm than good in the fight for freedom around 
the world.  This case study provides a vivid example this.  As discussed in Chapter 2 and 
above, the U.S. wanted to end Sandinista influence in Nicaragua and saw the country’s 
1989 elections as an opportunity to put the Sandinistas out-of-power.   
Even though many legitimate opposition candidates for Nicaragua’s presidency 
existed and Sandinista-leader Daniel Ortega appeared vulnerable to defeat, NED was 
used to channel money to presidential candidate Violetta Chamorro and her UNO party.  
This financial support from NED was instrumental in Chamorro’s election.  Instead of 
pursuing the reform agenda that she had promised, Chamorro cut deals with the 
Sandinistas that not only cemented their continued power, but endangered the future 
prospects of political and economic freedom in the country.  In particular, Chamorro 
allowed the Sandinistas to maintain control of the Nicaraguan military, which gave them 
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the potential ability to forcibly take back control of the government.  This kept Nicaragua 
from making progress toward more stability and kept control of the military out of 
civilian hands.  Letting the Sandinistas retain control of the military cost Chamorro many 
of her political allies.  Desperate for political friends, Chamorro allied with the 
Sandinistas and began to oppose almost all legitimate attempts at governmental reform.    
 Fortunately, in the 1995 presidential election, Arnoldo Aleman was elected 
president and, upon taking office, resurrected the reform agenda that Chamorro had 
promised in her 1989 campaign.  This kept Nicaragua from becoming a long-term foreign 
policy disaster for the U.S. and, in particular, NED.  In the 1989 elections, anti-Sandinista 
sentiment and the desire for greater freedom was strong in Nicaragua.  Without any U.S. 
assistance through NED, a reform candidate had a good chance to win the presidency.  
NED support was the reason that Chamorro emerged as the leading reform candidate and 
eventually won.  The U.S.’s hand-picked candidate eventually endangered the future of 
political and economic freedom in Nicaragua by allying with the Sandinistas.  Without 
NED involvement in the campaign, Nicaragua’s voters may have elected a candidate that 
would have followed-through on his/her promises of reform.  While a reformer did 
eventually ascend to the presidency, Chamorro’s election delayed the start of true reform 
in Nicaragua and resulted in the continuing lack of civilian control over the military.      
Based on the activity summaries provided by NED, the organization’s activities in 
Nicaragua during the 1990s appear to be much more benign than its activities during the 
1989 elections.  While NED’s involvement in the 1989 elections could be seen as direct 
“interference” in Nicaragua’s politics, the activities supported by NED grant money 
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during the 1990s do not seem to involve the same type of interference in the political and 
economic processes of the country.  At most, NED’s activities had an indirect influence, 
if any.  Of course, even benign involvement by NED in another country may be troubling 
to the country’s government and could interfere in its natural progress toward democracy 
and a free market.  The main issue in this debate may not necessarily be the types of 
activities that are funded by NED in other countries, but whether any U.S. organization 
should ever be involved in another country without permission.  NED’s experience in 
Nicaragua shows how U.S. involvement has the potential to cause more harm than good. 
NED’s critics worry that the organization’s activities in other countries could 
contradict official U.S. foreign policy regarding those countries.  As shown in Chapter 2, 
inconsistencies between NED’s activities and U.S. policy have occurred in the past, 
raising the specter that they could occur again.  NED’s supporters claim that the 
organization does not take a position on foreign policy questions – it concentrates only on 
helping democratic movements and activists around the world.  They claim that NED 
does not need to be concerned with contravening U.S. foreign policy because both NED 
and official U.S. foreign policy strongly support political and economic freedom around 
the world.  They also argue that past instances of conflict between NED activities and 
U.S. foreign policy all occurred in the organization’s early years when the grant process 
was new and still had imperfections.  The process has been improved and such 
contradictions are very unlikely to happen in the future.       
Based on the information provided by NED, none of the organization’s activities 
in Nicaragua during the 1990s appears to conflict with official U.S. policy regarding the 
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country.  In fact, most of NED’s activities in the 1990s seem to have a noble quality that 
is consonant with ideals that are held sacrosanct in the U.S. – democracy, economic 
freedom, human rights, education, free elections, etc.  Given its activities in Nicaragua, it 
seems that the only way that these activities could cause a foreign policy problem for the 
U.S. in the country would be if the Nicaraguan government objected to any uninvited 
NED activity within its borders, regardless of the type of activity involved.  This 
objection could potentially cause the Nicaraguan government to become suspicious of 
U.S. motives in regard to the country.        
 NED’s critics also question whether the organization truly pursues the altruistic 
goal of promoting democracy and open markets.  They claim that the organization has a 
more selfish motive behind its activities – the promotion of U.S. interests.  These critics 
note that NED has never given money to support a group whose agenda conflicted with 
U.S. interests.  NED’s supporters disagree, claiming that the correlation cited between the 
organization’s activities and U.S. foreign policy exists because democracy and free 
markets are important factors in determining both.  If it is assumed that the U.S. has an 
interest in promoting political and economic freedom, then all of NED’s activities in 
Nicaragua during the 1990s appear to indirectly promote U.S. interests in the country.  
Given the priority that political and economic freedom have in both NED policy 
decisions and U.S. policy decisions, it is easy to see how NED activities would almost 
always indirectly promote U.S. interests.  However, none of NED’s activities seems to 
provide the U.S. any direct political and/or economic benefit.    
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 According to its critics, NED and its supporters are unable to cite any “definitive” 
successes that justify its existence.  These critics doubt that any organization can 
successfully promote democracy in another country.  Without proof of its effectiveness, 
they worry that taxpayer dollars are being wasted by funding NED.  NED’s supporters 
claim that NED has had success, despite its woefully inadequate budget.  The types of 
activities funded by NED in Nicaragua during the 1990s – education, information, 
mobilizing citizens, etc. – are very subjective and quantifying their impact with any 
degree of certainty is extremely difficult.  These activities tend to have an indirect, 
cumulative impact on a country, not a direct, independent impact.  It can be argued that 
the impact of an individual activity does not matter – what matters is the impact of the 
entire range of activities undertaken in the country.  This makes assessing NED’s success 
in a country even more complicated.  Given this, “definitive” successes may be 
impossible to find even if NED is having a strong, positive impact.      
 NED’s critics charge that Congressional oversight of NED has been insufficient 
due to a lack of clear, candid NED record-keeping.  They claim that Congress, in 
overseeing the organization, relies primarily on records supplied by NED, which have 
often been purposefully vague and misleading.  As discussed above, in its 1990s grant 
data, NED provides a short description of each project that it funded.  Many of the project 
descriptions provide detailed information about the recipient organization and how it 
intends to use the grant money, while other project descriptions are more vague.  The 
data does not include any information on the outcomes associated with the assistance.  




analysis of the organization’s activities.  This case study of NED activity in Nicaragua 
during the 1990s used all information available from NED to provide some insight into 
the organization’s activities.  With more information, the insight gained into NED 
through this case study would have been greater.  A better understanding of the 
organization would be gained if NED did provide more information on its activities to the 
public, this better understanding may help to silence many of NED’s critics.  
 
CHAPTER 7 
THE NATIONAL ENDOWMENT FOR DEMOCRACY IN CHINA, 1990-1999 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 This chapter provides a case study of National Endowment for Democracy (NED) 
activity in the People’s Republic of China during the 1990s.  As with the previous case 
study on Nicaragua (Chapter 6), a summary of China’s political and economic history 
and an overview of the major political and economic issues faced by the country in the 
1990s will be provided.  The groups that received NED funding during the decade will be 
identified, and their use of NED grant money will be discussed.   
 Politically, China provides a stark contrast to Nicaragua.  In Nicaragua, we see 
NED at work in a politically dynamic environment.  In China, however, the political 
environment is much more static.  Economically, China and Nicaragua have many 
similarities.  Both experienced increases in their level of economic freedom during the 
1990s, but both also remained far from having a free economy at the end of the decade.  
An examination of NED activities in China is also important because, during the 1990s, it 
received more NED grants and more NED grant money than any other country.  
POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC HISTORY 
 On October 1, 1949, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) Chairman Mao Zedong 
proclaimed the founding of the People’s Republic of China.  Chairman Mao’s rule 
included harsh, mass ideological campaigns that resulted in millions of deaths  (discussed 
in “The People’s Republic of China After 50 Years” 1999; Meisner 1999; Nathan 1997; 
Yang 1998; and Yuan 1987).  The two most well-known of these campaigns were the 
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Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution.  The Great Leap Forward was an 
attempt to accelerate agricultural collectivization and spur industrialization in the years 
1958-1960.  The Great Leap Forward resulted in widespread rural famine and the loss of 
at least thirty million lives  (Meisner 1999, 155-241; Yang 1998, 21-40).  In 1966, the 
Cultural Revolution began as an attempt by Mao to reassert his control of the CCP.  The 
Cultural Revolution also had disastrous consequences, leaving many dead or disgraced  
(Meisner 1999, 291-412; Yuan 1987). 
Mao’s death in September, 1976, led to the rise of Deng Xiaopeng as China’s 
leader.  Ironically, Deng had previously been disgraced in one of Mao’s purges, but was 
able to re-establish himself as an important member of the CCP prior to Mao’s death.  In 
1978, Deng began instituting a series of market reforms.  The most important of these 
early reforms was the end of collectivized agriculture  (Lam 1995, 68-70; Meisner 1999, 
129-154; Nathan 1997; “The People’s Republic of China After 50 Years” 1999; Yiu-
chang 1998).   
The most publicized and disturbing event during Deng’s reign occurred over a 
three-month-period in 1989.  In April, 1989, thousands of students congregated in 
Tiananmen Square in Beijing.  Their original reason for coming together was to mourn 
the death of outspoken reformer and former CCP secretary general Hu Yaobang.  The 
wake eventually shifted its focus from the reformer to the reforms that he had advocated.  
The students began to protest the policies of the Chinese government, calling for greater 
openness and more popular participation in government – in other words, more 
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democracy.  By the middle of May, the protests in Tiananmen Square sparked similar 
student activity in other cities.   
The government was unwilling to compromise with student demands, and the 
students were unwilling to end their protests without gaining some concessions from the 
government.  The situation eventually became a stalemate.  The government decided to 
end the protests in Tiananmen Square and make an example of the students.  On June 3rd 
and 4th, the government launched a terrifying military assault on Tiananmen Square.  The 
assault resulted in more than one thousand deaths.  The ferocity of the government’s 
action was taken by the rest of the world to be an explicit rejection by the Chinese 
government of political reform (Donnelly 1998, 115-120; Lawrence 1999; Meisner 1999, 
483-513; “Ten Years On: China after Tiananmen” 1999; “The People’s Republic of 
China After 50 Years,” 1999).   
In 1992, faced with his impending death, Deng decided to make his market 
reforms irreversible.  At the CCP’s Fourteenth Party Congress, he had the party formally 
adopt the creation of a “socialist market economy” as one of its main goals.  Deng’s 
hand-picked successor – Jiang Zemin – assumed power in 1993.  Jiang was the mayor of 
Shanghai and a CCP party boss who was known as a party hardliner that was committed 
to Deng’s goals.  Jiang’s rule has seen the CCP struggle to maintain its monopoly on 
power.  Under Jiang, the party’s strategy for retaining power focused on using economic 
reform to improve the country’s standard-of-living, while harshly punishing all dissent.  
This strategy makes China paradoxical – it promotes economic freedom, but it severely 
restricts political freedom and civil liberties (discussed in Chen 1999; Cheng 1998; 
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“China at Fifty” 1999; Fewsmith 1998; Meisner, 514-548, Nathan 1997, Naughton 1998; 
“The People’s Republic of China After 50 Years” 1999; Wu 1998). 
MAJOR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC FREEDOM ISSUES OF THE 1990S 
A review of the literature on China in the 1990s reveals that certain issues – 
political parties, civil liberties, the judiciary, elections, the legislature, the media, labor 
unions, religion, and the rule of law – were commonly considered to be fundamental to 
the future of China’s political and economic freedom.  These issues are discussed here in 
order to give the reader a grasp of what outside observers and China’s leaders/citizens 
saw as the pivotal issues that would determine whether democracy and economic 
freedom would make progress in the country during the decade.  Later on, when NED-
funded activities in China are discussed, we will be able to see whether any of NED’s 
activities were aimed at having a positive impact on these fundamental issues.           
Political Parties 
 The CCP has absolute power.  It has ordered the imprisonment of almost all 
known political dissidents.  It uses the Chinese judicial system as a tool for controlling 
the country, and it harshly restricts many freedoms, including freedom of speech, press, 
association, and religion.  In China, there is little, if any, separation between the CCP and 
the state.  This results in an absence of political diversity in China and a lack of political 
choice for the Chinese people  (discussed in “The People’s Republic of China After 50 




 As discussed in Starr (1997) and Wan (1998), Chinese citizens, in the 1990s, had 
more freedom to work, travel, and enter into relationships than they have had in the past.  
However, two aspects of life – politics and procreation – remain severely restricted.  The 
restriction on political freedom (as mentioned above) is severe, and the restriction on 
procreation is just as harsh and controversial.  
 China’s policy on family planning restricts urban couples to one child – without 
exception.  Rural couples whose first child is female are allowed to petition the 
government for permission to have a son.  Couples who comply with the policy are 
rewarded with preferential benefits for education, food, and medical treatment.  Failure to 
comply results in the loss of these benefits.  The officials administering the policy have 
been known to impose penalties beyond what is legally specified.  They have also been 
know to force abortion and sterilization upon women in order to guarantee compliance. 
The Judiciary 
 As mentioned above, the judiciary is a tool of the CCP.  Judges are not unbiased – 
they tend to be men of great loyalty to the party (for example, retired military officers).  
This makes them susceptible to party influence in their judicial proceedings.  In the 
Chinese legal system, the due process rights of defendants are almost always ignored.  
Dissidents and accused criminals can be detained for up to four years without a judicial 
hearing.  These detainees spend this time working as slave labor in one of China’s forced 
labor camps.  It is estimated that over eight million people are held without due process 
in Chinese labor camps.  For those who do get a trial, there is no presumption of 
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innocence.  This helps explain why ninety-nine percent of defendants are convicted 
(Melone 1998).  
Elections 
Yiu-chung (1998) contends that only pre-selected CCP candidates and a few 
independent candidates can compete in China’s elections.  While independents have won 
some elections, such an occurrence is very infrequent.  Chinese elections have disturbing 
irregularities and are unfair to all but the pre-selected CCP candidates. 
The Legislature 
 The National Peoples Congress (NPC) is the highest constitutional body in China.  
It has the power to dictate policy, but it serves as little more than a rubber stamp on the 
CCP’s agenda.  It has virtually no power independent of the CCP  (Yiu-chung 1998). 
The Media 
 All media in China are controlled by the state, and their reporting must always be 
consonant with the CCP Propaganda Department’s guidelines.  Part of these guidelines is 
a prohibition on criticism of the CCP and its leaders.  Since 1996, the government has 
become even more strict on media freedoms.  Since then, at least twelve journalists have 
been imprisoned for their reporting.  The advancement of technology has posed a new 
threat to the CCP’s control of the media.  In response, the government has heavily 
regulated internet access and content.  As a result, China only has one million internet 
users, who tend to be wealthy members of the CCP.  China is also underrepresented in its 




 According to Chan (1998) and Hong and Warner (1998), the only trade unions 
allowed in China are controlled by the CCP and are members of the All-China Federation 
of Trade Unions.  Independent trade unions are illegal.  This gives Chinese workers little 
power in determining their work-conditions.  The lack of effective labor union 
representation helps guarantee that Chinese workers receive low pay, must work 
overtime, have no contracts, and can be fired arbitrarily. 
Religion 
 China’s government controls all organized religious practice.  A church must 
register with the government and give the government power to appoint its clergy.  The 
government monitors the church’s membership, finances, and activities.  It also regulates 
the content and distribution of the church’s religious materials.  Even if a church is 
registered and allows this level of government involvement, the church, its leaders, and 
its congregation are still not safe from governmental persecution.  The worst examples of 
religious persecution are in Xinjiang, Inner Mongolia, and Tibet, where the government 
has used ethnic strife as a pretext for harsh crackdowns on religious freedom  (see “Zhu 
Rongji in the Land of Demons,” 1999). 
The Rule of Law 
 According to Starr (1997), the rule of law is almost non-existent in China.  In a 
country of China’s population and geographic size, maintaining a lawful and orderly 
society would be difficult for any government.  The power concentrated in the CCP 
makes government in China highly centralized.  Therefore, it lacks the reach and 
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flexibility needed to enforce an adequate rule of law.  This lack of political capacity has 
led to the establishment of a second economy in China – a massive black market where 
scarce and prohibited goods can be purchased. 
NED ACTIVITY IN CHINA DURING THE 1990S 
 The Polity data-sets (discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6 ) operationalize democracy 
through the following factors: participation, competitiveness, openness, and constraints 
on the executive.  These factors are combined into one number that captures the level of  
democracy found in a country in a given year.  The variable’s value ranges from 1 (low 
democracy) to 10 (high democracy).  Table 7.1 shows that, according to the Polity  
data-sets, China began the 1990s with a level of democracy of 0 and ended the 1990s 
with a level of democracy of 0.  This shows that, politically, China is a highly repressive 
society that made no measurable progress toward democracy in the 1990s.   
 The economic freedom ratings published by The Heritage Foundation and The 
Wall Street Journal (also discussed in Chapters 4, 5, and 6) measure the level of 
governmental interference in the economic life of a given country.  The ratings focus on 
ten economic factors - trade policy, taxation, general government intervention, monetary 
policy, capital flows/foreign investment, banking, wage/price controls, property rights, 
regulation, and the black market – and the ratings are available beginning in 1994.  The 
average of these ten factors represents the level of economic freedom experienced by the 
country in a given year.  The variable’s value ranges from 1.00 to 5.00.  Countries are 




Table 7.1: Level of Democracy   
                   and Economic Freedom  
                   in China, 1990-1999 
 
 Level of Level of 
Year Democracy Ec. Freedom 
1990 6 n/a 
1991 6 n/a 
1992 6 n/a 
1993 6 n/a 
1994 6 3.90 
1995 8 3.60 
1996 8 3.60 
1997 8 3.50 
1998 8 3.50 




economic freedom score.  The values associated with each categorization are the 
following: 
- 1.00 and 1.99 – Free 
- 2.00 and 2.99 – Mostly Free 
- 3.00 and 3.99 – Mostly Unfree 
- 4.00 and 5.00 – Repressed 
 
Table 7.1 also shows that China’s level of economic freedom in 1994 (the first 
year that data is available) was 3.80, placing the country in the “mostly unfree” category 
and almost placing it in the “repressed” category.  China’s level of economic freedom 
was upgraded slightly in 1997 to a 3.75, but it returned to a 3.80 the following year 
(1998).  In the last year of the decade, China’s level of economic freedom was 3.40 – a 
strong improvement.  Even though China’s level of economic freedom did increase over 
the course of the decade (or, more accurately, over the course of the final year of the 
decade), the country’s level of economic freedom remained in the “mostly unfree” 
category throughout the 1990s.  While China did make progress toward greater economic 
freedom, it still has enormous strides to make in order to join the countries that are 
considered “mostly free” and “free” in regard to their economic policy.     
Figure 7.1 shows the trend in NED funding to China during the 1990s.  NED 
funding to China follows a trend that is the exact opposite of what was seen in Chapter 
6’s case study of Nicaragua.  NED funding was much higher in Nicaragua during the first  
half of the decade than in the second half.  In China, NED funding was much higher in 
the second half of the decade than the first.  NED awarded China $403,750, $579,537, 
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Equipment Rights Labor Legislatures









$0 $0 $0 $0 $0





$0 $195,000 $621,050 $0
1994 $0 $0 $299,719 $0 $0 $125,000 $728,343 $0
1995 $84,169 $0 $88,950 $538,506 $0 $254,000 $435,753 $0
1996 $266,072 $0 $454,286 $1,197,744 $0 $405,600 $759,393 $0
1997 $285,324 $334,499
 
$100,000 $100,120 $0 $319,600 $433,327 $0
1998 $287,177 $0 $76,800 $875,000 $188,905
 
$253,000 $779,581 $0
































$0 $0 $0 $403,750
1991 $260,000 $0 $0 $0 $0 $0 $579,537
1992 $325,000 $0 $24,000 $0 $0 $0 $409,000
1993 $518,250 $0 $136,136
 
$185,566 $0 $10,000 $1,791,011







1995 $544,000 $50,000 $281,138 $0 $0 $0 $2,276,516
1996 $574,000 $60,000
 
$139,133 $0 $0 $0 $3,856,228










1999 $223,000 $67,164 $0 $0 $0 $0 $2,649,133
Total $4,974,505 $339,664 $1,816,781 $340,346 $20,000 $45,000 $20,999,229
 
$2,276,516 in 1995, $3,856,228 in 1996, $3,308,026 in 1997, $3,859,193 in 1998, and 
$2,649,133 in 1999.   
OVERVIEW OF NED ACTIVITY IN CHINA BY SUBJECT AREA 
 As discussed in Chapter 6, NED categorizes each of its grants according to the 
subject area that the recipient will use the money to influence.  Table 7.2 shows NED’s 
grant activity in China for each year during the 1990s by subject area.  As Table7.2 
shows, NED recognizes 14 subject areas – business and economy, conflict resolution, 
education, elections, equipment, human rights, labor, legislatures, media and publishing, 
political parties, public policy, rule of law, women, and youth – that grantees influence.  
In the data used for this dissertation, NED expressly identifies the primary subject area of 
each grant.  As a review of the subject areas indicates, there is potential overlap among 
the subject areas.  Researchers must be cognizant that the primary subject area that NED 
identifies may only be one of multiple subject areas that the grant will impact. 
 As shown in Table 7.2, media and publishing was the subject area that received 
the most NED funding.  It received $4,974,505 (almost 24%) of the $20,999,229 that 
NED awarded to China in the 1990s.  Labor was second with $4,128,444, elections was 
third with $3,398,336, and human rights was fourth with $2,746,099.  The rest of the 
subject areas in order of how much NED grant money they received are the following: 
public policy ($1,816,781), education ($1,324,871), business and economy ($1,292,779), 
rule of law ($340,346), political parties ($339,664), conflict resolution ($334,499), 






































Figure 7.2: NED Grant Money Awarded by Subject Area to China, 1990-1999
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 Figure 7.2 shows the trends that occurred in NED’s funding of subject areas in 
China during the 1990s.  In 4 out of 10 years (1991-1992, 1995, and 1998), media and 
publishing received the most NED grant money.  Labor (1993-1994) and public policy  
 (1990 and 1997) each received the most grant money in two years.  Elections (1996) and 
human rights (1999) each received the most NED funding in one year during the 1990s.  
Figure 7.2 also illustrates the massive increase in NED funding to China during the 
second half of the 1990s.  Ten out of the fourteen subject areas – business and economy, 
conflict resolution, education, elections, equipment, human rights, labor, media and 
publishing, political parties, and public policy – received more NED funding in the 
second half of the decade than in the first half.   
SPECIFIC GROUPS/ACTIVITIES FUNDED WITHIN EACH SUBJECT AREA 
 As discussed in Chapter 6, NED includes a short description of each project that it 
has funded in its grant data.  Many of the project descriptions provide detailed 
information about the recipient organization and how it intends to use the grant money.  
Other project descriptions are more vague.  The data does not include any information on 
the outcome of the activity or whether the activity had any measurable impact.  The 
following section of this chapter looks at the groups within each subject area that 
received NED grant money in China during the 1990s and how the grant money was 
used.  This information will be the basis of the chapter’s conclusions about whether NED 
grant money in China was used for worthwhile, positive activities that contributed to 
democracy and economic freedom in the country.   
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Media and Publishing 
 In the 1990s, NED awarded $4,974,505 to support media and publishing in China.  
Democratic China was the leading recipient of NED’s media and publishing grant 
money.  The magazine received $50,000 in 1992, two $60,000 grants in 1993, $60,000 in 
1994, $65,000 in 1995, $65,000 in 1996, $65,000 in 1997, $85,000 in 1998 and $75,000 
in 1999, for a total of 9 grants and $585,000 during the decade.  Democratic China is a 
Chinese magazine that contains articles that promote democracy in mainland China and 
discusses the processes of democratization in Taiwan, Hong Kong, and Macao.  The 
magazine was awarded all of the grant money to support its continued publication and 
distribution.  
 China Perspective, Inc., was the second largest recipient of NED media and 
publishing funding during the 1990s.  China Perspective, Inc., publishes The Chinese 
Intellectual – a Chinese-language quarterly magazine that promotes democratic values to 
its readers in China.  The organization received 7 grants totaling $566,892 to help support 
the continued publication and distribution of the magazine.  It was awarded $20,892 in 
1990,  two grants totaling $260,000 in 1991, $130,000 in 1992, two grants totaling 
$26,000 in 1993, and $130,000 in 1994.   
 China’s Press Freedom Guardian – a bi-weekly, pro-democracy Chinese 
language newspaper – was the third largest recipient of NED media and publishing 
funding.  The Press Freedom Guardian received 8 grants totaling $446,000 to help 
support the newspaper’s ongoing publication and distribution.  It received two grants 
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totaling $35,000 in 1993, $38,000 in 1994, $40,000 in 1995, $45,000 in 1996, $45,000 in 
1997, $160,000 in 1998, and $48,000 in 1999.    
The Chinese Economists Society was the fourth leading recipient of NED media 
and publishing funding.  The organization received four grants from NED totaling 
$405,253.  The Chinese Economists Society was awarded $64,000 in 1992 to support the 
preparation of a series of twelve educational books for public distribution on the benefits 
of a market economy.  The Society was awarded two grants totaling $200,000 in 1993 to 
support its publication and distribution of monthly monographs on political reform, a 
journal featuring articles written by exiled dissidents, and a series of books on 
democracy.  In 1994, it was awarded $141,253 to produce a series of educational books 
on business administration, accounting, business law, corporate finance, international 
business, management information systems, and marketing.  
 The New Era – a bi-weekly newspaper – received 4 NED media and publishing 
grants for a total of $324,786, making it the fifth largest recipient.  The newspaper 
received $20,000 in 1995, $40,000 in 1996, $134,786 in 1997, and $135,000 in 1998.  
The New Era provides an alternative source of printed news and information for Chinese 
citizens.  The newspaper is pro-democracy and includes full-text transcripts of speeches 
and policy statements by human rights and democracy activists.   
 The China Strategic Institute received the sixth largest amount of NED media and 
publishing grant money.  It received two grants totaling $300,000 in the 1990s – one in 
1996 for $130,000 and another in 1997 for $170,000.  The Institute is comprised of forty 
scholars and policy experts in China who will use the funding to research, write, and 
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publish studies of constitutional reform in the country.  The studies will be distributed to 
the media and adapted for use in public education.      
 The Center for Modern China received $265,000 of NED media and publishing 
funding, making it the seventh largest recipient.  It received $100,000 in 1995, two grants 
totaling $110,000 in 1998, and $55,000 in 1999.  The Center received NED funding to 
support two journals and a series of books.  The two journals are Modern China Studies 
and the Journal of Contemporary China.  Both provide analysis of key issues relevant to 
democracy in China.  The book series focuses on the rule of law in China and is designed 
to be used in Chinese law schools.  The goal of the book series is to promote a complete 
overhaul of the Chinese legal system. 
 The last group to receive to receive a substantial amount of NED media and 
publishing funding was the Princeton China Initiative.  The organization received 5 
grants – $26,000 in 1992, $53,000 in 1994, $55,000 in 1995, $60,000 in 1996, and 
$40,000 in 1994 – for a total of $234,000.  The Princeton China Initiative is an 
independent center for exiled Chinese dissident intellectuals.  The grants support the 
continued publication of two journals featuring the writings of these intellectuals and 
their monthly distribution in China.  The journals are The Road and China Focus. 
 Other recipients of NED media and publishing funding include the Foundation for 
China in the 21st Century, which used its $150,000 of grant money to publish two books 
exploring issues related to Tibet and one book documenting Taiwan’s democratic 
development.  The Tibet Fund received $98,770 to produce and distribute audio and 
video tapes to educate Tibetans about current events and policy issues.  NED awarded 
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$88,000 to the Chinese literary magazine Today to help continue its publication and 
distribution.  Today features literary criticism and new fiction by Chinese writers that is 
free from government censorship.  Other grants supported the publication of a human 
rights manual, a human rights newsletter, a pro-democracy magazine, and information on 
Tibet.        
Labor 
 During the 1990s, NED awarded $4,128,444 to support labor activities in China.  
Over 60% of the labor funding ($2,519,556) went to the Asian-American Free Labor 
Institute (AAFLI). The AAFLI received three grants totaling $561,050 in 1993, $388,399 
in 1994, $435,753 in 1995, $400,000 in 1996, $433,327 in 1997, and $343,847 in 1998.  
AAFLI used this funding to build a support network of Chinese labor activists, to assist 
labor activists in China and Hong Kong, to support labor activists who have lost their 
jobs due to their activism, to promote worker rights in China, to disseminate information 
on labor rights abuses, to assist unions in Taiwan, to continue publishing the China 
Labour Bulletin and China Labor Notes, and to begin organizing workers in Macao.  The 
remainder of NED funding was awarded to the Laogai Research Foundation and one of 
NED’s core grantees – The American Center for International Labor Solidarity.  The 
grant money was primarily used to promote adherence to international labor standards in 
China, Hong Kong, Macao, and Taiwan.  It was also used to sponsor a conference on 




 In the 1990s, NED awarded $3,398,336 through 8 separate grants to China for 
activities related to elections.  The International Republican Institute (IRI) – one of 
NED’s core grantees – was awarded two grants totaling $1,190,522.  IRI received 
$538,506 in 1995 and $652,016 in 1999 to support its promotion of electoral reform in 
China.  The grant money was used to educate the public on proper elections procedures, 
for research on the shortcomings of China’s current electoral system, and for lobbying the 
Chinese government to change its laws regarding elections.   
China’s Association of Towns and Townships received an $875,000 grant in 1998 
to support electoral reform at the village level by training local election administrators 
and lobbying for changes in local election laws.  China’s Association for Grassroots 
Governance and the Institute for Asia-Pacific Studies both received just under $600,000 
in 1996 to hold training workshops for provincial and local elected officials in China.  
The remaining NED funding for elections activities went to NDI and the China Strategic 
Institute to analyze Hong Kong’s election process and to publish research papers on the 
failings of China’s electoral system.   
Human Rights  
During the 1990s, NED awarded $2,746,099 to promote human rights in China.  
Over 40% of this funding ($1,133,000) went to Human Rights in China, Inc.  The 
organization received $120,000 in 1993, three grants totaling $165,000 in 1995, $150,000 
in 1996, $150,000 in 1997, three grants totaling $148,000 in 1998, and $400,000 in 1999.  
NED funding supported the organization’s programs that provide legal advice to political 
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prisoners, publish educational materials aimed at informing Chinese citizens about their 
rights, document/publicize human rights abuses, lobby the Chinese government for 
improvement in its human rights record, and focus on special human rights issues 
pertaining to women. 
The Laogai Research Foundation was awarded $376,200 to support its human 
rights activities.  The Foundation was awarded $60,000 in 1992, two grants totaling 
$89,000 in 1995, two grants totaling $73,600 in 1996, $68,600 in 1997, and $85,000 in 
1999.  The activities supported by NED funding include the creation and maintenance of 
a human rights database on China’s forced labor prison camps, the publicizing within 
China and internationally of China’s use of labor camps to detain political prisoners 
without trial, the creation of a human rights handwork for distribution to throughout 
China, and. the production of a documentary on public executions in China. 
Public Policy 
 NED awarded three grants totaling $1,816,781 during the 1990s for activities 
related to public policy in China.  Over 60% of the grant money ($1,124,133) went to 
China’s Association of Towns and Townships.  This Beijing-based organization received 
$139,133 in 1996 to conduct a survey to determine the effectiveness of government at the 
village-level and to determine the training needs of local governments in China.  The 
organization used the survey results as the basis for proposing improvements to local 
government in China.  The Association of Towns and Townships also received $985,000 
in 1997 to support its ongoing efforts to reform election practices at the village level and 
legal reform at the provincial level. 
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 China’s National League for Democracy received two NED grants totaling 
$211,636 to support its public policy work in China.  The organization received $111,636 
in 1993 and $100,000 in 1998 to support its democratic development program and to 
provide organizational support to grassroots democracy groups in China.  NED awarded 
one grant totaling $116,138 to the China Center for Economic Research to help the 
organization organize a lecture series on economic reform in China.  The lecture series 
featured Chinese government officials and economists from China and the United States.  
The lectures were used as the basis for a new series of university textbooks on the subject 
of economic reform in China.   
The Center for Modern China was awarded two NED grants totaling $98,000 to 
aid its public policy efforts.  The organization received $75,000 in 1990 and $24,000 in 
1992 to hold conferences on Sino-Tibetan relations.  The rest of the grant money that 
NED awarded in the public policy area went to the International Campaign for Tibet, the 
Foundation for Human Rights in China, the China Strategic Institute, and the Future of 
China Society.  The activities funded by NED include publishing articles about Tibet in 
Chinese newspapers, publishing Tibet Forum and the Tibetan Environment and 
Development News, facilitating meetings between Chinese and Tibetan leaders, 
publishing a series of papers on solutions to pressing problems in China, and supporting a 
conference on Hong Kong-Chinese relations.   
Education  
During the 1990s, NED awarded $1,324,871 for activities related to education in 
China.  The leading recipient of NED funding for education was the National League for 
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Democracy, which received $305,125 during the decade.  The organization received 
$15,000 in 1991, $50,059 in 1993, $120,066 in 1994, and $120,000 in 1996.  The grant 
money was used to train leaders in strategic planning techniques, to open more offices for 
the organization, and to train citizens in opposing government through non-violent 
means.  Human Rights in China, Inc., received one NED grant in 1994 for $155,000 to 
support its “Human Rights Education and Assistance Project.”  The Project produces and 
circulates educational materials that inform Chinese citizens about their rights.  The 
Foundation for Human Rights and Democracy in China received one NED grant in the 
amount of $129,516 to promote democratic education in China and fund research into the 
solutions offered by democracy and free markets for China’s problems.   
The remainder of NED’s funding for education in China involves many smaller, 
individual grants.  Recipients include the Albert Einstein Institute, the Center for Modern 
China, the Center for the Study of Human Rights, the Independent Federation of Chinese 
Students and Scholars, the International Fund for the Development of Tibet, the 
International Campaign for Tibet, China’s National Health and Education Committee, the 
Tibet Fund, the Tibet Multimedia Center, the Tibetan Young Buddhist Association, and 
the Political Defiance Committee.  Their activities include a two-week training course on 
democracy, a conference on nationalism and democracy in China and Tibet, a leadership 
training program focusing on strategic planning and grassroots organizing, promoting 
democratic development in Tibet, producing written materials and audio cassettes to 
bring news into rural Tibet, educating Chinese citizens on non-violent political action, 
and providing civic education to Tibetan youth. 
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Business and Economy 
 During the 1990s, NED awarded $1,292,779 in grant money to support activities 
related to China’s business and economy.  The Chinese Economists Society was the 
leading recipient, receiving six grants totaling $428,487.  The organization received 
$50,000 in 1993, $67,971 in 1995, $89,377 in 1996, two grants totaling $187,165 in 
1997, and $83,974 in 1998.  The organization used the grant money to conduct a 
conference on China’s transition to a market economy, to hold a symposium to highlight 
problems faced by state-run industries in China, to encourage privatization of the 
financial sector in China’s Guangdong Province, to hold forums that encourage dialogue 
between China’s private entrepreneurs and the government, to establish a “Private 
Enterprise Management Training Center” that will train young Chinese entrepreneurs, 
and to hold a policy forum in Beijing highlighting the link between a market economy 
and increased social welfare. 
  The China Center for Economic Research received $133,100 in 1998 to help 
establish the China Economic Network and an economics-training program for young 
faculty at China’s colleges and universities.  China’s Unirule Institute of Economics 
received four grants during the 1990s totaling $129,094 to hold bi-weekly forums and 
debates on economic reform issues.  Participants in the forums and debates included 
private entrepreneurs, academics, government officials, and journalists.  The Center for 
Modern China received two grants in 1991 totaling $133,100 to support the publication 
and distribution of a monthly series of academic papers that focus on the solutions 
offered by a free market to China’s economic problems.  Other business and economy 
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grants were awarded to the Center for International Private Enterprise and the Beijing 
Siyuan Merger and Bankruptcy Consultancy.    
Other Subject Areas 
 In the rule of law subject area, NED awarded three grants during the 1990s 
totaling $340,346.  The grants were awarded to the Center for Modern China, the Center 
for the Study of Human Rights, and IRI.  These organizations used NED funding to 
support the ongoing publication and distribution of the Journal of Contemporary China, 
to publish and distribute works by Chinese scholars on constitutionalism and the rule of 
law, and to promote the role of private voluntary organizations in Chinese government.  
NED awarded $339,664 to organizations that sought to have an impact on political 
parties in China.  The Asian-American Free Labor Institute and NDI used this money to 
help organize dissident political parties in China and encourage unity among all pro-
democracy parties.  $334,499 was awarded by NED to promote conflict resolution in 
China during the 1990s.  IRI and the Political Defiance Committee used this funding to 
support their training of citizens in nonviolent resistance.  NED awarded $237,905 for 
equipment purchases in China.  The Tibet Fund and the National Coalition for 
Democracy used this funding to purchase the equipment needed to produce audio and 
video cassettes containing news and information that could be distributed in Tibet and 
other rural parts of China.  The Tibetan Youth Congress and the Karen Youth 
Organization received $45,000 from NED to support their youth leadership training 
programs.  Human Rights, Inc., received $20,000 from NED to help publicize the 
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Chinese government’s abuse of women’s rights.  NED did not make any grants regarding 
the legislatures subject area during the 1990s. 
DISCUSSION 
 The literature on China in the 1990s identifies certain issues – political parties, 
civil liberties, the judiciary, elections, the legislature, the media, labor unions, religion, 
and the rule of law – as the most fundamental issues impacting on political and economic 
freedom in the country.  While it can be argued that almost all of the activities funded by 
NED in China had an indirect impact on these fundamental issues, NED grants were used 
to directly influence all of these subject areas in China.  NED support was particularly 
strong in regard to the media, civil liberties (through its funding for human rights 
activities), elections, religion (through its funding of education and public policy 
activities related to Tibet), and labor unions.     
 In regard to some of the major debates surrounding NED (discussed in Chapters 2 
and 6) – whether the U.S. should be interfering in the politics of other countries, whether 
NED makes its own foreign policy irrespective of official U.S. policy, whether NED 
promotes democracy or U.S. interests, whether NED has been successful in its efforts, 
and whether NED escapes proper oversight through purposefully vague documentation of 
its activities – this case study of NED activity in China during the 1990s leads to many of 
the same conclusions as the case study of Nicaragua (Chapter 6).  However, NED activity 
in China during the 1990s was markedly different than its activity in Nicaragua. 
 In China, media and publishing was the subject area that received the most NED 
funding.  It received almost 24% of all NED funding that was awarded to China.  In 
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Nicaragua, the education subject area received the most NED funding (over 50% of all 
grant money awarded to the country).  The types of activities associated with the media 
and publishing subject area – publishing and distributing newspapers, magazines, books, 
etc. – appear to be less intrusive and less direct than the types of activities associated with 
the education subject area – civic education seminars and conferences, leadership 
training, democracy training, etc.  For example, publishing and distributing a magazine in 
China that contains articles about democratic and/or free market values is a much less 
intrusive and less direct way to promote democracy and/or economic freedom than 
holding face-to-face education seminars in China on democratic and/or free market 
values.   
 NED’s focus on less intrusive and less direct approaches to promoting democracy 
and economic freedom in China is probably dictated by the Chinese government’s 
intolerance to any promotion of reform, especially any outside promotion of reform.  
More direct approaches would likely meet with staunch opposition from the Chinese 
government and could result in negative consequences for the Chinese groups and people 
that are involved.  This may also explain why a much higher proportion of NED funding 
that is awarded to China – as compared to Nicaragua – is awarded to groups that are 
active in the country, but not native to China.  For example, over 60% of NED funding to 
the labor subject area was awarded to the Asian-American Free Labor Institute – a group 
that promotes worker rights in China, but is not based in the country and, therefore, is not 
subject to direct government reprisals.   
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 A less intrusive and less direct approach to promoting democracy and economic 
freedom would seem to have a negative impact on NED’s success in the country.  Less 
intrusive and less direct methods would seem to make success more difficult to achieve, 
and – if success is achieved – the length of time required for its achievement would seem 
to be longer.  This makes promoting democracy and economic development a much more 
difficult task in a repressed country such as China, than in Nicaragua – a country that is 
more open to change. 
 NED must also be careful in its approach to promoting political and economic 
freedom in China because of the controversial issues that it was confronting.  The best 
example of this involves NED support for groups seeking to protect Tibet.  NED awarded 
grant money in the areas of media and publishing, human rights, labor, elections, public 
policy, education, and youth to these groups.  As discussed above, China’s government 
had severely cracked-down on Tibet for religious and ethnic reasons.  The crack-down 
became a prominent international issue and a “sore” issue for China’s government, which 
steadfastly refused to change its policy.  The involvement of an organization that is 
funded by the U.S. government in such high-profile, domestic issues that involves an 
economic and military power such as China seems to be risky – it could potentially harm 
U.S.-China relations.   
Out of respect for China’s economic and military power, during the 1990s, 
official U.S. foreign policy was willing to accept the status-quo in China.  It expressed 
support for greater political and economic freedom for the country, but it did not take any 




more freedom.  NED’s support for groups that were actively attempting to change the 
status-quo in China seems to support the contention of NED’s critics that the organization 






 As a student of international relations and, in particular, U.S. foreign policy at the 
end of the 1990s and the beginning of the 21st century, the importance of democracy and 
economic freedom in the post-Cold War world caught my attention.  Although the 
literature on democracy and economic freedom was already extensive and growing 
rapidly, one topic had not been adequately addressed.  As mentioned in Chapter 1 of this 
dissertation, billions of dollars have been spent to promote democracy and economic 
freedom through U.S. foreign aid, but little is known about its impact.  Even those who 
staunchly support the promotion of democracy and free markets as an integral part of 
U.S. foreign policy are unsure whether it really has a positive impact.  The evidence that 
exists provides limited guidance because it is based on anecdotal evidence, not analysis 
of objective aggregate data gathered over a substantial period of time.  This led me to 
conclude that an objective and thorough analysis of the promotion of democracy and 
economic freedom is not only needed, but would be a valuable contribution to the 
literature.   
 As a student of U.S. foreign policy, I also took note of the leading U.S. 
organization that promotes democracy and economic freedom throughout the world – the 
National Endowment for Democracy (NED).  As discussed in Chapter 2, NED, since its 
founding, has been the subject of immense discussion and controversy.  Even though 
NED’s critics and supporters disagree on many issues, both agree that many aspects of 
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the organization are shrouded in secrecy, and this secrecy helps to promote the 
controversy.  Seeing this, I concluded that a thorough analysis of NED is needed in order 
to help end this secrecy and help resolve the debates surrounding the organization.   
The goal of this dissertation is to provide insight into the promotion of democracy 
and economic freedom through an analysis of NED activities.  The analysis uses 
aggregate data analysis to look at the organizations that were awarded NED grant money, 
how much money they were awarded, how the money was used, and whether NED’s 
grant money helped to promote political and economic freedom.  The results of this 
aggregate data analysis of NED’s activities can be better generalized to all democracy 
and free market promotion activity and help provide greater insight into its impact than 
the evidence that is currently available in the literature.  This dissertation uses data on 
NED activities during the 1990s.  Even though NED activities are shrouded in secrecy, 
the author of this dissertation was fortunate to obtain complete data on NED grant 
activity in the 1990s during a short period of time that the data was made available over 
the internet by NED.  Chapter 3 of this dissertation represents the first time that complete, 
detailed data on NED’s grant activities for any length of time has been presented and 
analyzed.   
Chapter 4 provides an analysis of the determinants of which organizations were 
awarded NED grant money.  It uses the extensive theoretical and empirical literature that 
analyzes the determinants of traditional U.S. foreign aid funding decisions as its 
foundation.  In this literature, certain variables have been identified as potentially 
important in U.S. foreign aid funding decisions.  They include the following:  U.S. 
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military presence within a country, a country’s openness to U.S. trade, a country’s level 
of economic development, whether the country is a U.S. alliance partner, the country’s 
population, and the size of a country’s economy.  These variables and one other – U.S. 
foreign aid allocations to the country – are used as control variables in the analysis.  They 
control for the traditional motivations behind U.S. foreign aid decisions and help allow 
for the true impact of democracy and economic freedom on NED grant making decisions 
to be seen.  The analysis uses difference of means tests and regression techniques to 
analyze the data.   
The difference of means test results indicate that NED funds projects in countries 
that have a large, poor population and have little political and/or economic freedom.  This 
suggests that NED does not base its grant decisions on promoting selfish U.S. interests, 
but, instead, bases its decisions more on a country’s need for assistance.  The regression 
results show that more NED grants and a higher amount of NED funding are associated 
with a lower level of democracy and a lower level of economic freedom.  However, level 
of democracy is significant in the first model, but not significant in the second, third, and 
fourth models.  Level of economic freedom (included in only the first and third models 
due to data limitations) is not significant in the first model, but is significant in the third 
model.   The inconsistent significance of these independent-variables-of-interest across 
the regression models casts doubt on their importance in NED grant making decisions.   
Chapter 5 provides an analysis of the impact of NED’s activities on democracy 
and economic freedom around the world.  Since students of democracy agree that 
modernization/wealth and external forces – such as international politics and economics –
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have an impact on whether democracy and economic freedom evolve within a country, 
the following were included as control variables: change in a country’s level of economic 
development, change in the size of a country’s economy, change in a country’s 
population, and change in a country’s level of U.S. foreign aid.  The analysis also uses 
difference of means tests and regression techniques to analyze the data.     
The difference of means test results reveal that countries that experienced an 
increase in democracy received slightly more NED grant money than countries that 
experienced no increase in democracy.  The difference is not significant.  This casts 
doubt on the impact that NED grant money had on democracy.  The difference of means 
test results also show that, even though the difference in NED grant money awarded to 
countries that increased their economic freedom and to countries that did not increase 
their economic freedom is larger than the difference regarding democracy, the lack of a 
sizable difference in NED grant money and the lack of a significant relationship casts 
doubt on NED’s impact on economic freedom.  The regression results show that 
countries that received more NED grant money did not make as much progress toward 
political and economic freedom as countries that received less or no money.  Even though 
the relationships are not significant, this indicates that NED funding was not a positive 
factor – much less a strong, positive factor – in promoting democracy and economic 
freedom during the 1990s.    
Chapters 6 and 7 are case studies of NED involvement in Nicaragua and China, 
respectively.  Each presents an overview of each country’s recent political and economic 
history and an overview of the major political and economic freedom issues faced by 
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each country during the 1990s.  The case studies also identify the organizations that 
received NED funding in each country during the decade and discuss their use of NED 
funding.     
 In both Nicaragua and China during the 1990s, certain issues were considered to 
be the most fundamental issues impacting on political and economic freedom in each 
country.  In Nicaragua, the issues were civilian-military relations, the rule of law, the 
judiciary, the media, and labor unions.  In China, the issues were political parties, civil 
liberties, the judiciary, elections, the legislature, the media, labor unions, religion, and the 
rule of law.  Both case studies found that a sizable amount of NED funding was being 
targeted at these fundamental issues. 
 In Chapter 2, the major debates surrounding NED were discussed.  The case 
studies of NED activity in Nicaragua and China during the 1990s provide evidence that 
can help resolve many of these debates.   These debates include the following: whether 
the U.S. should be interfering in the politics of other countries, whether NED makes its 
own foreign policy irrespective of official U.S. policy, whether NED promotes 
democracy or U.S. interests, whether NED has been successful in its efforts, and whether 
NED escapes proper oversight through purposefully vague documentation of its 
activities.  One particularly important issue involves claims by NED’s critics that the 
organization has the potential to be a “loose cannon” that may do more harm than good in 
the fight for freedom around the world.  Both Nicaragua (in its support Violetta 
Chammorro in the 1989 elections) and China (in its involvement in Tibet) provide 
examples of this.  Another important issues involves whether NED can cite any definitive 
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successes that justify its existence.   Both case studies show that the types of activities 
funded by NED – education, information, mobilizing citizens, etc. – are very subjective 
and quantifying their impact with any degree of certainty is extremely difficult.  Given 
this, definitive successes may be impossible to find even if NED is having a strong, 
positive impact.      
 The case studies also show that NED activity in China during the 1990s was 
markedly different than its activity in Nicaragua.  The types of activities funded in China 
appear to be less intrusive and less direct than the types of activities funded in Nicaragua.  
This is probably a result of the differing political environments found in each country.  
China’s government is highly intolerant to any promotion of reform, while Nicaragua’s 
government is much more open to change.  More direct approaches by NED to promoting 
political and economic freedom in China would likely meet with staunch opposition 
China’s government and potentially result in negative consequences for the Chinese 
groups and people that are involved.  This may also explain why a much higher 
proportion of NED funding that is awarded to China goes to groups that are active in the 
country, but not native to China.   A less intrusive and less direct approach to promoting 
democracy and economic freedom would seem to have a negative impact on NED’s 
ability to bring about change in China or any other highly repressed country.  
FINAL THOUGHTS 
 This research does not find evidence that NED was successful at promoting 
democracy and economic freedom during the 1990s.  Even though NED grant money 
appears to have been appropriately awarded to countries based on their need, the grant 
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money had a mixed impact on political and economic freedom and was not significantly 
related to either.  This calls into question the wisdom of using the U.S. government’s 
scarce resources to promote democracy and economic freedom – not only through NED, 
but in any similar manner.   
As discussed throughout this dissertation, the activities that are supported in the 
promotion of democracy and free markets tend to be subjective, tend to have an indirect 
impact, and tend to take many years to have an impact.  In highly repressed countries 
such as China (discussed in Chapter 7 and above), the activities can be even more 
subjective, more indirect, and take even more time to have an impact.  Greater insight 
into the impact of promoting democracy and economic freedom may be gained by 
analyzing data over a longer period of time.  However, data limitations make this a 
difficult task to accomplish.  More years of data would allow for more of an opportunity 
for these subjective and indirect activities to have a measurable impact. 
Without proof that the activities supported in the name promoting democracy and 
economic freedom are effective, it is hard to justify our involvement in the internal affairs 
of other countries – even if the involvement does not directly interfere in their political 
and economic processes.  Even though many of the supported activities have a noble 
quality and are consistent with American ideals, why risk offending other governments 
when there is no evidence that our involvement has a positive impact on their political 
and/or economic freedom?  Similar foreign involvement in the U.S. would probably not 
be tolerated and could jeopardize U.S. relations with the sponsoring country.  The 




without proof of its efficacy, it seems to have more potential risks than benefits.  This 
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APPENDIX A: NED GRANT ACTIVITY, 1990-1999 
    
Year Country NED $ Grants 
1990 Afghanistan $199,870 4 
1991 Afghanistan $57,068 1 
1992 Afghanistan $61,344 1 
1993 Afghanistan $24,000 1 
1994 Afghanistan $66,000 1 
1995 Afghanistan $48,000 2 
1996 Afghanistan $48,000 2 
1997 Afghanistan $98,000 3 
1998 Afghanistan $48,000 2 
1999 Afghanistan $58,000 3 
Total Afghanistan $708,282 20 
1990 Africa $904,193 7 
1991 Africa $1,045,541 10 
1992 Africa $963,280 11 
1993 Africa $777,648 6 
1994 Africa $950,284 6 
1995 Africa $1,091,208 11 
1996 Africa $810,076 8 
1997 Africa $649,210 6 
1998 Africa $600,663 10 
1999 Africa $550,436 6 
Total Africa $8,342,539 81 
1990 Albania $0 0 
1991 Albania $848,136 3 
1992 Albania $100,500 1 
1993 Albania $0 0 
1994 Albania $22,616 1 
1995 Albania $132,464 3 
1996 Albania $79,010 2 
1997 Albania $0 0 
1998 Albania $47,745 2 
1999 Albania $0 0 
Total Albania $1,230,471 12 
         (table continued) 
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Year Country NED $ Grants 
1990 Algeria $0 0 
1991 Algeria $0 0 
1992 Algeria $0 0 
1993 Algeria $0 0 
1994 Algeria $0 0 
1995 Algeria $0 0 
1996 Algeria $147,696 1 
1997 Algeria $50,000 1 
1998 Algeria $52,000 1 
1999 Algeria $52,000 1 
Total Algeria $301,696 4 
1990 Angola $0 0 
1991 Angola $0 0 
1992 Angola $0 0 
1993 Angola $0 0 
1994 Angola $0 0 
1995 Angola $136,220 1 
1996 Angola $249,520 2 
1997 Angola $50,000 1 
1998 Angola $50,000 1 
1999 Angola $0 0 
Total Angola $485,740 5 
1990 Argentina $422,500 6 
1991 Argentina $358,430 3 
1992 Argentina $186,000 2 
1993 Argentina $296,603 4 
1994 Argentina $161,145 2 
1995 Argentina $85,220 2 
1996 Argentina $0 0 
1997 Argentina $74,910 1 
1998 Argentina $0 0 
1999 Argentina $24,200 1 
Total Argentina $1,609,008 21 
1990 Armenia $25,000 1 
1991 Armenia $0 0 
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Year Country NED $ Grants 
1992 Armenia $15,450 1 
1993 Armenia $25,000 1 
1994 Armenia $0 0 
1995 Armenia $91,688 1 
1996 Armenia $122,666 2 
1997 Armenia $53,733 2 
1998 Armenia $157,016 3 
1999 Armenia $386,327 8 
Total Armenia $876,880 19 
1990 Asia $405,136 5 
1991 Asia $632,492 4 
1992 Asia $300,000 2 
1993 Asia $880,969 4 
1994 Asia $1,399,827 6 
1995 Asia $1,714,545 7 
1996 Asia $2,239,320 9 
1997 Asia $809,775 4 
1998 Asia $378,534 1 
1999 Asia $987,259 5 
Total Asia $9,747,857 47 
1990 Australia $0 0 
1991 Australia $0 0 
1992 Australia $0 0 
1993 Australia $0 0 
1994 Australia $0 0 
1995 Australia $0 0 
1996 Australia $0 0 
1997 Australia $0 0 
1998 Australia $0 0 
1999 Australia $0 0 
Total Australia $0 0 
1990 Austria $0 0 
1991 Austria $0 0 
1992 Austria $0 0 
1993 Austria $0 0 
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Year Country NED $ Grants 
1994 Austria $0 0 
1995 Austria $0 0 
1996 Austria $0 0 
1997 Austria $0 0 
1998 Austria $0 0 
1999 Austria $0 0 
Total Austria $0 0 
1990 Azerbaijan $0 0 
1991 Azerbaijan $0 0 
1992 Azerbaijan $0 0 
1993 Azerbaijan $125,617 1 
1994 Azerbaijan $30,000 1 
1995 Azerbaijan $263,268 4 
1996 Azerbaijan $390,838 4 
1997 Azerbaijan $558,928 6 
1998 Azerbaijan $198,877 4 
1999 Azerbaijan $0 0 
Total Azerbaijan $1,567,528 20 
1990 Bahrain $0 0 
1991 Bahrain $0 0 
1992 Bahrain $0 0 
1993 Bahrain $0 0 
1994 Bahrain $0 0 
1995 Bahrain $0 0 
1996 Bahrain $0 0 
1997 Bahrain $0 0 
1998 Bahrain $0 0 
1999 Bahrain $16,500 1 
Total Bahrain $16,500 1 
1990 Bangladesh $0 0 
1991 Bangladesh $0 0 
1992 Bangladesh $0 0 
1993 Bangladesh $0 0 
1994 Bangladesh $0 0 
1995 Bangladesh $0 0 
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Year Country NED $ Grants 
1996 Bangladesh $0 0 
1997 Bangladesh $0 0 
1998 Bangladesh $0 0 
1999 Bangladesh $90,811 1 
Total Bangladesh $90,811 1 
1990 Belarus $0 0 
1991 Belarus $0 0 
1992 Belarus $0 0 
1993 Belarus $101,170 3 
1994 Belarus $251,429 4 
1995 Belarus $242,463 3 
1996 Belarus $449,156 6 
1997 Belarus $752,967 13 
1998 Belarus $673,984 13 
1999 Belarus $909,074 20 
Total Belarus $3,380,243 62 
1990 Belgium $0 0 
1991 Belgium $0 0 
1992 Belgium $0 0 
1993 Belgium $0 0 
1994 Belgium $0 0 
1995 Belgium $0 0 
1996 Belgium $0 0 
1997 Belgium $0 0 
1998 Belgium $0 0 
1999 Belgium $0 0 
Total Belgium $0 0 
1990 Benin $0 0 
1991 Benin $221,070 3 
1992 Benin $0 0 
1993 Benin $0 0 
1994 Benin $116,178 2 
1995 Benin $0 0 
1996 Benin $0 0 
1997 Benin $0 0 
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1998 Benin $0 0 
1999 Benin $142,000 1 
Total Benin $479,248 6 
1990 Bhutan $0 0 
1991 Bhutan $0 0 
1992 Bhutan $0 0 
1993 Bhutan $0 0 
1994 Bhutan $0 0 
1995 Bhutan $0 0 
1996 Bhutan $0 0 
1997 Bhutan $0 0 
1998 Bhutan $0 0 
1999 Bhutan $0 0 
Total Bhutan $0 0 
1990 Bolivia $75,000 1 
1991 Bolivia $78,005 1 
1992 Bolivia $56,800 1 
1993 Bolivia $122,404 2 
1994 Bolivia $127,800 2 
1995 Bolivia $462,433 5 
1996 Bolivia $0 0 
1997 Bolivia $0 0 
1998 Bolivia $0 0 
1999 Bolivia $0 0 
Total Bolivia $922,442 12 
1990 Bosnia $0 0 
1991 Bosnia $0 0 
1992 Bosnia $0 0 
1993 Bosnia $0 0 
1994 Bosnia $152,000 1 
1995 Bosnia $35,000 1 
1996 Bosnia $548,746 8 
1997 Bosnia $98,400 3 
1998 Bosnia $193,282 3 
1999 Bosnia $362,760 10 
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Total Bosnia $1,390,188 26 
1990 Botswana $0 0 
1991 Botswana $160,900 2 
1992 Botswana $0 0 
1993 Botswana $80,000 1 
1994 Botswana $0 0 
1995 Botswana $0 0 
1996 Botswana $0 0 
1997 Botswana $0 0 
1998 Botswana $0 0 
1999 Botswana $0 0 
Total Botswana $240,900 3 
1990 Brazil $583,122 3 
1991 Brazil $273,600 3 
1992 Brazil $139,885 1 
1993 Brazil $370,720 3 
1994 Brazil $352,504 3 
1995 Brazil $0 0 
1996 Brazil $105,585 2 
1997 Brazil $0 0 
1998 Brazil $0 0 
1999 Brazil $229,170 2 
Total Brazil $2,054,586 17 
1990 Bulgaria $2,210,686 14 
1991 Bulgaria $538,786 4 
1992 Bulgaria $111,700 3 
1993 Bulgaria $334,735 3 
1994 Bulgaria $277,455 2 
1995 Bulgaria $537,636 5 
1996 Bulgaria $378,110 4 
1997 Bulgaria $275,138 4 
1998 Bulgaria $492,906 6 
1999 Bulgaria $198,953 3 
Total Bulgaria $5,356,105 48 
1990 Burkina Faso $18,000 1 
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1991 Burkina Faso $33,000 1 
1992 Burkina Faso $0 0 
1993 Burkina Faso $44,000 1 
1994 Burkina Faso $40,000 1 
1995 Burkina Faso $0 0 
1996 Burkina Faso $0 0 
1997 Burkina Faso $0 0 
1998 Burkina Faso $0 0 
1999 Burkina Faso $0 0 
Total Burkina Faso $135,000 4 
1990 Burma $608,865 6 
1991 Burma $806,932 6 
1992 Burma $2,150,082 27 
1993 Burma $0 0 
1994 Burma $0 0 
1995 Burma $0 0 
1996 Burma $0 0 
1997 Burma $0 0 
1998 Burma $0 0 
1999 Burma $1,648,200 28 
Total Burma $5,214,079 67 
1990 Burundi $0 0 
1991 Burundi $0 0 
1992 Burundi $75,000 1 
1993 Burundi $0 0 
1994 Burundi $0 0 
1995 Burundi $48,085 1 
1996 Burundi $0 0 
1997 Burundi $0 0 
1998 Burundi $0 0 
1999 Burundi $0 0 
Total Burundi $123,085 2 
1990 C/E Europe $3,741,869 41 
1991 C/E Europe $1,696,050 23 
1992 C/E Europe $2,453,985 35 
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1993 C/E Europe $886,875 13 
1994 C/E Europe $1,622,434 15 
1995 C/E Europe $1,503,204 18 
1996 C/E Europe $718,149 9 
1997 C/E Europe $593,020 9 
1998 C/E Europe $1,146,968 21 
1999 C/E Europe $1,815,077 16 
Total C/E Europe $16,177,631 200 
1990 Cambodia $37,000 1 
1991 Cambodia $147,425 2 
1992 Cambodia $64,859 1 
1993 Cambodia $188,318 3 
1994 Cambodia $220,000 2 
1995 Cambodia $986,478 11 
1996 Cambodia $1,248,363 12 
1997 Cambodia $1,176,691 6 
1998 Cambodia $100,000 1 
1999 Cambodia $413,899 7 
Total Cambodia $4,583,033 46 
1990 Cameroon $0 0 
1991 Cameroon $0 0 
1992 Cameroon $0 0 
1993 Cameroon $0 0 
1994 Cameroon $0 0 
1995 Cameroon $0 0 
1996 Cameroon $0 0 
1997 Cameroon $77,629 1 
1998 Cameroon $0 0 
1999 Cameroon $88,330 1 
Total Cameroon $165,959 2 
1990 Canada $0 0 
1991 Canada $0 0 
1992 Canada $0 0 
1993 Canada $0 0 
1994 Canada $0 0 
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1995 Canada $0 0 
1996 Canada $0 0 
1997 Canada $0 0 
1998 Canada $0 0 
1999 Canada $0 0 
Total Canada $0 0 
1990 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1991 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1992 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1993 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1994 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1995 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1996 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1997 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1998 Central African Rep. $0 0 
1999 Central African Rep. $150,000 1 
Total Central African Rep. $150,000 1 
1990 Chad $0 0 
1991 Chad $0 0 
1992 Chad $0 0 
1993 Chad $0 0 
1994 Chad $48,000 2 
1995 Chad $51,635 2 
1996 Chad $0 0 
1997 Chad $48,000 2 
1998 Chad $18,000 1 
1999 Chad $30,000 1 
Total Chad $195,635 8 
1990 Chile $317,000 4 
1991 Chile $545,200 7 
1992 Chile $132,500 2 
1993 Chile $76,000 2 
1994 Chile $60,000 1 
1995 Chile $0 0 
1996 Chile $0 0 
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1997 Chile $0 0 
1998 Chile $0 0 
1999 Chile $0 0 
Total Chile $1,130,700 16 
1990 China $403,750 7 
1991 China $579,537 10 
1992 China $409,000 8 
1993 China $1,791,011 27 
1994 China $1,866,835 23 
1995 China $2,276,516 28 
1996 China $3,856,228 29 
1997 China $3,308,026 30 
1998 China $3,859,193 40 
1999 China $2,649,133 20 
Total China $20,999,229 222 
1990 Colombia $112,842 2 
1991 Colombia $225,000 4 
1992 Colombia $160,000 2 
1993 Colombia $90,000 1 
1994 Colombia $200,000 3 
1995 Colombia $189,255 3 
1996 Colombia $235,800 4 
1997 Colombia $261,140 4 
1998 Colombia $367,706 7 
1999 Colombia $428,085 7 
Total Colombia $2,269,828 37 
1990 Comoros $0 0 
1991 Comoros $0 0 
1992 Comoros $0 0 
1993 Comoros $0 0 
1994 Comoros $0 0 
1995 Comoros $0 0 
1996 Comoros $0 0 
1997 Comoros $0 0 
1998 Comoros $0 0 
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1999 Comoros $0 0 
Total Comoros $0 0 
1990 Congo $0 0 
1991 Congo $0 0 
1992 Congo $0 0 
1993 Congo $0 0 
1994 Congo $0 0 
1995 Congo $24,000 1 
1996 Congo $30,000 1 
1997 Congo $30,000 1 
1998 Congo $60,000 1 
1999 Congo $30,000 1 
Total Congo $174,000 5 
1990 Costa Rica $75,000 1 
1991 Costa Rica $0 0 
1992 Costa Rica $0 0 
1993 Costa Rica $0 0 
1994 Costa Rica $0 0 
1995 Costa Rica $0 0 
1996 Costa Rica $0 0 
1997 Costa Rica $0 0 
1998 Costa Rica $0 0 
1999 Costa Rica $0 0 
Total Costa Rica $75,000 1 
1991 Croatia $0 0 
1992 Croatia $0 0 
1993 Croatia $57,555 2 
1994 Croatia $256,276 4 
1995 Croatia $401,652 2 
1996 Croatia $29,900 1 
1997 Croatia $65,000 2 
1998 Croatia $30,000 1 
1999 Croatia $272,327 5 
Total Croatia $1,112,710 17 
1990 Cuba $180,000 4 
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1991 Cuba $462,132 7 
1992 Cuba $655,643 13 
1993 Cuba $520,100 9 
1994 Cuba $577,965 8 
1995 Cuba $873,563 9 
1996 Cuba $719,780 8 
1997 Cuba $565,257 7 
1998 Cuba $409,000 7 
1999 Cuba $744,453 9 
Total Cuba $5,707,893 81 
1990 Cyprus $0 0 
1991 Cyprus $0 0 
1992 Cyprus $0 0 
1993 Cyprus $0 0 
1994 Cyprus $0 0 
1995 Cyprus $0 0 
1996 Cyprus $0 0 
1997 Cyprus $0 0 
1998 Cyprus $0 0 
1999 Cyprus $0 0 
Total Cyprus $0 0 
1993 Czech Republic $171,060 2 
1994 Czech Republic $398,574 2 
1995 Czech Republic $199,386 1 
1996 Czech Republic $0 0 
1997 Czech Republic $0 0 
1998 Czech Republic $0 0 
1999 Czech Republic $0 0 
Total Czech Republic $769,020 5 
1990 Czechoslovakia $0 0 
1991 Czechoslovakia $0 0 
1992 Czechoslovakia $0 0 
Total Czechoslovakia $0 0 
1990 Dem. Rep. Vietnam $70,000 2 
1991 Dem. Rep. Vietnam $197,000 2 
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1992 $79,800 1 
1993 $287,501 5 
1994 $565,770 5 
1995 $354,533 4 
1996 $90,000 1 
1997 $269,611 3 
1998 $227,255 3 
1999 $140,703 3 
Total $2,282,173 29 
1990 $0 0 
1991 $0 0 
1992 $0 0 
1993 $0 0 
1994 $0 0 
Denmark $0 0 
1996 Denmark $0 0 
1997 Denmark $0 0 
1998 Denmark $0 0 
1999 Denmark $0 0 
Total Denmark $0 0 
1990 Dijibouti $0 0 
1991 Dijibouti $0 0 
1992 Dijibouti $0 0 
1993 Dijibouti $0 0 
1994 Dijibouti $0 0 
1995 Dijibouti $0 0 
1996 Dijibouti $0 0 
1997 Dijibouti $0 0 
1998 Dijibouti $0 0 
1999 Dijibouti $0 0 
Total Dijibouti $0 0 
1990 Dominican Republic $40,000 1 
1991 Dominican Republic $40,000 1 
1992 Dominican Republic $42,000 1 
1993 Dominican Republic $0 0 
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Dem. Rep. Vietnam 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 








Year Country NED $ Grants 
1994 Dominican Republic $0 0 
1995 Dominican Republic $150,385 2 
1996 Dominican Republic $0 0 
1997 Dominican Republic $0 0 
1998 Dominican Republic $0 0 
1999 Dominican Republic $0 0 
Total Dominican Republic $272,385 5 
1990 Ecuador $151,550 3 
1991 Ecuador $25,000 1 
1992 Ecuador $164,500 3 
1993 Ecuador $0 0 
1994 Ecuador $110,000 2 
1995 Ecuador $142,500 2 
1996 Ecuador $85,000 1 
1997 Ecuador $93,775 1 
1998 Ecuador $0 0 
1999 Ecuador $48,376 1 
Total Ecuador $820,701 14 
1990 Egypt $0 0 
1991 Egypt $0 0 
1992 Egypt $0 0 
1993 Egypt $93,669 1 
1994 Egypt $45,000 1 
1995 Egypt $56,584 1 
1996 Egypt $249,061 6 
1997 Egypt $353,254 5 
1998 Egypt $496,255 6 
1999 Egypt $288,067 6 
Total Egypt $1,581,890 26 
1990 El Salvador $75,000 1 
1991 El Salvador $157,000 3 
1992 El Salvador $155,000 2 
1993 El Salvador $0 0 
1994 El Salvador $91,688 1 
1995 El Salvador $0 0 
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1996 El Salvador $0 0 
1997 El Salvador $80,432 1 
1998 El Salvador $0 0 
1999 El Salvador $0 0 
Total El Salvador $559,120 8 
1990 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1991 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1992 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1993 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1994 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1995 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1996 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1997 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1998 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1999 Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
Total Equatorial Guinea $0 0 
1991 Eritrea $0 0 
1992 Eritrea $0 0 
1993 Eritrea $53,000 1 
1994 Eritrea $0 0 
1995 Eritrea $0 0 
1996 Eritrea $0 0 
1997 Eritrea $0 0 
1998 Eritrea $0 0 
1999 Eritrea $0 0 
Total Eritrea $53,000 1 
1990 Estonia $35,000 2 
1991 Estonia $0 0 
1992 Estonia $16,852 1 
1993 Estonia $0 0 
1994 Estonia $39,271 1 
1995 Estonia $107,527 2 
1996 Estonia $29,993 1 
1997 Estonia $87,843 4 
1998 Estonia $0 0 
         (table continued) 
 230
Year Country NED $ Grants 
1999 Estonia $31,000 2 
Total Estonia $347,486 13 
1990 Ethiopia $0 0 
1991 Ethiopia $109,913 3 
1992 Ethiopia $216,446 6 
1993 Ethiopia $24,950 1 
1994 Ethiopia $136,185 4 
1995 Ethiopia $25,000 1 
1996 Ethiopia $96,052 1 
1997 Ethiopia $48,000 2 
1998 Ethiopia $214,085 5 
1999 Ethiopia $49,630 2 
Total Ethiopia $920,261 25 
1990 Fiji $0 0 
1991 Fiji $0 0 
1992 Fiji $0 0 
1993 Fiji $0 0 
1994 Fiji $0 0 
1995 Fiji $0 0 
1996 Fiji $0 0 
1997 Fiji $0 0 
1998 Fiji $0 0 
1999 Fiji $0 0 
Total Fiji $0 0 
1990 Finland $0 0 
1991 Finland $0 0 
1992 Finland $0 0 
1993 Finland $0 0 
1994 Finland $0 0 
1995 Finland $0 0 
1996 Finland $0 0 
1997 Finland $0 0 
1998 Finland $0 0 
1999 Finland $0 0 
Total Finland $0 0 
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1990 France $0 0 
1991 France $0 0 
1992 France $0 0 
1993 France $0 0 
1994 France $0 0 
1995 France $0 0 
1996 France $0 0 
1997 France $0 0 
1998 France $0 0 
1999 France $0 0 
Total France $0 0 
1990 Gambia $0 0 
1991 Gambia $0 0 
1992 Gambia $0 0 
1993 Gambia $0 0 
1994 Gambia $0 0 
1995 Gambia $0 0 
1996 Gambia $47,665 1 
1997 Gambia $0 0 
1998 Gambia $0 0 
1999 Gambia $0 0 
Total Gambia $47,665 1 
1991 Georgia $25,000 1 
1992 Georgia $0 0 
1993 Georgia $27,500 1 
1994 Georgia $55,000 1 
1995 Georgia $55,000 1 
1996 Georgia $27,237 1 
1997 Georgia $0 0 
1998 Georgia $69,115 1 
1999 Georgia $156,239 5 
Total Georgia $415,091 11 
1990 Germany $0 0 
1991 Germany $0 0 
1992 Germany $0 0 
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1993 Germany $0 0 
1994 Germany $0 0 
1995 Germany $0 0 
1996 Germany $0 0 
1997 Germany $0 0 
1998 Germany $0 0 
1999 Germany $0 0 
Total Germany $0 0 
1990 Ghana $0 0 
1991 Ghana $40,000 1 
1992 Ghana $149,460 2 
1993 Ghana $0 0 
1994 Ghana $125,548 1 
1995 Ghana $145,925 2 
1996 Ghana $56,220 2 
1997 Ghana $159,375 2 
1998 Ghana $21,560 1 
1999 Ghana $0 0 
Total Ghana $698,088 11 
1990 Greece $0 0 
1991 Greece $0 0 
1992 Greece $0 0 
1993 Greece $0 0 
1994 Greece $0 0 
1995 Greece $0 0 
1996 Greece $0 0 
1997 Greece $0 0 
1998 Greece $0 0 
1999 Greece $0 0 
Total Greece $0 0 
1990 Grenada $0 0 
1991 Grenada $28,000 1 
1992 Grenada $22,000 1 
1993 Grenada $0 0 
1994 Grenada $0 0 
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1995 Grenada $0 0 
1996 Grenada $0 0 
1997 Grenada $0 0 
1998 Grenada $0 0 
1999 Grenada $0 0 
Total Grenada $50,000 2 
1990 Guatemala $262,000 5 
1991 Guatemala $186,000 3 
1992 Guatemala $156,850 3 
1993 Guatemala $0 0 
1994 Guatemala $275,450 5 
1995 Guatemala $224,260 3 
1996 Guatemala $380,311 5 
1997 Guatemala $166,468 3 
1998 Guatemala $318,531 3 
1999 Guatemala $293,837 2 
Total Guatemala $2,263,707 32 
1990 Guinea $0 0 
1991 Guinea $0 0 
1992 Guinea $24,750 1 
1993 Guinea $0 0 
1994 Guinea $0 0 
1995 Guinea $0 0 
1996 Guinea $0 0 
1997 Guinea $0 0 
1998 Guinea $0 0 
1999 Guinea $22,668 1 
Total Guinea $47,418 2 
1990 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1991 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1992 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1993 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1994 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1995 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1996 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
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1997 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1998 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1999 Guinea Bissau $0 0 
Total Guinea Bissau $0 0 
1990 Guyana $0 0 
1991 Guyana $0 0 
1992 Guyana $0 0 
1993 Guyana $0 0 
1994 Guyana $0 0 
1995 Guyana $90,496 1 
1996 Guyana $0 0 
1997 Guyana $0 0 
1998 Guyana $0 0 
1999 Guyana $0 0 
Total Guyana $90,496 1 
1990 Haiti $1,234,000 7 
1991 Haiti $40,000 1 
1992 Haiti $0 0 
1993 Haiti $0 0 
1994 Haiti $0 0 
1995 Haiti $178,343 2 
1996 Haiti $162,041 1 
1997 Haiti $431,477 3 
1998 Haiti $148,476 3 
1999 Haiti $0 0 
Total Haiti $2,194,337 17 
1990 Honduras $0 0 
1991 Honduras $0 0 
1992 Honduras $0 0 
1993 Honduras $0 0 
1994 Honduras $0 0 
1995 Honduras $0 0 
1996 Honduras $0 0 
1997 Honduras $0 0 
1998 Honduras $0 0 
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1999 Honduras $0 0 
Total Honduras $0 0 
1990 Hungary $897,461 9 
1991 Hungary $671,585 7 
1992 Hungary $569,480 4 
1993 Hungary $806,145 6 
1994 Hungary $248,650 2 
1995 Hungary $310,543 4 
1996 Hungary $88,617 2 
1997 Hungary $0 0 
1998 Hungary $0 0 
1999 Hungary $0 0 
Total Hungary $3,592,481 34 
1990 Iceland $0 0 
1991 Iceland $0 0 
1992 Iceland $0 0 
1993 Iceland $0 0 
1994 Iceland $0 0 
1995 Iceland $0 0 
1996 Iceland $0 0 
1997 Iceland $0 0 
1998 Iceland $0 0 
1999 Iceland $0 0 
Total Iceland $0 0 
1990 India $42,000 1 
1991 India $42,000 1 
1992 India $26,500 1 
1993 India $127,035 2 
1994 India $0 0 
1995 India $0 0 
1996 India $0 0 
1997 India $0 0 
1998 India $0 0 
1999 India $0 0 
Total India $237,535 5 
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1990 Indonesia $86,319 1 
1991 Indonesia $58,050 1 
1992 Indonesia $54,739 1 
1993 Indonesia $0 0 
1994 Indonesia $89,000 2 
1995 Indonesia $99,618 1 
1996 Indonesia $301,705 2 
1997 Indonesia $485,706 3 
1998 Indonesia $408,838 2 
1999 Indonesia $133,120 2 
Total Indonesia $1,717,095 15 
1990 Iran $0 0 
1991 Iran $50,000 1 
1992 Iran $60,620 1 
1993 Iran $121,240 2 
1994 Iran $60,620 1 
1995 Iran $50,000 1 
1996 Iran $25,000 1 
1997 Iran $0 0 
1998 Iran $0 0 
1999 Iran $0 0 
Total Iran $367,480 7 
1990 Iraq $0 0 
1991 Iraq $50,000 1 
1992 Iraq $101,920 2 
1993 Iraq $140,000 2 
1994 Iraq $126,360 2 
1995 Iraq $145,000 2 
1996 Iraq $105,600 2 
1997 Iraq $90,000 1 
1998 Iraq $112,000 1 
1999 Iraq $114,750 2 
Total Iraq $985,630 15 
1990 Ireland $0 0 
1991 Ireland $0 0 
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1992 Ireland $0 0 
1993 Ireland $0 0 
1994 Ireland $0 0 
1995 Ireland $0 0 
1996 Ireland $0 0 
1997 Ireland $0 0 
1998 Ireland $0 0 
1999 Ireland $0 0 
Total Ireland $0 0 
1990 Israel $0 0 
1991 Israel $0 0 
1992 Israel $0 0 
1993 Israel $0 0 
1994 Israel $0 0 
1995 Israel $0 0 
1996 Israel $0 0 
1997 Israel $0 0 
1998 Israel $0 0 
1999 Israel $0 0 
Total Israel $0 0 
1990 Italy $0 0 
1991 Italy $0 0 
1992 Italy $0 0 
1993 Italy $0 0 
1994 Italy $0 0 
1995 Italy $0 0 
1996 Italy $0 0 
1997 Italy $0 0 
1998 Italy $0 0 
1999 Italy $0 0 
Total Italy $0 0 
1990 Ivory Coast $0 0 
1991 Ivory Coast $0 0 
1992 Ivory Coast $0 0 
1993 Ivory Coast $31,200 1 
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1994 Ivory Coast $134,496 2 
1995 Ivory Coast $36,000 1 
1996 Ivory Coast $36,000 1 
1997 Ivory Coast $52,940 2 
1998 Ivory Coast $0 0 
1999 Ivory Coast $64,100 2 
Total Ivory Coast $354,736 9 
1990 Jamaica $0 0 
1991 Jamaica $0 0 
1992 Jamaica $0 0 
1993 Jamaica $0 0 
1994 Jamaica $0 0 
1995 Jamaica $0 0 
1996 Jamaica $0 0 
1997 Jamaica $0 0 
1998 Jamaica $0 0 
1999 Jamaica $0 0 
Total Jamaica $0 0 
1990 Japan $0 0 
1991 Japan $0 0 
1992 Japan $0 0 
1993 Japan $0 0 
1994 Japan $0 0 
1995 Japan $0 0 
1996 Japan $0 0 
1997 Japan $0 0 
1998 Japan $0 0 
1999 Japan $0 0 
Total Japan $0 0 
1990 Jordan $0 0 
1991 Jordan $0 0 
1992 Jordan $0 0 
1993 Jordan $76,798 2 
1994 Jordan $267,460 3 
1995 Jordan $266,349 5 
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1996 Jordan $360,848 5 
1997 Jordan $217,372 3 
1998 Jordan $383,648 5 
1999 Jordan $110,000 3 
Total Jordan $1,682,475 26 
1991 Kazakhstan $0 0 
1992 Kazakhstan $0 0 
1993 Kazakhstan $0 0 
1994 Kazakhstan $416,316 3 
1995 Kazakhstan $406,421 4 
1996 Kazakhstan $127,650 5 
1997 Kazakhstan $100,184 4 
1998 Kazakhstan $359,501 3 
1999 Kazakhstan $148,051 1 
Total Kazakhstan $1,558,123 20 
1990 Kenya $0 0 
1991 Kenya $60,000 2 
1992 Kenya $169,990 3 
1993 Kenya $316,868 6 
1994 Kenya $429,911 6 
1995 Kenya $335,350 4 
1996 Kenya $239,681 1 
1997 Kenya $287,331 2 
1998 Kenya $441,588 4 
1999 Kenya $0 0 
Total Kenya $2,280,719 28 
1993 Kosovo $0 0 
1994 Kosovo $0 0 
1995 Kosovo $0 0 
1996 Kosovo $0 0 
1997 Kosovo $0 0 
1998 Kosovo $0 0 
1999 Kosovo $459,000 7 
Total Kosovo $459,000 7 
1990 Kuwait $0 0 
         (table continued) 
 240
Year Country NED $ Grants 
1991 Kuwait $138,000 4 
1992 Kuwait $150,000 1 
1993 Kuwait $0 0 
1994 Kuwait $66,731 1 
1995 Kuwait $102,710 1 
1996 Kuwait $100,533 1 
1997 Kuwait $0 0 
1998 Kuwait $0 0 
1999 Kuwait $0 0 
Total Kuwait $557,974 8 
1991 Kyrgyzstan $0 0 
1992 Kyrgyzstan $0 0 
1993 Kyrgyzstan $0 0 
1994 Kyrgyzstan $88,152 1 
1995 Kyrgyzstan $15,400 1 
1996 Kyrgyzstan $85,955 4 
1997 Kyrgyzstan $106,720 5 
1998 Kyrgyzstan $175,461 4 
1999 Kyrgyzstan $64,204 3 
Total Kyrgyzstan $535,892 18 
1990 Laos $0 0 
1991 Laos $35,000 1 
1992 Laos $41,175 1 
1993 Laos $40,000 1 
1994 Laos $35,000 1 
1995 Laos $0 0 
1996 Laos $0 0 
1997 Laos $0 0 
1998 Laos $0 0 
1999 Laos $0 0 
Total Laos $151,175 4 
1990 Latin Am./Caribbean $941,850 9 
1991 Latin Am./Caribbean $968,240 7 
1992 Latin Am./Caribbean $860,359 8 
1993 Latin Am./Caribbean $882,329 6 
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1994 Latin Am./Caribbean $1,109,216 7 
1995 Latin Am./Caribbean $654,397 5 
1996 Latin Am./Caribbean $1,014,369 7 
1997 Latin Am./Caribbean $1,018,116 6 
1998 Latin Am./Caribbean $133,437 3 
1999 Latin Am./Caribbean $567,379 5 
Total Latin Am./Caribbean $8,149,692 63 
1990 Latvia $30,000 1 
1991 Latvia $45,000 1 
1992 Latvia $65,000 2 
1993 Latvia $0 0 
1994 Latvia $50,000 1 
1995 Latvia $50,000 1 
1996 Latvia $125,187 2 
1997 Latvia $95,000 3 
1998 Latvia $0 0 
1999 Latvia $20,000 1 
Total Latvia $480,187 12 
1990 Lebanon $0 0 
1991 Lebanon $26,100 1 
1992 Lebanon $0 0 
1993 Lebanon $115,000 2 
1994 Lebanon $90,000 2 
1995 Lebanon $228,291 5 
1996 Lebanon $80,000 2 
1997 Lebanon $114,500 3 
1998 Lebanon $131,670 3 
1999 Lebanon $283,467 3 
Total Lebanon $1,069,028 21 
1990 Lesotho $0 0 
1991 Lesotho $0 0 
1992 Lesotho $0 0 
1993 Lesotho $0 0 
1994 Lesotho $0 0 
1995 Lesotho $0 0 
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1996 Lesotho $0 0 
1997 Lesotho $0 0 
1998 Lesotho $0 0 
1999 Lesotho $0 0 
Total Lesotho $0 0 
1990 Liberia $0 0 
1991 Liberia $0 0 
1992 Liberia $0 0 
1993 Liberia $0 0 
1994 Liberia $0 0 
1995 Liberia $0 0 
1996 Liberia $0 0 
1997 Liberia $0 0 
1998 Liberia $0 0 
1999 Liberia $232,100 8 
Total Liberia $232,100 8 
1990 Libya $0 0 
1991 Libya $44,000 2 
1992 Libya $72,350 2 
1993 Libya $71,850 1 
1994 Libya $139,000 5 
1995 Libya $190,000 5 
1996 Libya $172,200 5 
1997 Libya $224,900 7 
1998 Libya $122,000 4 
1999 Libya $122,000 4 
Total Libya $1,158,300 35 
1990 Lithuania $35,000 1 
1991 Lithuania $50,000 2 
1992 Lithuania $0 0 
1993 Lithuania $0 0 
1994 Lithuania $579,141 1 
1995 Lithuania $156,121 3 
1996 Lithuania $261,355 2 
1997 Lithuania $670,396 4 
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1998 Lithuania $391,718 3 
1999 Lithuania $269,967 3 
Total Lithuania $2,413,698 19 
1990 Luxembourg $0 0 
1991 Luxembourg $0 0 
1992 Luxembourg $0 0 
1993 Luxembourg $0 0 
1994 Luxembourg $0 0 
1995 Luxembourg $0 0 
1996 Luxembourg $0 0 
1997 Luxembourg $0 0 
1998 Luxembourg $0 0 
1999 Luxembourg $0 0 
Total Luxembourg $0 0 
1990 Macedonia $0 0 
1991 Macedonia $0 0 
1992 Macedonia $0 0 
1993 Macedonia $79,194 1 
1994 Macedonia $100,000 1 
1995 Macedonia $100,000 1 
1996 Macedonia $40,000 1 
1997 Macedonia $232,211 1 
1998 Macedonia $22,000 1 
1999 Macedonia $304,375 5 
Total Macedonia $877,780 11 
1990 Madagascar $0 0 
1991 Madagascar $0 0 
1992 Madagascar $0 0 
1993 Madagascar $0 0 
1994 Madagascar $0 0 
1995 Madagascar $0 0 
1996 Madagascar $0 0 
1997 Madagascar $0 0 
1998 Madagascar $0 0 
1999 Madagascar $0 0 
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Total Madagascar $0 0 
1990 Malawi $0 0 
1991 Malawi $0 0 
1992 Malawi $53,990 2 
1993 Malawi $0 0 
1994 Malawi $0 0 
1995 Malawi $6,683 1 
1996 Malawi $283,194 3 
1997 Malawi $0 0 
1998 Malawi $187,199 2 
1999 Malawi $0 0 
Total Malawi $531,066 8 
1990 Malaysia $0 0 
1991 Malaysia $94,493 1 
1992 Malaysia $0 0 
1993 Malaysia $0 0 
1994 Malaysia $0 0 
1995 Malaysia $0 0 
1996 Malaysia $0 0 
1997 Malaysia $0 0 
1998 Malaysia $0 0 
1999 Malaysia $203,388 2 
Total Malaysia $297,881 3 
1990 Mali $0 0 
1991 Mali $0 0 
1992 Mali $44,000 1 
1993 Mali $40,000 1 
1994 Mali $75,200 1 
1995 Mali $55,000 1 
1996 Mali $50,000 1 
1997 Mali $0 0 
1998 Mali $50,000 1 
1999 Mali $45,000 1 
Total Mali $359,200 7 
1990 Mauritania $0 0 
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1991 Mauritania $0 0 
1992 Mauritania $0 0 
1993 Mauritania $0 0 
1994 Mauritania $0 0 
1995 Mauritania $0 0 
1996 Mauritania $0 0 
1997 Mauritania $0 0 
1998 Mauritania $0 0 
1999 Mauritania $0 0 
Total Mauritania $0 0 
1990 Mauritius $0 0 
1991 Mauritius $0 0 
1992 Mauritius $0 0 
1993 Mauritius $0 0 
1994 Mauritius $0 0 
1995 Mauritius $0 0 
1996 Mauritius $0 0 
1997 Mauritius $0 0 
1998 Mauritius $0 0 
1999 Mauritius $0 0 
Total Mauritius $0 0 
1990 Mexico $834,740 12 
1991 Mexico $95,000 1 
1992 Mexico $381,780 5 
1993 Mexico $0 0 
1994 Mexico $898,090 10 
1995 Mexico $694,483 7 
1996 Mexico $358,512 5 
1997 Mexico $1,103,450 8 
1998 Mexico $714,354 8 
1999 Mexico $293,000 5 
Total Mexico $5,373,409 61 
1990 Middle East $0 0 
1991 Middle East $122,353 2 
1992 Middle East $141,443 2 
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1993 Middle East $367,268 7 
1994 Middle East $1,623,318 20 
1995 Middle East $1,349,096 18 
1996 Middle East $1,361,898 22 
1997 Middle East $1,130,704 17 
1998 Middle East $1,083,279 14 
1999 Middle East $1,344,903 14 
Total Middle East $8,524,262 116 
1990 Moldova $0 0 
1991 Moldova $0 0 
1992 Moldova $0 0 
1993 Moldova $0 0 
1994 Moldova $25,000 1 
1995 Moldova $25,000 1 
1996 Moldova $0 0 
1997 Moldova $0 0 
1998 Moldova $0 0 
1999 Moldova $0 0 
Total Moldova $50,000 2 
1990 Mongolia $0 0 
1991 Mongolia $65,453 2 
1992 Mongolia $173,030 3 
1993 Mongolia $108,828 2 
1994 Mongolia $134,073 1 
1995 Mongolia $15,050 1 
1996 Mongolia $182,132 2 
1997 Mongolia $35,000 1 
1998 Mongolia $69,650 2 
1999 Mongolia $48,545 1 
Total Mongolia $831,761 15 
1993 Montenegro $0 0 
1994 Montenegro $0 0 
1995 Montenegro $0 0 
1996 Montenegro $0 0 
1997 Montenegro $0 0 
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1998 Montenegro $0 0 
1999 Montenegro $337,580 5 
Total Montenegro $337,580 5 
1990 Morocco $0 0 
1991 Morocco $0 0 
1992 Morocco $0 0 
1993 Morocco $40,370 1 
1994 Morocco $138,263 3 
1995 Morocco $137,037 2 
1996 Morocco $256,954 2 
1997 Morocco $90,000 2 
1998 Morocco $291,644 4 
1999 Morocco $60,000 1 
Total Morocco $1,014,268 15 
1990 Mozambique $0 0 
1991 Mozambique $60,000 1 
1993 Mozambique $152,786 3 
1994 Mozambique $0 0 
1995 Mozambique $25,596 1 
1996 Mozambique $20,000 1 
1997 Mozambique $0 0 
1998 Mozambique $0 0 
1999 Mozambique $0 0 
Total Mozambique $258,382 6 
1990 Multi-Region $608,865 6 
1991 Multi-Region $1,097,427 8 
1992 Multi-Region $1,227,916 10 
1993 Multi-Region $1,514,880 8 
1994 Multi-Region $1,307,675 8 
1995 Multi-Region $1,604,426 10 
1996 Multi-Region $1,377,673 14 
1997 Multi-Region $757,667 8 
1998 Multi-Region $1,434,922 9 
1999 Multi-Region $0 0 
Total Multi-Region $10,931,451 81 
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1990 Namibia $135,892 3 
1991 Namibia $152,168 4 
1992 Namibia $24,999 1 
1993 Namibia $35,000 1 
1994 Namibia $231,636 3 
1995 Namibia $40,000 1 
1996 Namibia $0 0 
1997 Namibia $20,000 1 
1998 Namibia $0 0 
1999 Namibia $0 0 
Total Namibia $639,695 14 
1990 Nepal $8,000 1 
1991 Nepal $0 0 
1992 Nepal $7,000 1 
1993 Nepal $0 0 
1994 Nepal $170,000 1 
1995 Nepal $210,864 2 
1996 Nepal $0 0 
1997 Nepal $151,799 1 
1998 Nepal $101,000 1 
1999 Nepal $100,000 1 
Total Nepal $748,663 8 
1990 Netherlands $0 0 
1991 Netherlands $0 0 
1992 Netherlands $0 0 
1993 Netherlands $0 0 
1994 Netherlands $0 0 
1995 Netherlands $0 0 
1996 Netherlands $0 0 
1997 Netherlands $0 0 
1998 Netherlands $0 0 
1999 Netherlands $0 0 
Total Netherlands $0 0 
1990 New Zealand $0 0 
1991 New Zealand $0 0 
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1992 New Zealand $0 0 
1993 New Zealand $0 0 
1994 New Zealand $0 0 
1995 New Zealand $0 0 
1996 New Zealand $0 0 
1997 New Zealand $0 0 
1998 New Zealand $0 0 
1999 New Zealand $0 0 
Total New Zealand $0 0 
1990 Newly Independent Sts. $1,271,807 20 
1991 Newly Independent Sts. $1,272,500 6 
1992 Newly Independent Sts. $2,581,080 17 
1993 Newly Independent Sts. $1,529,718 14 
1994 Newly Independent Sts. $789,233 10 
1995 Newly Independent Sts. $428,764 6 
1996 Newly Independent Sts. $237,664 5 
1997 Newly Independent Sts. $194,235 4 
1998 Newly Independent Sts. $388,601 5 
1999 Newly Independent Sts. $629,763 9 
Total Newly Independent Sts. $9,323,365 96 
1990 Nicaragua $1,309,329 9 
1991 Nicaragua $750,130 10 
1992 Nicaragua $1,278,034 10 
1993 Nicaragua $998,491 6 
1994 Nicaragua $1,218,532 8 
1995 Nicaragua $697,739 8 
1996 Nicaragua $393,634 4 
1997 Nicaragua $174,320 3 
1998 Nicaragua $312,396 2 
1999 Nicaragua $409,358 3 
Total Nicaragua $7,541,963 63 
1990 Niger $0 0 
1991 Niger $0 0 
1992 Niger $0 0 
1993 Niger $0 0 
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1994 Niger $0 0 
1995 Niger $0 0 
1996 Niger $35,000 1 
1997 Niger $0 0 
1998 Niger $129,105 2 
1999 Niger $228,385 2 
Total Niger $392,490 5 
1990 Nigeria $88,665 3 
1991 Nigeria $200,873 4 
1992 Nigeria $205,895 5 
1993 Nigeria $258,800 5 
1994 Nigeria $206,455 3 
1995 Nigeria $400,113 9 
1996 Nigeria $470,056 11 
1997 Nigeria $1,024,953 16 
1998 Nigeria $1,089,978 21 
1999 Nigeria $617,218 16 
Total Nigeria $4,563,006 93 
1990 Norway $0 0 
1991 Norway $0 0 
1992 Norway $0 0 
1993 Norway $0 0 
1994 Norway $0 0 
1995 Norway $0 0 
1996 Norway $0 0 
1997 Norway $0 0 
1998 Norway $0 0 
1999 Norway $0 0 
Total Norway $0 0 
1990 Oman $0 0 
1991 Oman $0 0 
1992 Oman $0 0 
1993 Oman $69,506 1 
1994 Oman $0 0 
1995 Oman $0 0 
         (table continued) 
 251
Year Country NED $ Grants 
1996 Oman $0 0 
1997 Oman $0 0 
1998 Oman $0 0 
1999 Oman $0 0 
Total Oman $69,506 1 
1990 Other $0 0 
1991 Other $0 0 
1992 Other $0 0 
1993 Other $0 0 
1994 Other $0 0 
1995 Other $0 0 
1996 Other $0 0 
1997 Other $0 0 
1998 Other $0 0 
1999 Other $0 0 
Total Other $0 0 
1990 Pakistan $217,889 2 
1991 Pakistan $27,220 1 
1992 Pakistan $68,999 1 
1993 Pakistan $0 0 
1994 Pakistan $0 0 
1995 Pakistan $0 0 
1996 Pakistan $0 0 
1997 Pakistan $0 0 
1998 Pakistan $0 0 
1999 Pakistan $137,615 1 
Total Pakistan $451,723 5 
1990 Panama $164,923 2 
1991 Panama $121,000 2 
1992 Panama $75,000 1 
1993 Panama $241,501 3 
1994 Panama $0 0 
1995 Panama $0 0 
1996 Panama $0 0 
1997 Panama $0 0 
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1998 Panama $0 0 
1999 Panama $0 0 
Total Panama $602,424 8 
1990 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1991 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1992 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1993 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1994 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1995 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1996 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1997 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1998 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1999 Papua New Guinea $0 0 
Total Papua New Guinea $0 0 
1990 Paraguay $286,810 7 
1991 Paraguay $296,515 5 
1992 Paraguay $191,800 4 
1993 Paraguay $80,000 2 
1994 Paraguay $95,200 2 
1995 Paraguay $252,301 3 
1996 Paraguay $207,220 4 
1997 Paraguay $0 0 
1998 Paraguay $79,489 2 
1999 Paraguay $128,951 1 
Total Paraguay $1,618,286 30 
1990 People's Rep. of Korea $0 0 
1991 People's Rep. of Korea $0 0 
1992 People's Rep. of Korea $0 0 
1993 People's Rep. of Korea $79,806 1 
1994 People's Rep. of Korea $0 0 
1995 People's Rep. of Korea $0 0 
1996 People's Rep. of Korea $0 0 
1997 People's Rep. of Korea $0 0 
1998 People's Rep. of Korea $63,700 2 
1999 People's Rep. of Korea $62,000 1 
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Total People's Rep. of Korea $205,506 4 
1990 Peru $123,000 2 
1991 Peru $149,000 3 
1992 Peru $100,000 2 
1993 Peru $479,335 7 
1994 Peru $414,608 6 
1995 Peru $333,117 4 
1996 Peru $355,565 6 
1997 Peru $238,273 5 
1998 Peru $293,669 6 
1999 Peru $618,993 8 
Total Peru $3,105,560 49 
1990 Philippines $461,708 2 
1991 Philippines $440,282 2 
1992 Philippines $398,000 3 
1993 Philippines $201,253 1 
1994 Philippines $197,643 2 
1995 Philippines $231,761 3 
1996 Philippines $184,598 2 
1997 Philippines $0 0 
1998 Philippines $0 0 
1999 Philippines $0 0 
Total Philippines $2,115,245 15 
1990 Poland $4,969,613 19 
1991 Poland $892,025 10 
1992 Poland $751,539 12 
1993 Poland $392,421 6 
1994 Poland $585,058 6 
1995 Poland $623,402 4 
1996 Poland $462,914 3 
1997 Poland $264,596 2 
1998 Poland $148,563 1 
1999 Poland $76,368 1 
Total Poland $9,166,499 64 
1990 Portugal $270,938 1 
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1991 Portugal $0 0 
1992 Portugal $0 0 
1993 Portugal $0 0 
1994 Portugal $0 0 
1995 Portugal $0 0 
$0 
1996 Portugal $0 0 
1997 Portugal $0 0 
1998 Portugal $0 0 
1999 Portugal $0 0 
Total Portugal $270,938 1 
1990 Qatar $0 0 
1991 Qatar $0 0 
1992 Qatar $0 0 
1993 Qatar $0 0 
1994 Qatar $0 0 
1995 Qatar $0 0 
1996 Qatar $0 0 
1997 Qatar $0 0 
1998 Qatar $0 0 
1999 Qatar $0 0 
Total Qatar $0 0 
1990 Republic of Korea $56,000 1 
1991 Republic of Korea $187,600 2 
1992 Republic of Korea $111,372 1 
1993 Republic of Korea $0 0 
1994 Republic of Korea $69,039 1 
1995 Republic of Korea $0 0 
1996 Republic of Korea 0 
1997 Republic of Korea $0 0 
1998 Republic of Korea $125,753 1 
1999 Republic of Korea $0 0 
Total Republic of Korea $549,764 6 
1990 Romania $1,724,551 16 
1991 Romania $519,286 6 
1992 Romania $397,960 5 
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1993 Romania $24,990 1 
1994 Romania $309,149 7 
1995 Romania $472,892 7 
1996 Romania $575,273 7 
1997 Romania $952,124 8 
1998 Romania $269,212 6 
1999 Romania $588,392 6 
Total Romania $5,833,829 69 
1990 Russia $0 0 
1991 Russia $1,091,392 17 
1992 Russia $747,219 18 
1993 Russia $2,379,059 24 
1994 Russia $2,212,595 25 
1995 Russia $2,166,461 21 
1996 Russia $1,541,660 23 
1997 Russia $1,519,683 28 
1998 Russia $2,471,603 35 
1999 Russia $1,393,015 30 
Total Russia $15,522,687 221 
1990 Rwanda $0 0 
1991 Rwanda $0 0 
1992 Rwanda $0 0 
1993 Rwanda $0 0 
1994 Rwanda $45,041 2 
1995 Rwanda $60,000 1 
1996 Rwanda $0 0 
1997 Rwanda $0 0 
1998 Rwanda $0 0 
1999 Rwanda $0 0 
Total Rwanda $105,041 3 
1990 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1991 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1992 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1993 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1994 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
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1995 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1996 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1997 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1998 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1999 Saudi Arabia $0 0 
Total Saudi Arabia $0 0 
1990 Senegal $0 0 
1991 Senegal $24,000 1 
1992 Senegal $42,000 1 
1993 Senegal $36,000 1 
1994 Senegal $0 0 
1995 Senegal $0 0 
1996 Senegal $0 0 
1997 Senegal $0 0 
1998 Senegal $0 0 
1999 Senegal $0 0 
Total Senegal $102,000 3 
1993 Serbia $110,864 1 
1994 Serbia   
1995 Serbia $45,000 1 
1996 Serbia   
1997 Serbia $604,195 6 
1998 Serbia $45,000 1 
1999 Serbia $0 0 
Total Serbia $805,059 9 
1990 Sierra Leone $0 0 
1991 Sierra Leone $56,000 1 
1992 Sierra Leone $41,450 2 
1993 Sierra Leone $60,150 2 
1994 Sierra Leone $49,950 2 
1995 Sierra Leone $94,525 1 
1996 Sierra Leone $21,750 1 
1997 Sierra Leone $0 0 
1998 Sierra Leone $81,714 1 
1999 Sierra Leone $154,417 4 
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Total Sierra Leone $559,956 14 
1990 Singapore $0 0 
1991 Singapore $0 0 
1992 Singapore $0 0 
1993 Singapore $0 0 
1994 Singapore $0 0 
1995 Singapore $0 0 
1996 Singapore $0 0 
1997 Singapore $0 0 
1998 Singapore $0 0 
1999 Singapore $0 0 
Total Singapore $0 0 
1993 Slovakia $445,304 8 
1994 Slovakia $296,225 4 
1995 Slovakia $322,692 6 
1996 Slovakia $325,676 6 
1997 Slovakia $461,382 7 
1998 Slovakia $760,548 11 
1999 Slovakia $723,555 15 
Total Slovakia $3,335,382 57 
1991 Slovenia $0 0 
1992 Slovenia $0 0 
1993 Slovenia $149,000 1 
1994 Slovenia $160,963 2 
1995 Slovenia $0 0 
1996 Slovenia $0 0 
1997 Slovenia $0 0 
1998 Slovenia $0 0 
1999 Slovenia $0 0 
Total Slovenia $309,963 3 
1990 Somalia $0 0 
1991 Somalia $0 0 
1992 Somalia $0 0 
1993 Somalia $0 0 
1994 Somalia $30,000 1 
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1995 Somalia $0 0 
1996 Somalia $50,000 1 
1997 Somalia $0 0 
1998 Somalia $20,200 1 
1999 Somalia $35,200 2 
Total Somalia $135,400 5 
1990 South Africa $545,500 1 
1991 South Africa $887,928 9 
1992 South Africa $1,778,720 13 
1993 South Africa $1,164,809 12 
1994 South Africa $616,459 8 
1995 South Africa $362,725 4 
1996 South Africa $245,168 3 
1997 South Africa $352,790 4 
1998 South Africa $62,325 1 
1999 South Africa $0 0 
Total South Africa $6,016,424 55 
1990 Spain $0 0 
1991 Spain $0 0 
1992 Spain $0 0 
1993 Spain $0 0 
1994 Spain $0 0 
1995 Spain $0 0 
1996 Spain $0 0 
1997 Spain $0 0 
1998 Spain $0 0 
1999 Spain $0 0 
Total Spain $0 0 
1990 Sri Lanka $0 0 
1991 Sri Lanka $105,000 1 
1992 Sri Lanka $0 0 
1993 Sri Lanka $74,190 1 
1994 Sri Lanka $160,083 2 
1995 Sri Lanka $212,400 2 
1996 Sri Lanka $173,221 2 
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1997 Sri Lanka $0 0 
1998 Sri Lanka $61,608 3 
1999 Sri Lanka $15,000 1 
Total Sri Lanka $801,502 12 
1990 Sudan $0 0 
1991 Sudan $44,000 1 
1992 Sudan $68,950 2 
1993 Sudan $144,000 2 
1994 Sudan $122,000 3 
1995 Sudan $64,000 2 
1996 Sudan $110,000 3 
1997 Sudan $130,000 5 
1998 Sudan $116,500 4 
1999 Sudan $154,700 6 
Total Sudan $954,150 28 
1990 Swaziland $0 0 
1991 Swaziland $0 0 
1992 Swaziland $0 0 
1993 Swaziland $0 0 
1994 Swaziland $0 0 
1995 Swaziland $0 0 
1996 Swaziland $0 0 
1997 Swaziland $0 0 
1998 Swaziland $0 0 
1999 Swaziland $0 0 
Total Swaziland $0 0 
1990 Sweden $0 0 
1991 Sweden $0 0 
1992 Sweden $0 0 
1993 Sweden $0 0 
1994 Sweden $0 0 
1995 Sweden $0 0 
1996 Sweden $0 0 
1997 Sweden $0 0 
1998 Sweden $0 0 
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1999 Sweden $0 0 
Total Sweden $0 0 
1990 Switzerland $0 0 
1991 Switzerland $0 0 
1992 Switzerland $0 0 
1993 Switzerland $0 0 
1994 Switzerland $0 0 
1995 Switzerland $0 0 
1996 Switzerland $0 0 
1997 Switzerland $0 0 
1998 Switzerland $0 0 
1999 Switzerland $0 0 
Total Switzerland $0 0 
1990 Syria $0 0 
1991 Syria $0 0 
1992 Syria $0 0 
1993 Syria $0 0 
1994 Syria $0 0 
1995 Syria $0 0 
1996 Syria $0 0 
1997 Syria $0 0 
1998 Syria $0 0 
1999 Syria $0 0 
Total Syria $0 0 
1991 Tajikistan $0 0 
1992 Tajikistan $0 0 
1993 Tajikistan $0 0 
1994 Tajikistan $40,000 1 
1995 Tajikistan $50,000 1 
1996 Tajikistan $0 0 
1997 Tajikistan $13,188 1 
1998 Tajikistan $66,331 3 
1999 Tajikistan $0 0 
Total Tajikistan $169,519 6 
1990 Tanzania $0 0 
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1991 Tanzania $0 0 
1992 Tanzania $0 0 
1993 Tanzania $0 0 
1994 Tanzania $0 0 
1995 Tanzania $0 0 
1996 Tanzania $0 0 
1997 Tanzania $0 0 
1998 Tanzania $0 0 
1999 Tanzania $0 0 
Total Tanzania $0 0 
1990 Thailand $0 0 
1991 Thailand $75,007 1 
1992 Thailand $75,000 1 
1993 Thailand $89,724 1 
1994 Thailand $188,535 1 
1995 Thailand $97,000 2 
1996 Thailand $118,592 1 
1997 Thailand $134,999 1 
1998 Thailand $235,511 2 
1999 Thailand $222,749 2 
Total Thailand $1,237,117 12 
1990 The Gabon $0 0 
1991 The Gabon $0 0 
1992 The Gabon $0 0 
1993 The Gabon $0 0 
1994 The Gabon $0 0 
1995 The Gabon $0 0 
1996 The Gabon $0 0 
1997 The Gabon $0 0 
1998 The Gabon $0 0 
1999 The Gabon $0 0 
Total The Gabon $0 0 
1990 Togo $0 0 
1991 Togo $0 0 
1992 Togo $42,978 1 
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1993 Togo $0 0 
1994 Togo $0 0 
1995 Togo $0 0 
1996 Togo $0 0 
1997 Togo $0 0 
1998 Togo $0 0 
1999 Togo $0 0 
Total Togo $42,978 1 
1990 Trinidad $0 0 
1991 Trinidad $0 0 
1992 Trinidad $0 0 
1993 Trinidad $0 0 
1994 Trinidad $0 0 
1995 Trinidad $0 0 
1996 Trinidad $0 0 
1997 Trinidad $0 0 
1998 Trinidad $0 0 
1999 Trinidad $0 0 
Total Trinidad $0 0 
1990 Tunisia $50,000 1 
1991 Tunisia $0 0 
1992 Tunisia $0 0 
1993 Tunisia $0 0 
1994 Tunisia $0 0 
1995 Tunisia $0 0 
1996 Tunisia $0 0 
1997 Tunisia $0 0 
1998 Tunisia $0 0 
1999 Tunisia $0 0 
Total Tunisia $50,000 1 
1990 Turkey $50,000 1 
1991 Turkey $206,100 4 
1992 Turkey $50,000 1 
1993 Turkey $48,817 1 
1994 Turkey $71,583 1 
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1995 Turkey $303,442 4 
1996 Turkey $442,697 3 
1997 Turkey $673,695 7 
1998 Turkey $760,616 5 
1999 Turkey $651,214 6 
Total Turkey $3,258,164 33 
1991 Turkmenistan $0 0 
1992 Turkmenistan $0 0 
1993 Turkmenistan $0 0 
1994 Turkmenistan $0 0 
1995 Turkmenistan $45,000 2 
1996 Turkmenistan $45,200 2 
1997 Turkmenistan $73,420 3 
1998 Turkmenistan $29,376 1 
1999 Turkmenistan $24,770 1 
Total Turkmenistan $217,766 9 
1990 Uganda $32,500 1 
1991 Uganda $104,000 2 
1992 Uganda $0 0 
1993 Uganda $72,000 2 
1994 Uganda $92,860 3 
1995 Uganda $45,000 1 
1996 Uganda $0 0 
1997 Uganda $40,000 1 
1998 Uganda $0 0 
1999 Uganda $40,000 1 
Total Uganda $426,360 11 
1991 Ukraine $207,400 3 
1992 Ukraine $309,740 5 
1993 Ukraine $1,408,483 17 
1994 Ukraine $2,150,656 11 
1995 Ukraine $1,131,289 7 
1996 Ukraine $678,665 10 
1997 Ukraine $707,145 10 
1998 Ukraine $994,678 15 
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1999 Ukraine $1,023,502 14 
Total Ukraine $8,611,558 92 
1990 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1991 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1992 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1993 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1994 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1995 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1996 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1997 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1998 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1999 United Arab Emirates $0 0 
Total United Arab Emirates $0 0 
1990 United Kingdom $0 0 
1991 United Kingdom $0 0 
1992 United Kingdom $0 0 
1993 United Kingdom $0 0 
1994 United Kingdom $0 0 
1995 United Kingdom $0 0 
1996 United Kingdom $0 0 
1997 United Kingdom $0 0 
1998 United Kingdom $0 0 
1999 United Kingdom $0 0 
Total United Kingdom $0 0 
1990 Uruguay $51,000 1 
1991 Uruguay $0 0 
1992 Uruguay $46,568 1 
1993 Uruguay $0 0 
1994 Uruguay $0 0 
1995 Uruguay $0 0 
1996 Uruguay $0 0 
1997 Uruguay $0 0 
1998 Uruguay $0 0 
1999 Uruguay $0 0 
Total Uruguay $97,568 2 
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1991 Uzbekistan $0 0 
1992 Uzbekistan $0 0 
1993 Uzbekistan $0 0 
1994 Uzbekistan $45,000 1 
1995 Uzbekistan $64,484 1 
1996 Uzbekistan $0 0 
1997 Uzbekistan $26,105 1 
1998 Uzbekistan $40,414 2 
1999 Uzbekistan $34,890 2 
Total Uzbekistan $210,893 7 
1990 Venezuela $0 0 
1991 Venezuela $0 0 
1992 Venezuela $0 0 
1993 Venezuela $205,000 2 
1994 Venezuela $314,213 5 
1995 Venezuela $388,499 7 
1996 Venezuela $612,130 7 
1997 Venezuela $187,443 4 
1998 Venezuela $601,334 8 
1999 Venezuela $1,051,370 8 
Total Venezuela $3,359,989 41 
1990 Yemen $0 0 
1991 Yemen $0 0 
1992 Yemen $20,000 1 
1993 Yemen $325,664 2 
1994 Yemen $0 0 
1995 Yemen $0 0 
1996 Yemen $353,906 3 
1997 Yemen $215,846 1 
1998 Yemen $30,000 1 
1999 Yemen $175,003 1 
Total Yemen $1,120,419 9 
1990 Zaire $0 0 
1991 Zaire $91,289 2 
1992 Zaire $40,000 1 




Year Country NED $ Grants 
1993 Zaire $216,595 4 
1994 Zaire $189,140 4 
1995 Zaire $247,950 6 
1996 Zaire $381,980 10 
1997 Zaire $365,000 10 
1998 Zaire $294,028 14 
1999 Zaire $559,000 18 
Total Zaire $2,384,982 69 
1990 Zambia $0 0 
1991 Zambia $44,000 1 
1992 Zambia $154,000 2 
1993 Zambia $119,845 3 
1994 Zambia $69,186 1 
1995 Zambia $0 0 
1996 Zambia $0 0 
1997 Zambia $0 0 
1998 Zambia $0 0 
1999 Zambia $62,466 1 
Total Zambia $449,497 8 
1990 Zimbabwe $0 0 
1991 Zimbabwe $0 0 
1992 Zimbabwe $60,000 1 
1993 Zimbabwe $0 0 
1994 Zimbabwe $72,000 2 
1995 Zimbabwe $15,000 1 
1996 Zimbabwe $14,000 1 
1997 $0 0 
1998 Zimbabwe $171,712 2 
1999 Zimbabwe $150,120 1 
Total Zimbabwe $482,832 8 
 
 
  APPENDIX B: SUMMARY OF NED GRANT ACTIVITY BY COUNTRY 
     
Country NED $ % of Total Grants % of Total 
Afghanistan $708,282 0.27% 20 0.62% 
Africa $8,342,539 3.14% 81 2.49% 
Albania $1,230,471 0.46% 12 0.37% 
Algeria $301,696 0.11% 4 0.12% 
Angola $485,740 0.18% 5 0.15% 
Argentina $1,609,008 0.61% 21 0.65% 
Armenia $876,880 0.33% 19 0.58% 
Asia $9,747,857 3.67% 47 1.45% 
Australia $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Austria $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Azerbaijan $1,567,528 0.59% 20 0.62% 
Bahrain $16,500 0.01% 1 0.03% 
Bangladesh $90,811 0.03% 1 0.03% 
Belarus $3,380,243 1.27% 62 1.91% 
Belgium $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Benin $479,248 0.18% 6 0.18% 
Bhutan $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Bolivia $922,442 0.35% 12 0.37% 
Bosnia $1,390,188 0.52% 26 0.80% 
Botswana $240,900 0.09% 3 0.09% 
Brazil $2,054,586 0.77% 17 0.52% 
Bulgaria $5,356,105 2.02% 48 1.48% 
Burkina Faso $135,000 0.05% 4 0.12% 
Burma $5,214,079 1.96% 67 2.06% 
Burundi $123,085 0.05% 2 0.06% 
Cambodia $4,583,033 1.72% 46 1.41% 
Cameroon $165,959 0.06% 2 0.06% 
Canada $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
C/E Europe $16,177,631 6.09% 200 6.15% 
Central African Rep. $150,000 0.06% 1 0.03% 
Chad $195,635 0.07% 8 0.25% 
Chile $1,130,700 0.43% 16 0.49% 
China $20,999,229 7.90% 222 6.83% 
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Colombia $2,269,828 0.85% 37 1.14% 
Comoros $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Congo $174,000 0.07% 5 0.15% 
Costa Rica $75,000 0.03% 1 0.03% 
Croatia $1,112,710 0.42% 17 0.52% 
Cuba $5,707,893 2.15% 81 2.49% 
Cyprus $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Czech Republic $769,020 0.29% 5 0.15% 
Czechoslovakia $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam $2,282,173 0.86% 29 0.89% 
Denmark $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Dijibouti $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Dominican Republic $272,385 0.10% 5 0.15% 
Ecuador $820,701 0.31% 14 0.43% 
Egypt $1,581,890 0.60% 26 0.80% 
El Salvador $559,120 0.21% 8 0.25% 
Equatorial Guinea $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Eritrea $53,000 0.02% 1 0.03% 
Estonia $347,486 0.13% 13 0.40% 
Ethiopia $920,261 0.35% 25 0.77% 
Fiji $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Finland $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
France $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Gambia $47,665 0.02% 1 0.03% 
Georgia $415,091 0.16% 11 0.34% 
Germany $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Ghana $698,088 0.26% 11 0.34% 
Greece $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Grenada $50,000 0.02% 2 0.06% 
Guatemala $2,263,707 0.85% 32 0.98% 
Guinea $47,418 0.02% 2 0.06% 
Guinea Bissau $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Guyana $90,496 0.03% 1 0.03% 
Haiti $2,194,337 0.83% 17 0.52% 
Honduras $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
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Hungary $3,592,481 1.35% 34 1.05% 
Iceland $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
India $237,535 0.09% 5 0.15% 
Indonesia $1,717,095 0.65% 15 0.46% 
Iran $367,480 0.14% 7 0.22% 
Iraq $985,630 0.37% 15 0.46% 
Ireland $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Israel $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Italy $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Ivory Coast $354,736 0.13% 9 0.28% 
Jamaica $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Japan $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Jordan $1,682,475 0.63% 26 0.80% 
Kazakhstan $1,558,123 0.59% 20 0.62% 
Kenya $2,280,719 0.86% 28 0.86% 
Kosovo $459,000 0.17% 7 0.22% 
Kuwait $557,974 0.21% 8 0.25% 
Kyrgyzstan $535,892 0.20% 18 0.55% 
Latin Am./Caribbean $8,149,692 3.07% 63 1.94% 
Laos $151,175 0.06% 4 0.12% 
Latvia $480,187 0.18% 12 0.37% 
Lebanon $1,069,028 0.40% 21 0.65% 
Lesotho $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Liberia $232,100 0.09% 8 0.25% 
Libya $1,158,300 0.44% 35 1.08% 
Lithuania $2,413,698 0.91% 19 0.58% 
Luxembourg $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Macedonia $877,780 0.33% 11 0.34% 
Madagascar $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Malawi $531,066 0.20% 8 0.25% 
Malaysia $297,881 0.11% 3 0.09% 
Mali $359,200 0.14% 7 0.22% 
Mauritania $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Mauritius $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Mexico $8,524,262 3.21% 116 3.57% 
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Middle East $5,373,409 2.02% 61 1.88% 
Moldova $50,000 0.02% 2 0.06% 
Mongolia $831,761 0.31% 15 0.46% 
Montenegro $337,580 0.13% 5 0.15% 
Morocco $1,014,268 0.38% 15 0.46% 
Mozambique $258,382 0.10% 6 0.18% 
Multi-Region $10,931,451 4.11% 81 2.49% 
Namibia $639,695 0.24% 14 0.43% 
Nepal $748,663 0.28% 8 0.25% 
Netherlands $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
New Zealand $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Newly Independent Sts. $7,541,963 2.84% 63 1.94% 
Nicaragua $392,490 0.15% 5 0.15% 
Niger $4,563,006 1.72% 93 2.86% 
Nigeria $9,323,365 3.51% 96 2.95% 
Norway $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Oman $69,506 0.03% 1 0.03% 
Other  0.00%  0.00% 
Pakistan $451,723 0.17% 5 0.15% 
Panama $602,424 0.23% 8 0.25% 
Papua New Guinea $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Paraguay $1,618,286 0.61% 30 0.92% 
People's Rep. of Korea $205,506 0.08% 4 0.12% 
Peru $3,105,560 1.17% 49 1.51% 
Philippines $2,115,245 0.80% 15 0.46% 
Poland $9,166,499 3.45% 64 1.97% 
Portugal $270,938 0.10% 1 0.03% 
Qatar $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Republic of Korea $549,764 0.21% 6 0.18% 
Romania $5,833,829 2.20% 69 2.12% 
Russia $15,522,687 5.84% 221 6.80% 
Rwanda $105,041 0.04% 3 0.09% 
Saudi Arabia $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Senegal $102,000 0.04% 3 0.09% 
Serbia $805,059 0.30% 9 0.28% 
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Sierra Leone $559,956 0.21% 14 0.43% 
Singapore $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Slovakia $3,335,382 1.26% 57 1.75% 
Slovenia $309,963 0.12% 3 0.09% 
Somalia $135,400 0.05% 5 0.15% 
South Africa $6,016,424 2.26% 55 1.69% 
Spain $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Sri Lanka $801,502 0.30% 12 0.37% 
Sudan $954,150 0.36% 28 0.86% 
Swaziland $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Sweden $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Switzerland $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Syria $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Tajikistan $169,519 0.06% 6 0.18% 
Tanzania $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Thailand $1,237,117 0.47% 12 0.37% 
The Gabon $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Togo $42,978 0.02% 1 0.03% 
Trinidad $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Tunisia $50,000 0.02% 1 0.03% 
Turkey $3,258,164 1.23% 33 1.02% 
Turkmenistan $217,766 0.08% 9 0.28% 
Uganda $426,360 0.16% 11 0.34% 
Ukraine $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
United Arab Emirates $8,611,558 3.24% 92 2.83% 
United Kingdom $0 0.00% 0 0.00% 
Uruguay $97,568 0.04% 2 0.06% 
Uzbekistan $210,893 0.08% 7 0.22% 
Venezuela $3,359,989 1.26% 41 1.26% 
Yemen $1,120,419 0.42% 9 0.28% 
Zaire $2,384,982 0.90% 69 2.12% 
Zambia $449,497 0.17% 8 0.25% 
Zimbabwe $482,832 0.18% 8 0.25% 
Total $265,763,672 100.00% 3,251 100.00% 
 
 
APPENDIX C: DATA BY COUNTRY AND YEAR USED IN 
                           CHAPTER 4'S REGRESSION MODELS 
   
Table C.1: List of Data by Country and Year Used to Estimate 
                   Chapter 4's First Regression Model 
   
 Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Afghanistan None 1994-1999 
Albania 1994-1999 None 
Algeria 1994-1999 None 
Angola 1998-1999 1994-1997 
Argentina 1994-1999 None 
Armenia None 1994-1999 
Australia 1994-1999 None 
Austria 1994-1999 None 
Azerbaijan 1995-1999 1994 
Bahrain 1994-1999 None 
Bangladesh 1994-1999 None 
Belarus 1994-1999 None 
Belgium 1995-1999 1994 
Benin 1995-1999 1994 
Bhutan None 1994-1999 
Bolivia 1994-1999 None 
Bosnia 1997-1998 1994-1996, 1999 
Botswana 1994-1999 None 
Brazil 1994-1999 None 
Bulgaria 1994-1999 None 
Burkina Faso 1995-1999 1994 
Burma None 1994-1999 
Burundi 1996-1999 1994-1995 
Cambodia 1996-1999 1994-1995 
Cameroon 1994-1999 None 
Canada 1994-1999 None 
Central African Rep. None 1994-1999 
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Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Chad 1996-1999 1994-1995 
Chile 1994-1999 None 
China 1994-1999 None 
Colombia 1994-1999 None 
Comoros None 1994-1999 
Congo 1994-1999 None 
Costa Rica 1994-1999 None 
Croatia 1995-1998 1994, 1999 
Cuba None 1994-1999 
Cyprus 1995-1999 1994 
Czech Repubic 1994-1999 None 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 1994-1999 None 
Denmark 1995-1999 1994 
Dijibouti 1996-1999 1994-1995 
Dominican Rep. 1994-1999 None 
Ecuador 1994-1999 None 
Egypt 1994-1999 None 
El Salvador 1994-1999 None 
Equ. Guinea 1998-1999 1994-1997 
Eritrea None 1994-1997 
Estonia 1994-1999 None 
Ethiopia 1995-1999 1994 
Fiji 1994-1999 None 
Finland 1995-1999 1994 
France 1994-1999 None 
Gambia 1996-1999 1994-1995 
Georgia 1995-1999 1994 
Germany 1994-1999 None 
Ghana 1994-1999 None 
Greece 1994-1999 None 
Grenada None 1994-1999 
Guatemala 1999 1994-1998 
Guinea 1994-1999 None 
  (table continued) 
   
 274
 Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Guinea Bissau None 1994-1999 
Guyana 1994-1999 None 
Haiti 1994-1998 1999 
Honduras 1994-1999 None 
Hungary 1994-1999 None 
Iceland 1996-1999 1994-1995 
India 1994-1999 None 
Indonesia 1994-1999 None 
Iran 1995-1999 1994 
Iraq None 1994-1999 
Ireland 1994-1999 None 
Israel 1994-1999 None 
Italy 1994-1999 None 
Ivory Coast 1994-1998 1999 
Jamaica 1994-1999 None 
Japan 1994-1999 None 
Jordan 1994-1999 None 
Kazakhstan 1999 1994-1998 
Kenya 1994-1999 None 
Kosovo None 1994-1999 
Kuwait 1995-1999 1994 
Kyrgyzstan 1997-1999 1994-1996 
Laos 1996-1999 1994-1995 
Latvia 1995-1999 1994 
Lebanon 1995-1998 1994, 1999 
Lesotho 1995-1997 1994, 1998-1999 
Liberia None 1994-1999 
Libya None 1994-1999 
Lithuania 1995-1999 1994 
Luxembourg 1995-1999 1994 
Macedonia None 1994-1999 
Madagascar 1994-1999 None 
Malawi 1994-1999 None 
Malaysia 1994-1999 None 
  (table continued) 
 275
 Sufficient Insufficient 
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Mauritania 1995-1999 1994 
Mauritius 1998-1999 1994-1997 
Mexico 1994-1999 None 
Moldova 1994-1999 None 
Mongolia 1994-1999 None 
Montenegro None 1994-1999 
Morocco 1994-1999 None 
Mozambique 1999 1994-1998 
Namibia 1999 1994-1998 
Nepal 1995-1999 1994 
Netherlands 1995-1999 1994 
New Zealand 1995-1999 1994 
Nicaragua 1994-1999 None 
Niger 1995-1999 1994 
Nigeria 1994-1999 None 
Norway 1995-1999 1994 
Oman 1994-1999 None 
Pakistan 1994-1999 None 
Panama 1994-1999 None 
Papua New Guinea 1995-1999 1994 
Paraguay 1994-1999 None 
People's Rep. of Korea None 1994-1999 
Peru 1994-1999 None 
Philippines 1994-1999 None 
Poland 1994-1999 None 
Portugal 1994-1999 None 
Qatar 1998-1999 1994-1997 
Rep. Of Korea 1994-1999 None 
Romania 1994-1999 None 
Russia 1994-1999 None 
Rwanda 1996-1999 1994-1995 
Saudi Arabia 1995-1999 1994 
Senegal 1995-1999 1994 
Serbia None 1994-1999 
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 Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Singapore 1994-1999 None 
Slovakia 1994-1999 None 
Slovenia 1994-1999 None 
Somalia None 1994-1999 
South Africa 1994-1999 None 
Spain 1994-1999 None 
Sri Lanka 1994-1999 None 
Sudan 1994-1999 None 
Swaziland 1994-1999 None 
Sweden 1994-1999 None 
Switzerland 1995-1999 1994 
Syria 1995-1999 1994 
Tajikistan 1997-1999 1994-1996 
Tanzania 1994-1999 None 
Thailand 1994-1999 None 
The Gabon 1994-1999 None 
Togo 1998-1999 1994-1997 
Trinidad 1995-1999 1994 
Tunisia 1994-1999 None 
Turkey 1994-1999 None 
Turkmenistan 1997-1999 1994-1996 
Uganda 1994-1999 None 
Ukraine 1994-1999 None 
United Arab Em. 1995-1999 1994 
United Kingdom 1994-1999 None 
Uruguay 1994-1999 None 
Uzbekistan 1997-1999 1994-1996 
Venezuela 1994-1999 None 
Yemen 1994-1999 None 
Zaire 1997-1998 1994-1996 
Zambia 1994-1999 None 
Zimbabwe 1994-1999 None 
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Table C.2: List of Data by Country and Year Used to Estimate 
                   Chapter 4's Second Regression Model 
   
 Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Afghanistan None 1990-1999 
Albania 1990-1999 None 
Algeria 1990-1999 None 
Angola 1990, 1998-1999 1991-1997 
Argentina 1990-1999 None 
Armenia 1991-1999 1990 
Australia 1990-1999 None 
Austria 1990-1999 None 
Azerbaijan 1991-1999 1990 
Bahrain 1990-1999 None 
Bangladesh 1990-1999 None 
Belarus 1991-1999 1990 
Belgium 1990-1999 None 
Benin 1991-1999 1990 
Bhutan 1990-1999 None 
Bolivia 1991-1999 1990 
Bosnia 1996-1998 1990-1995, 1999 
Botswana 1990-1999 None 
Brazil 1990-1999 None 
Bulgaria 1990-1999 None 
Burkina Faso 1990-1999 None 
Burma None 1990-1999 
Burundi 1990-1991, 1996-1999 1992-1995 
Cambodia 1990, 1993-1999 1991-1992 
Cameroon 1990-1999 None 
Canada 1990-1999 None 
Central African Rep. 1990-1999 None 
Chad 1990-1999 None 
Chile 1990-1999 None 
China 1990-1999 None 
  (table continued) 
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 Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Congo 1990, 1992-1999 1991 
Costa Rica 1990-1999 None 
Croatia 1991-1998 1999 
Cuba None 1990-1999 
Cyprus 1990-1999 None 
Czech Repubic 1993-1999 None 
Czechoslovakia 1992 1990-1991 
Dem. Rep. Vietnam 1990-1999 None 
Denmark 1990-1999 None 
Dijibouti 1990-1999 None 
Dominican Rep. 1990-1999 None 
Ecuador 1990-1999 None 
Egypt 1990-1999 None 
El Salvador 1990-1999 None 
Equ. Guinea 1990-1999 None 
Eritrea 1991-1999 1990 
Estonia 1991-1999 1990 
Ethiopia 1990, 1995-1999 1991-1994 
Fiji 1990-1999 None 
Finland 1990-1999 None 
France 1990-1999 None 
Gambia 1990-1999 None 
Georgia 1991-1999 1990 
Germany 1990-1999 None 
Ghana 1990, 1992-1999 1991 
Greece 1990-1999 None 
Grenada None 1990-1999 
Guatemala 1990-1999 None 
Guinea 1990-1999 None 
Guinea Bissau 1990-1997 1998-1999 
Guyana 1990-1999 None 
Haiti 1991-1998 1990 
Honduras 1990-1999 None 
Hungary 1990-1999 None 
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 279
 Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Iceland 1990-1993, 1996-1999 1994-1995 
India 1990-1999 None 
Indonesia 1990-1999 None 
Iran 1990-1999 None 
Iraq None 1990-1999 
Ireland 1990-1999 None 
Israel 1990-1999 None 
Italy 1990-1999 None 
Ivory Coast 1990-1998 1999 
Jamaica 1990-1999 None 
Japan 1990-1999 None 
Jordan 1990-1999 None 
Kazakhstan 1991-1999 1990 
Kenya 1990-1999 None 
Kosovo None 1990-1999 
Kuwait 1991-1999 1990 
Kyrgyzstan 1991-1999 1990 
Laos 1990-1999 None 
Latvia 1991-1999 1990 
Lebanon 1992-1998 1990-1991 
Lesotho 1990-1997 1998-1999 
Liberia None 1990-1999 
Libya None 1990-1999 
Lithuania 1991-1999 1990 
Luxembourg 1990-1999 None 
Macedonia 1991-1999 1990 
Madagascar 1990-1999 None 
Malawi 1990-1999 None 
Malaysia 1990-1999 None 
Mali 1990, 1992-1999 1991 
Mauritania 1990-1999 None 
Mauritius 1990-1993, 1997-1999 1994-1996 
Mexico 1990-1999 None 
Moldova 1991-1999 1990 
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 Sufficient Insufficient 
Country Data Data 
Mongolia 1990-1999 None 
Montenegro None 1990-1999 
Morocco 1990-1999 None 
Mozambique 1999 1990-1998 
Namibia 1999 1990-1998 
Nepal 1990-1999 None 
Netherlands 1990-1999 None 
New Zealand 1990-1999 None 
Nicaragua 1990-1999 None 
Niger 1990, 1993-1999 1991-1992 
Nigeria 1990-1999 None 
Norway 1990-1999 None 
Oman 1990-1999 None 
Pakistan 1990-1999 None 
Panama 1990-1999 None 
Papua New Guinea 1990-1993, 1995-1999 1994 
Paraguay 1990-1999 None 
People's Rep. of Korea None 1990-1999 
Peru 1990-1999 None 
Philippines 1990-1999 None 
Poland 1990-1999 None 
Portugal 1990-1999 None 
Qatar 1990-1999 None 
Rep. Of Korea 1990-1999 None 
Romania 1990-1999 None 
Russia 1990-1999 None 
Rwanda 1990, 1995-1999 1991-1994 
Saudi Arabia 1990-1999 None 
Senegal 1990-1999 None 
Serbia None 1990-1999 
Sierra Leone 1990-1998 1999 
Singapore 1990-1999 None 
Slovakia 1993-1999 1990-1992 
  (table continued) 




Country Data Data 
Slovenia 1991-1999 1990 
Somalia None 1990-1999 
South Africa 1990-1992, 1994-1999 1993 
Spain 1990-1999 None 
Sri Lanka 1990-1999 None 
Sudan 1990-1999 None 
Swaziland 1990-1999 None 
Sweden 1990-1999 None 
Switzerland 1990-1999 1994 
Syria 1990-1999 1994 
Tajikistan 1991-1999 1990 
Tanzania 1990-1999 None 
Thailand 1990-1999 None 
The Gabon 1991-1999 None 
Togo 1990, 1993-1999 1991-1992 
Trinidad 1990-1999 None 
Tunisia 1990-1999 None 
Turkey 1990-1999 None 
Turkmenistan 1991-1999 1990 
Uganda 1990-1999 None 
Ukraine 1991-1999 1990 
United Arab Em. 1990-1999 None 
United Kingdom 1990-1999 None 
Uruguay 1990-1999 None 
Uzbekistan 1991-1999 1990 
Venezuela 1990-1999 None 
Yemen 1994-1999 1990-1993 
Zaire 1990-1992, 1997-1998 1993-1996 
Zambia 1990-1999 None 
Zimbabwe 1990-1999 None 
 
 
APPENDIX D: CORRELATION TABLES FOR VARIABLES 
                                       USED IN CHAPTER 4, 1990-1999 
 
Table D.1: 1990 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4    




































































NED Money 1           
Obs 155           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.44 1          
Obs 155 155          
Sig None           
Democracy 0.13 0.15 1         
Obs 135 135 135         
Sig None 0.05          
Ec. Freedom N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Obs N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Sig N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Military Pres. 0.03 0.03 0.14 n/a 1       
Obs 151 151 135 n/a 151       
Sig None 0.10 0.10 n/a        
Size of Ec. 0.04 0.08 0.14 n/a 0.87 1      
Obs 143 143 129 n/a 143 143      
Sig None 0.10 None n/a 0.01       
Population 0.08 0.16 -0.04 n/a 0.60 0.71 1     
Obs 151 151 135 n/a 151 143 151     
Sig None 0.05 None n/a 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.12 -0.27 0.56 n/a 0.19 0.20 -0.07 1    
Obs 143 143 129 n/a 143 143 143 143    
Sig None 0.01 0.01 n/a 0.05 0.05 None     
Trade Open -0.03 0.04 0.07 n/a -0.04 -0.05 -0.05 0.10 1   
Obs 143 143 129 n/a 143 143 143 143 143   
Sig None None None n/a None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.08 0.14 -0.04 n/a 0.55 0.65 0.96 -0.07 -0.03 1  
Obs 152 152 135 n/a 151 143 151 143 143 152  
Sig None 0.10 None n/a 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.24 0.33 0.62 n/a 0.30 0.31 0.19 0.31 0.19 0.19 1 
Obs 152 152 135 n/a 151 143 151 143 143 143 152 
Sig 0.01 0.01 0.01 n/a 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.05  
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Table D.2: 1991 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4 



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 166           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.53 1          
Obs 166 166          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy 0.06 -0.04 1         
Obs 145 145 145         
Sig None None          
Ec. Freedom N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Obs N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Sig N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Military Pres. 0.16 0.00 0.13 n/a 1       
Obs 165 165 145 n/a 145       
Sig 0.05 0.05 None n/a        
Size of Ec. 0.25 0.04 0.11 n/a 0.87 1      
Obs 157 157 139 n/a 157 157      
Sig 0.01 None None n/a 0.01       
Population 0.34 0.18 -0.06 n/a 0.54 0.71 1     
Obs 165 165 145 n/a 165 157 165     
Sig 0.01 0.05 None n/a 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.16 -0.31 0.45 n/a 0.20 0.20 -0.07 1    
Obs 157 157 139 n/a 157 157 157 157    
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01 n/a 0.05 0.05 None     
Trade Open -0.09 -0.05 0.07 n/a -0.04 -0.05 -0.04 0.09 1   
Obs 157 157 139 n/a 157 157 157 157 157   
Sig None None None n/a None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.27 0.15 -0.07 n/a 0.44 0.55 0.93 -0.06 -0.02 1  
Obs 166 166 145 n/a 165 157 165 157 157 166  
Sig 0.01 0.10 None n/a 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.19 0.16 0.52 n/a 0.30 0.31 0.19 0.31 0.22 0.18 1 
Obs 166 166 145 n/a 165 157 165 157 157 166 166 
Sig 0.05 0.05 0.01 n/a 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05  
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Table D.3: 1992 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4 



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 165           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.41 1          
Obs 165 165          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy 0.03 -0.05 1         
Obs 150 150 150         
Sig None None          
Ec. Freedom N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Obs N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Sig N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Military Pres. 0.15 0.02 0.13 n/a 1       
Obs 164 164 150 n/a 164       
Sig 0.10 None None n/a        
Size of Ec. 0.18 0.05 0.11 n/a 0.91 1      
Obs 156 156 145 n/a 156 156      
Sig 0.05 None None n/a 0.01       
Population 0.27 0.19 -0.06 n/a 0.61 0.73 1     
Obs 164 164 150 n/a 164 156 164     
Sig 0.01 0.05 None n/a 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.13 -0.33 0.45 n/a 0.21 0.21 -0.06 1    
Obs 156 156 145 n/a 156 156 156 156    
Sig None 0.01 0.01 n/a 0.01 None None     
Trade Open -0.05 -0.07 0.07 n/a -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 1   
Obs 156 156 145 n/a 156 156 156 156 156   
Sig None None None n/a None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.24 0.16 -0.07 n/a 0.52 0.61 0.94 -0.07 -0.02 1  
Obs 165 165 150 n/a 164 156 164 156 156 165  
Sig 0.01 0.05 None n/a 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.12 0.16 0.49 n/a 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.32 0.21 0.18 1 
Obs 165 165 150 n/a 164 156 164 156 156 165 165






Table D.4: 1993 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4    



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 169           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.47 1          
Obs 169 169          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy -0.06 -0.15 1         
Obs 152 152 152         
Sig None 0.10          
Ec. Freedom N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Obs N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Sig N/a n/a n/a n/a        
Military Pres. 0.23 0.01 0.11 n/a 1       
Obs 166 166 152 n/a 166       
Sig 0.01 None None n/a        
Size of Ec. 0.28 0.04 0.10 n/a 0.94 1      
Obs 157 157 147 n/a 157 157      
Sig 0.01 None None n/a 0.01       
Population 0.42 0.17 -0.07 n/a 0.66 0.71 1     
Obs 166 166 152 n/a 166 157 166     
Sig 0.01 0.05 None n/a 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.16 -0.35 0.44 n/a -0.04 -0.04 0.09 1    
Obs 157 157 147 n/a 157 157 157 157    
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01 n/a 0.05 0.01 None     
Trade Open -0.10 -0.22 0.08 n/a -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 1   
Obs 157 157 147 n/a 157 157 157 157 157   
Sig None None None n/a None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.34 0.15 -0.07 n/a 0.56 0.59 0.95 -0.07 -0.03 1  
Obs 166 166 152 n/a 166 157 166 157 157 166  
Sig 0.01 0.10 None n/a 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.08 -0.01 0.49 n/a 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.32 0.23 0.18 1 
Obs 166 166 152 n/a 166 157 166 157 157 166 166 
Sig None 0.10 0.01 n/a 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05  
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Table D.5: 1994 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4 



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 168           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.45 1          
Obs 168 168          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy -0.08 -0.15 1         
Obs 154 154 154         
Sig None 0.10          
Ec. Freedom 0.25 0.23 -0.4 1        
Obs 103 103 100 103        
Sig 0.05 0.05 0.01         
Military Pres. 0.24 0.01 0.10 -0.19 1       
Obs 165 165 154 103 165       
Sig 0.01 0.10 None 0.10        
Size of Ec. 0.26 -0.00 0.10 -0.19 0.95 1      
Obs 157 157 149 101 157 157      
Sig 0.01 0.05 None 0.10 0.01       
Population 0.45 0.13 -0.07 0.09 0.68 0.71 1     
Obs 165 165 154 103 165 157 165     
Sig 0.01 0.10 None None 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.19 -0.4 0.43 -0.69 0.17 0.21 -0.07 1    
Obs 157 157 149 101 157 157 157 157    
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 None     
Trade Open -0.06 -0.22 0.1 -0.08 -0.03 -0.04 -0.04 0.09 1   
Obs 157 157 149 101 157 157 157 157 157   
Sig None 0.01 None None None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.39 0.14 -0.06 0.08 0.60 0.61 0.93 -0.07 -0.04 1  
Obs 165 165 154 103 165 157 165 157 157 165  
Sig 0.10 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 None None   
All. Partner 0.14 -0.01 0.51 -0.32 0.33 0.31 0.19 0.32 0.25 0.16 1 
Obs 165 165 154 103 165 157 165 157 157 165 165





   
 
Table D.6: 1995 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4 



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 169           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.46 1          
Obs 169 169          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy -0.12 -0.22 1         
Obs 155 155 155         
Sig None 0.01          
Ec. Freedom 0.23 0.37 -0.51 1        
Obs 138 138 134 138        
Sig 0.01 0.01 0.01         
Military Pres. 0.31 -0.01 0.10 -0.10 1       
Obs 166 166 155 138 166       
Sig 0.01 None None None        
Size of Ec. 0.33 -0.01 0.10 -0.09 0.95 1      
Obs 157 157 150 132 157 157      
Sig 0.01 None None None 0.01       
Population 0.53 0.13 -0.06 0.08 0.70 0.71 1     
Obs 166 166 155 138 166 157 166     
Sig 0.01 0.10 None None 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.20 -0.44 0.44 -0.68 0.18 0.21 -0.07 1    
Obs 157 157 150 132 157 157 157 157    
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 None     
Trade Open -0.04 -0.08 0.10 -0.12 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.07 1   
Obs 157 157 150 132 157 157 157 157 157   
Sig None None None None None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.44 0.13 -0.06 0.07 0.59 0.59 0.95 -0.07 -0.03 1  
Obs 166 166 155 138 166 157 166 157 157 166  
Sig 0.01 0.10 None None 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.13 -0.06 0.52 -0.37 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.33 0.26 0.18 1 
Obs 166 166 155 138 166 157 166 157 157 166 166






Table D.7: 1996 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4     



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 168           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.44 1          
Obs 168 168          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy -0.13 -0.22 1         
Obs 159 159 159         
Sig 0.10 0.01          
Ec. Freedom 0.22 0.42 -0.53 1        
Obs 146 146 141 146        
Sig 0.01 0.01 0.01         
Military Pres. 0.34 0.05 0.08 -0.06 1       
Obs 165 165 159 146 165       
Sig 0.01 None None None        
Size of Ec. 0.32 0.02 0.10 -0.08 0.93 1      
Obs 157 157 153 140 157 157      
Sig 0.01 None None None 0.01       
Population 0.50 0.15 -0.06 0.08 0.79 0.71 1     
Obs 165 165 159 146 165 157 165     
Sig 0.01 0.10 None None 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.18 -0.40 0.44 -0.67 0.12 0.19 -0.07 1    
Obs 157 157 153 140 157 157 157 157    
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 None 0.05 None     
Trade Open -0.04 -0.11 0.12 -0.14 -0.04 -0.04 -0.04 0.08 1   
Obs 157 157 153 140 157 157 157 157 157   
Sig None None None 0.10 None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.35 0.14 -0.06 0.07 0.67 0.58 0.94 -0.07 -0.03 1  
Obs 165 165 159 146 165 157 165 157 157 165  
Sig 0.01 0.10 None None 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.07 -0.08 0.55 -0.38 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.33 0.26 0.17 1 
Obs 165 165 159 146 165 157 165 157 157 165 165 
Sig 0.10 None 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.05  
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Table D.8: 1997 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4 



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 169           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.51 1          
Obs 169 169          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy -0.15 -0.25 1         
Obs 161 161 161         
Sig 0.10 0.01          
Ec. Freedom 0.18 0.34 -0.59 1        
Obs 151 151 147 151        
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01         
Military Pres. 0.13 0.04 0.11 -0.09 1       
Obs 166 166 161 151 166       
Sig 0.10 None None None        
Size of Ec. 0.18 0.04 0.11 -0.09 0.95 1      
Obs 157 157 154 145 157 157      
Sig 0.05 None None None 0.01       
Population 0.33 0.16 -0.05 0.06 0.73 0.73 1     
Obs 166 166 161 151 166 157 166     
Sig 0.01 0.05 None None 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.19 -0.38 0.46 -0.66 0.15 0.18 -0.07 1    
Obs 157 157 154 145 157 157 157 157    
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.05 None     
Trade Open -0.03 -0.08 0.15 -0.17 -0.04 -0.03 -0.03 0.11 1   
Obs 157 157 154 145 157 157 157 157 157   
Sig None None 0.10 0.05 None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.25 0.16 -0.05 0.05 0.62 0.62 0.95 -0.07 -0.02 1  
Obs 166 166 161 151 166 157 166 157 157 166  
Sig 0.01 0.05 None None 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.01 -0.07 0.56 -0.4 0.32 0.31 0.19 0.34 0.29 0.18 1 
Obs 166 166 161 151 166 157 166 157 157 166 166





   
 
Table D.9: 1998 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4 



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 169           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.44 1          
Obs 169 169          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy -0.12 -0.26 1         
Obs 159 159 159         
Sig None 0.01          
Ec. Freedom 0.16 0.45 -0.61 1        
Obs 156 156 150 156        
Sig 0.10 0.01 0.01         
Military Pres. 0.18 0.06 0.09 -0.07 1       
Obs 166 166 159 156 166       
Sig 0.05 None None None        
Size of Ec. 0.19 0.03 0.11 -0.09 0.94 1      
Obs 157 157 152 150 157 157      
Sig 0.05 None None None 0.01       
Population 0.38 0.16 -0.06 0.07 0.78 0.72 1     
Obs 166 166 159 156 166 157 166     
Sig 0.01 0.05 None None 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.06 -0.14 -0.02 -0.13 0.01 0.04 -0.03 1    
Obs 157 157 152 150 157 157 157 157    
Sig 0.05 0.10 None None 0.10 None None     
Trade Open -0.04 -0.09 0.14 -0.19 -0.03 -0.02 -0.03 -0.03 1   
Obs 157 157 152 150 157 157 157 157 157   
Sig None None 0.10 0.05 None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.31 0.15 -0.05 0.06 0.69 0.62 0.94 -0.02 -0.03 1  
Obs 166 166 159 156 166 157 166 157 157 166  
Sig 0.01 0.05 None None 0.01 0.01 0.01 None None   
All. Partner 0.01 -0.12 0.55 -0.42 0.31 0.31 0.19 0.01 0.29 0.17 1 
Obs 166 166 159 156 166 157 166 157 157 166 166







Table D.10: 1999 Correlation Table for Variables Used in Chapter 4    



































































NED Money 1           
Obs 170           
Sig            
NED Recip. 0.48 1          
Obs 170 170          
Sig 0.01           
Democracy -0.1 -0.26 1         
Obs 155 155 155         
Sig None 0.01          
Ec. Freedom 0.19 0.35 -0.61 1        
Obs 158 158 147 158        
Sig 0.05 0.01 0.01         
Military Pres. -0.03 -0.09 0.11 -0.17 1       
Obs 170 170 155 158 170       
Sig None None None 0.05        
Size of Ec. -0.01 -0.08 0.11 -0.18 0.99 1      
Obs 157 157 147 152 157 157      
Sig None None None 0.05 0.01       
Population 0.16 -0.02 0.06 -0.02 0.66 0.64 1     
Obs 169 169 155 158 169 157 169     
Sig 0.05 None None None 0.01 0.01      
Ec. Dev. -0.07 -0.15 -0.02 -0.13 0.01 0.02 -0.02 1    
Obs 157 157 147 152 157 157 157 157    
Sig None 0.10 None 0.10 None None None     
Trade Open -0.05 -0.12 -0.11 -0.16 -0.03 -0.03 -0.03 -0.04 1   
Obs 158 158 147 152 158 157 158 157 158   
Sig None None None 0.05 None None None None    
US For. Aid 0.14 0.07 0.03 0.05 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.03 1  
Obs 160 160 149 152 160 151 160 151 151 160  
Sig 0.10 None None None None None 0.10 None None   
All. Partner 0.03 -0.15 0.51 -0.44 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.01 0.27 -0.09 1 
Obs 170 170 155 158 170 157 169 157 158 160 170 
Sig None 0.10 0.01 0.01 0.05 0.05 0.01 None 0.01 None  
 
       APPENDIX E: DATA BY COUNTRY USED TO ESTIMATE   
                                 CHAPTER 5'S REGRESSION MODELS 
   
     Table E.1: List of Data by Country Used to Estimate Chapter 5's 
                        First Regression Model  
   
  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Afghanistan No 
 Albania Yes 
 Algeria Yes 
 Angola Yes 
 Argentina Yes 
 Armenia No 
 Australia Yes 
 Austria Yes 
 Azerbaijan No 
 Bahrain Yes 
 Bangladesh Yes 
 Belarus No 
 Belgium Yes 
 Benin No 
 Bhutan No 
 Bolivia Yes 
 Bosnia No 
 Botswana Yes 
 Brazil Yes 
 Bulgaria Yes 
 Burkina Faso Yes 
 Burma No 
 Burundi Yes 
 Cambodia No 
 Cameroon Yes 
 Canada Yes 
 Central African Rep. Yes 
  (table continued) 
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Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Chad Yes 
 Chile Yes 
 China Yes 
 Colombia Yes 
 Comoros Yes 
 Congo Yes 
 Costa Rica Yes 
 Croatia No 
 Cuba No 
 Cyprus Yes 
 Czech Repubic Yes 
 Czechoslovakia No 
 Dem. Rep. Vietnam No 
 Denmark Yes 
 Dijibouti Yes 
 Dominican Rep. Yes 
 Ecuador Yes 
 Egypt Yes 
 El Salvador Yes 
 Equ. Guinea Yes 
 Eritrea No 
 Estonia No 
 Ethiopia No 
 Fiji Yes 
 Finland No 
 France Yes 
 Gambia Yes 
 Georgia Yes 
 Germany No 
 Ghana No 
 Greece Yes 
 Grenada Yes 
 Guatemala Yes 
 Guinea No 
  (table continued) 
 294
  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Guyana Yes 
 Haiti Yes 
 Honduras Yes 
 Hungary No 
 Iceland Yes 
 India Yes 
 Indonesia Yes 
 Iran Yes 
 Iraq Yes 
 Ireland Yes 
 Israel No 
 Italy Yes 
 Ivory Coast Yes 
 Jamaica Yes 
 Japan Yes 
 Jordan Yes 
 Kazakhstan Yes 
 Kenya Yes 
 Kosovo No 
 Kuwait Yes 
 Kyrgyzstan No 
 Laos No 
 Latvia Yes 
 Lebanon Yes 
 Lesotho No 
 Liberia No 
 Libya Yes 
 Lithuania No 
 Luxembourg No 
 Macedonia No 
 Madagascar Yes 
 Malawi No 
 Malaysia Yes 
 Mali Yes 
  (table continued) 
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  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Mauritania Yes 
 Mauritius Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
 Moldova Yes 
 Mongolia Yes 
 Montenegro No 
 Morocco Yes 
 Mozambique No 
 Namibia No 
 Nepal Yes 
 Netherlands No 
 New Zealand Yes 
 Nicaragua Yes 
 Niger Yes 
 Nigeria Yes 
 Norway Yes 
 Oman No 
 Pakistan Yes 
 Panama Yes 
 Papua New Guinea Yes 
 Paraguay Yes 
 People's Rep. of Korea Yes 
 Peru Yes 
 Philippines No 
 Poland Yes 
 Portugal Yes 
 Qatar Yes 
 Rep. of Korea Yes 
 Romania Yes 
 Russia Yes 
 Rwanda Yes 
 Saudi Arabia Yes 
 Senegal No 
 Serbia Yes 
  (table continued) 
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  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Sierra Leone Yes 
 Singapore No 
 Slovakia Yes 
 Slovenia Yes 
 Somalia Yes 
 South Africa Yes 
 Spain No 
 Sri Lanka Yes 
 Sudan Yes 
 Swaziland Yes 
 Sweden Yes 
 Switzerland Yes 
 Syria Yes 
 Tajikistan Yes 
 Tanzania Yes 
 Thailand No 
 The Gabon Yes 
 Togo Yes 
 Trinidad No 
 Tunisia No 
 Turkey Yes 
 Turkmenistan Yes 
 Uganda Yes 
 Ukraine Yes 
 United Arab Em. Yes 
 United Kingdom Yes 
 Uruguay Yes 
 Uzbekistan Yes 
 Venezuela Yes 
 Yemen Yes 
 Zaire Yes 
 Zambia No 
 Zimbabwe Yes 
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Table E.2: List of Data by Country Used to Estimate Chapter 5's Second 
                   Regression Model  
   
  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Afghanistan No 
 Albania Yes 
 Algeria Yes 
 Angola Yes 
 Argentina Yes 
 Armenia No 
 Australia Yes 
 Austria Yes 
 Azerbaijan Yes 
 Bahrain Yes 
 Bangladesh Yes 
 Belarus Yes 
 Belgium Yes 
 Benin Yes 
 Bhutan No 
 Bolivia Yes 
 Bosnia Yes 
 Botswana Yes 
 Brazil Yes 
 Bulgaria Yes 
 Burkina Faso Yes 
 Burma No 
 Burundi Yes 
 Cambodia Yes 
 Cameroon Yes 
 Canada Yes 
 Central African Rep. No 








 Country Data 
 Chad Yes 
 Chile Yes 
 China Yes 
 Colombia Yes 
 Comoros No 
 Congo Yes 
 Costa Rica Yes 
 Croatia Yes 
 Cuba No 
 Cyprus Yes 
 Czech Repubic Yes 
 Dem. Rep. Vietnam Yes 
 Denmark Yes 
 Dijibouti Yes 
 Dominican Rep. Yes 
 Ecuador Yes 
 Egypt Yes 
 El Salvador Yes 
 Equ. Guinea Yes 
 Eritrea No 
 Estonia Yes 
 Ethiopia Yes 
 Fiji Yes 
 Finland Yes 
 France Yes 
 Gambia Yes 
 Georgia Yes 
 Germany Yes 
 Ghana Yes 
 Greece Yes 
 Grenada No 
 Guatemala No 
 Guinea Yes 
 Guinea Bissau Yes 
  (table continued) 
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  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Guyana Yes 
 Haiti Yes 
 Honduras Yes 
 Hungary Yes 
 Iceland Yes 
 India Yes 
 Indonesia Yes 
 Iran Yes 
 Iraq No 
 Ireland Yes 
 Israel Yes 
 Italy Yes 
 Ivory Coast Yes 
 Jamaica Yes 
 Japan Yes 
 Jordan Yes 
 Kazakhstan No 
 Kenya Yes 
 Kosovo No 
 Kuwait Yes 
 Kyrgyzstan Yes 
 Laos Yes 
 Latvia Yes 
 Lebanon Yes 
 Lesotho Yes 
 Liberia No 
 Libya No 
 Lithuania Yes 
 Luxembourg Yes 
 Macedonia No 
 Madagascar Yes 
 Malawi Yes 
 Malaysia Yes 
 Mali Yes 
  (table continued) 
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  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Mauritania Yes 
 Mauritius Yes 
 Mexico Yes 
 Moldova Yes 
 Mongolia Yes 
 Montenegro No 
 Morocco Yes 
 Mozambique Yes 
 Namibia Yes 
 Nepal Yes 
 Netherlands Yes 
 New Zealand Yes 
 Nicaragua Yes 
 Niger Yes 
 Nigeria Yes 
 Norway Yes 
 Oman Yes 
 Pakistan Yes 
 Panama Yes 
 Papua New Guinea Yes 
 Paraguay Yes 
 People's Rep. of Korea No 
 Peru Yes 
 Philippines Yes 
 Poland Yes 
 Portugal Yes 
 Qatar Yes 
 Rep. of Korea Yes 
 Romania Yes 
 Russia Yes 
 Rwanda Yes 
 Saudi Arabia Yes 
 Senegal Yes 
 Serbia No 
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  Sufficient 
 Country Data 
 Sierra Leone Yes 
 Singapore Yes 
 Slovakia Yes 
 Slovenia Yes 
 Somalia No 
 South Africa Yes 
 Spain Yes 
 Sri Lanka Yes 
 Sudan Yes 
 Swaziland Yes 
 Sweden Yes 
 Switzerland Yes 
 Syria Yes 
 Tajikistan Yes 
 Tanzania Yes 
 Thailand Yes 
 The Gabon Yes 
 Togo Yes 
 Trinidad Yes 
 Tunisia Yes 
 Turkey Yes 
 Turkmenistan Yes 
 Uganda Yes 
 Ukraine Yes 
 United Arab Em. Yes 
 United Kingdom Yes 
 Uruguay Yes 
 Uzbekistan Yes 
 Venezuela Yes 
 Yemen Yes 
 Zaire Yes 
 Zambia Yes 
 Zimbabwe Yes 
 
 
APPENDIX F: CORRELATION TABLE FOR VARIABLES 
                                        USED IN CHAPTER 5, 1990-1999 
 
          















































Dem. Change 1   
Obs 125   
Sig    
NED Money -0.12 1   
Obs 125 125   
Sig None   
Ec. Size Ch. -0.05 0.09 1   
Obs 125 125 125   
Sig None None   
Pop. Change -0.02 -0.02 0.17 1   
Obs 125 125 125 125   
Sig None None 0.10   
Ec. Dev. Ch. -0.06 0.07 0.90 -0.04 1   
Obs 125 125 125 125 125   
Sig None None 0.01 None   
Tr. Open Ch. 0.01 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 1   
Obs 125 125 125 125 125 125   
Sig None None None None None   
For. Aid Ch. 0.05 -0.06 -0.02 -0.04 -0.02 0.05 1   
Obs 125 125 125 125 125 125 125   
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